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I INTRODUCTION
Every Who down in Whoville liked parody a lot;
But the Ninth Circuit Grinches, with jurisdiction over
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Whoville, did not!
They were hostile to parody, whatever the season.
Please don't ask why; no one quite knows the reason.
It may have been that their ties were too tight,
Or perhaps their heads weren't screwed on just right.
But I think that the most likely reason of all
Was that their sense of humor was two sizes too small.
For nine months in 1995, media coverage of the O.J. Simpson double-
murder trial transfixed the nation. The trial also gave rise to an astonish-
ing number of books examining every possible aspect of the case, from
biographies of the various personalities involved to post-hoc explanations
of the verdict and its impact on or reflection of society. By one estimate,
more than 60 volumes have already been published concerning the Simp-
son case.1
Given the amount of information available about the Simpson case,
the loss of one additional book to a court injunction may seem like a rela-
tively minor matter. But this one book was like no other: it was a satirical
account of the O.J. Simpson trial written in the style of Dr. Seuss. Entitled
The Cat NOT in the Hat! and labeled "A Parody By Dr. Juice," the book
recounted the events of the trial in simple and repetitive rhyming phrases
like those used in The Cat in the Hat and 46 other children's books written
by Theodor S. Geisel under the pseudonym Dr. Seuss. The Cat NOT in
the Hat! was illustrated with thirteen depictions of a cartoon caricature of
O.J. Simpson, also in the style of Dr. Seuss, wearing the Cat's distinctive
red-and-white stovepipe hat.
Based on a pre-publication advertisement, Dr. Seuss Enterprises filed
suit against the authors and publishers of the parody, claiming that it vio-
lated the Copyright Act, the Lanham Act, the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act, and California Unfair Competition law by using copyrighted expres-
sion and registered and unregistered trademarks belonging to the plain-
tiff.2 The District Court entered a preliminary injunction against the
1 Josh Getlin, Simpson Civil Case, Los ANGELES TIMEs, Feb. 11, 1997, at A16.
A search for the words "O.J. Simpson" in the Internet bookstore ama-
zon.com revealed 92 titles published after 1994. Amazon.com (visited Aug.
24, 1998) <http://www.amazon.com/ exec/obidos/subst/home/home.html>.
Of those, 19 were videotapes or were books unrelated to the trial, and 23
were duplicate titles (paperback, audio and large-print editions), leaving a
total of 50 titles currently available. A similar search on Oct. 18, 1997 re-
sulted in a total of 45 distinct titles. Not all of the titles in earlier search are
still available, however, so the estimate of more than 60 appears to be
reasonable.
2 Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P., v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1561-
62 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
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defendants, holding that the plaintiff had demonstrated a likelihood of
success on the merits of its copyright claim, and that the trademark claim
presented serious questions for review and the balance of hardships fa-
vored the plaintiff.3 On an interlocutory appeal, the District Court's rul-
ings were affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in a published opinion.4
In this article, I will demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit's opinion was
incorrect, both as a matter of law and as a matter of public policy. In its
opinion, the Ninth Circuit misapplied controlling U.S. Supreme Court pre-
cedent in holding that The Cat NOT in the Hat! was not a parody and was
not a transformative use; in holding that the defendants were limited to
that copying necessary to "conjure up" the original; and in presuming that
the defendant's commercial parody would cause harm to the potential
market for the original and licensed derivatives.
Part II of this article will discuss the social importance of parody and
the related forms of burlesque and satire. Part III will briefly review the
development of the parody defense to copyright infringement, with partic-
ular attention to the U.S. Supreme Court's 1994 opinion in Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.5 Part IV will summarize the Ninth Circuit's opin-
ion in the Dr. Seuss case, while Part V will offer an alternative analysis
explaining how the Ninth Circuit erred in enjoining publication of The Cat
NOT in the Hat!
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF PARODY AND SATIRE
Although seemingly straightforward, the task of defining parody can
be maddeningly elusive. Many authors have commented on the difficulty
of defining parody6 and the related forms of burlesque7 and satire,8 and of
3 Id. at 1562.
4 Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P., v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.
1997).
5 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
6 See MARGARET A. ROSE, PARODY: ANCIENT, MODERN AND POST-MODERN 5
(1993) ("Lack of attention to the historical background of the terms used to
define parody has been but one of the problems of parody definition. One
other problem has been the restriction of the description of parody to only
one or two aspects of that term or its usage."); JOSEPH A. DANE, PARODY:
CRITICAL CONCEPTS VERSUS LITERARY PRACTICES, ARISTOPHANES TO
STERNE 5 (1988) ("The definitions of 'parody' and related words . .. have a
history - a history that distorts our view of the literature we conventionally
regard as parodic."); id. at 123 (describing the "unsystematic and often acci-
dental history of the vocabulary of parody").
7 See ARCHIBALD BOLLING SHEPPERSON, THE NOVEL IN MOTLEY: A HISTORY
OF THE BURLESQUE NOVEL IN ENGLISH 4 (1936) ("The word 'burlesque' as
applied to literature has been used indiscriminately to include caricature,
travesty and parody - themselves words of which the meanings are not
widely differentiated."); V.C. CLINTON-BADDELEY, THE BURLESQUE TRA-
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the inadequacy of various dictionary definitions.9 At times, one is re-
minded of Justice Stewart's famous dictum concerning pornography: "I
know it when I see it."10 Nonetheless, in order to apply copyright law to
parody intelligently, it is necessary to attempt to reach a working defini-
tion of the term "parody," and to understand how parody is related to
both burlesque and satire.
To begin, the Oxford English Dictionary defines parody as follows:
A composition in prose or verse in which the characteristic turns
of thought and phrase in an author or class of authors are imi-
tated in such a way as to make them appear ridiculous, especially
by applying them to ludicrously inappropriate subjects; an imita-
tion of a work more or less closely modelled on the original, but
so turned as to produce a ridiculous effect."
DITION IN THE ENGLISH THEATRE AFTER 1660 5 (1952) ("The exact art of
burlesque is not easy to define clearly, because at different times the word
has been used to mean different things.").
8 See GEORGE A. TEST, SATIRE: SPIRIT AND ART 7 (1991) ("Robert C. Elliott,
having surveyed the history of the meaning of the word and the 'staggering
diversity of forms, tones and materials' of satire, concluded that no single
definition covered such diversity."); id. at ix ("satire is merely the aesthetic
manifestation of a universal urge so varied as to elude definition"); id. at x
("What can replace such vague and ambiguous terms as parody, burlesque,
and travesty commonly linked to satire?") (emphasis in original); PETER
PETRO, MODERN SATIRE: FOUR STUDIES 1 (1982) (referring to "the peren-
nial problem of the definition of satire").
9 See ROSE, supra note 6, at 5 ("Many definitions of parody have paid insuffi-
cient attention to its ancient heritage."); DANE, supra note 6, at 130 ("The
particular claims made by these lexicographers are of limited authority.");
id. at 133 ("The value of these words as descriptions of genres in modem
criticism is very limited."); TEST, supra note 8, at 1 ("There is not an ac-
cepted definition of what satire is, only general dictionary descriptions.").
10 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Compare
DANE, supra note 6 at 4 ("My use of the word 'parody' thus always implies
'that which we conventionally consider parody."'); PETRO, supra note 8 at
127 ("satire is a genre that is more difficult to define than to identify.").
11 11 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 247 (2d ed. 1991). See also THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 954 (1973
ed.) ("A literary or artistic work that broadly mimics an author's character-
istic style and holds it up to ridicule."); C. HUGH HOLMAN & WILLIAM
HARMON, A HANDBOOK To LITERATURE 344 (6th ed. 1992) ("A composi-
tion imitating another, usually serious, piece. It is designed to ridicule a
work or its style or author."); MARY ELLEN SNODGRASS, ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF SATIRICAL LITERATURE 351 (1996) ("A keen, creative form of mimicry
or indirect commentary, parody . . . parallels the tone, diction, style or
themes of a serious work to create incongruity, disparagement, or
dissonance.").
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This definition emphasizes two aspects of parody: first, that parody relies
on imitation to achieve its purposes; and second, that parody may aim to
ridicule a particular author or work.
When defined in this manner, parody can be considered to be merely
a specific form of burlesque.12 In the United States, the term "burlesque"
is used chiefly to refer to a form of vaudeville entertainment featuring
broad, ribald comedy, dancing and striptease;' 3 but in England, "bur-
lesque" retains its original meaning of any type of comic or derisive imita-
tion. 14 Thus, the Oxford English Dictionary defines burlesque as a
"species of literary composition . .. which aims at exciting laughter by
caricature of the manner or spirit of serious works, or by ludicrous treat-
ment of their subjects."' 5 Even in England, however, the relationship be-
tween parody and burlesque is not precisely defined. Some authors use
the two terms more or less interchangeably, the principal distinction being
that parody imitates a specific original work, while burlesque includes imi-
tation of an author's general style or of an entire genre of works;16 while
others add the further limitation that parody involves applying the style of
a particular work (or author) to a relatively trifling or less worthy
subject.' 7
12 See SHEPPERSON, supra note 7, at 7 ("every parody belongs to the general class
of burlesque literature."); JOHN D. JuNE, BURLESQUE 2 (1972) (defining
parody as one of four species of burlesque); 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA
801 (1990 ed.) ("[B]urlesque is frequently a comic imitation of a serious and
well-known work.").
13 See 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 801 (1990 ed.) ("In the United States in the
mid-19th century, the term 'burlesque' came to be applied to a form of mu-
sic hall entertainment that had no resemblance to classic burlesque."); 2
THE NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 655 (15th ed. 1993) (defining "bur-
lesque show"); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 178 (1973 ed.) (alternative definition). But see Loew's Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), affd sub nom.
Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1956), affd by an equally di-
vided court sub nom. Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43
(1958) (using the term "burlesque" throughout to refer to a television par-
ody of a motion picture).
14 See 2 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 672 (2d ed. 1991) ("Of the nature of
derisive imitation; ironically bombastic, mock-heroic or mock-pathetic"); 2
THE NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 655 (15th ed. 1993) ("in literature,
comic imitation of a serious literary or artistic form"); JUMP, supra note 12,
at 1 ("the use or imitation of serious matter or manner, made amusing by
the creation of an incongruity between style and subject.").
15 2 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 672 (2d ed. 1991).
16 See SHEPPERSON, supra note 7, at 1-8; CLINTON-BADDELEY, supra note 7, at 7-
8.
17 See JUMP, supra note 12, at 1-2. Jump divides burlesque into "high" burlesque,
"in which a relatively trifling subject is ludicrously elevated by the style of
presentation," and "low" burlesque, "in which a relatively important subject
550
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More recent scholarship, however, has charged that the uncritical as-
sociation of parody with burlesque has resulted in a marginalization of the
former art.' 8 In her definitive work,19 Professor Margaret Rose empha-
sizes that the word "parody" derives from the ancient Greek word
"parodia," which was first used to describe mock-epic poems in the style
of Homer, but which came to include many different forms of comic quo-
tation and textual rearrangement of prior works. 20 The word "burlesque,"
by contrast, is of more recent origin and was derived from the Italian word
"burla," meaning joke or ridicule. 21 Because of its emphasis on comedy,
the art of burlesque generally has been treated as little more than a divert-
ing amusement by the literary elite.22 Thus, according to Rose, "the rele-
gation of parody to a sub-category of the burlesque in the eighteenth
century" resulted in many of "the negative connotations attributed to par-
ody in recent centuries," 23 and to its dismissal as "a lowly comic form
which had been of little real significance in the history of literature or of
other arts." 24
is ludicrously denigrated by the style of presentation." Id. at 1. Jump also
distinguishes between imitation of a specific work or author and imitation
of an entire genre. Id. Combining the two distinctions results in four cate-
gories of burlesque: "travesty," the low burlesque of a particular work; "hu-
dibrastic," the low burlesque of an entire genre; "parody," the high
burlesque of a particular work or author; and the "mock-poem" or "mock
epic," the high burlesque of a whole class of literature. Id. at 2.
18 See ROSE, supra note 6, at 5 ("Several misunderstandings have been generated
by the definition of parody as burlesque"); id. at 54 ("The modem reduction
of parody to a type of burlesque in descriptions given of it in the eighteenth
century and after has already been seen to have limited the meaning of the
more ancient definitions and uses of parody.").
19 See ROSE, supra note 6.
20 Professor Rose's book contains an excellent description of the etymology of
the word "parody" and of the various connotations ascribed to it through-
out the centuries. Id. at 6-19.
21 Id. at 54; Jump, supra note 12 at 72. See also 2 THE OXFORD ENGLISH Dic-
TIONARY 672 (2d ed. 1991); THE NEw AMERICAN HERITAGE DICrIoNARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 178 (1973 ed.).
22 See SHEPPERSON, supra note 7, at 3 ("'burlesque' has in general been ignored
by modem critics as an unruly stepchild, not entitled to a place within the
family circle of respectable literature. Mistakenly adjudged as unmitigated
foolishness, as 'mere imitative ridicule,' it has been treated, when it has
been noticed at all, with the half-patronizing, half-contemptuous attitude
which serious-minded persons always assume toward those who wear the
cap and bells."); CLINTON-BADDELEY, supra note 7, at 8 ("Burlesque is
laughter for laughter's sake"); JUMP, supra note 12 at 72 ("Burlesque is
mockery, it is joking, it is fun.").
23 ROSE, supra note 6, at 9.
24 Id. at 1.
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The dismissal of parody and burlesque as comedic arts with little last-
ing value, however, fails to convey the complexity of parody as a literary
phenomenon, and the importance of both parody and burlesque as vehi-
cles for literary and social criticism.
The complexity of parody is implicit in its etymology. The Greek
word "parodia" is comprised of two roots: the prefix para-, meaning both
similar to (as in parallel), and in opposition to (as in paranormal); and the
noun "ode," meaning a song or verse poem.25 The word "parodia" there-
fore implies a work that is both similar to and in opposition to the origi-
nal.26 At its finest, parody "imitates and then comically transforms other
works in ambiguous and often complex meta-fictional ways." 27 For exam-
ple, parodists may use imitation of the original "to elicit the expectations
of their audience for a text, before presenting another version or view of
it." 28 By playing upon the audience's expectations, the parody can simul-
taneously present an exemplar of the original work, the parodist's com-
ment upon the style and/or subject matter of the original, and the
parodist's comment upon the expectations of the reader or audience.29 In
Rose's words:
Whatever our attitude toward comedy, the complicated structure
of more sophisticated parody - in which the target text may not
only be satirised but also "refunctioned" - nonetheless demon-
strates a more subtle (though still comic) use of other literary
works than is implied by the term burlesque . . . . [T]he use of
parody may aim both at a comic effect and at the transmission of
both complex and serious messages .... .0
In transforming an original work through comic imitation, parody can
therefore reveal that the original may itself be susceptible to multiple in-
terpretations or contain hidden layers of meaning.
Although parody may contain a variety of messages, it is most fre-
quently used as a form of literary criticism.3 1 The best parodies exagger-
25 ROSE, supra note 6 at 8.
26 Id. at 48-49.
27 Id. at 54.
28 Id. at 30.
29 Id. at 39, 43.
30 Id. at 28-29.
31 See DANE, supra note 6, at 4-5 (parody often contains "an implied critique of
the object text" and "thus is a form of literary criticism."); MARGARET A.
ROSE, PARODY/[META-FICrION 179-80 (1979) ("in using the work of an-
other as a word-mask for its own message, parody has been a particularly
subversive form of criticism . . . [and] one of the most ignored forms of
literary criticism."); DwIGHT MACDONALD, PARODIES: AN ANTHOLOGY
FROM CHAUCER TO BEERBOHM - AND AFTER xiii (1960) (parody is "an
552
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ate the weakest features of the original work in order to expose its
inadequacies,3 2 and thereby to encourage subsequent authors to abandon
the overworked cliches and excesses of the original in their own works.33
Such criticism may take the form of comic incongruity between the subject
matter of the parody and the style used to depict it.34 Incongruity reveals
the faults and flaws of the original work by allowing the reader to focus on
the style of the original divorced from its subject matter. The critical effect
of such parodies is heightened by the parodist's deadpan seriousness in
depicting the most ludicrous of subjects.35 By turning an author's own
words against him, parody and burlesque often prove to be more effective
in stimulating artistic reform than more traditional methods of criticism. 36
intuitive kind of literary criticism, shorthand for what 'serious' critics must
write out at length.").
32 SNODGRASS, supra note 11, at 351 ("A clever, often spitefully cutting method
of ridiculing or lampooning pompous or erudite authors, actors or notables,
parody derides words, situations, sentimentality, posturing and overblown
rhetoric through exaggeration or misapplication").
33 See 9 THE NEw ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 167 (15th ed. 1993) (defining
parody as "a form of satirical criticism or comic mockery that imitates the
style or manner of a particular writer or school of writers so as to emphasize
the weaknesses of the writer or the overused conventions of the school.");
PETRO, supra note 8, at 12 ("That parody is imitation which strives toward a
comical effect is indisputable, but parody can be seen also as stylization with
a hostile tendency, a vehicle for reinterpretation and re-evaluation, and as a
catalyst of literary change.").
34 See JUMP, supra note 12 at 24 ("The incongruity between his subject and his
style provokes laughter, and this helps us to perceive in a clearer critical
light both [the original author's] style and the feelings with which he regards
his subject."); ROSE, supra note 6 at 36-37 ("a prime feature distinguishing
the imitation (or the non-ironic, non-critical reproduction of the whole or
part of another literary work in a text) from the literary parody is the estab-
lishment in the parody of comic discrepancy or incongruity between the
original work and its 'imitation' and transformation.").
35 See ROSE, supra note 6, at 30 ("a parody may also be said to be 'dissimulative'
... when the parodist pretends not to understand the original meaning of
the parodied author."); CLINTON-BADDELEY, supra note 7, at 10 ("The best
burlesque supports an elaborate pretense of not being funny at all, and
leaves audience or reader in a happy state of uncertainty whether good
sense has been outraged or not."); see also TEST, supra note 8, at 160 ("Sati-
rists usually present the material deadpan, betraying no indication that what
they are presenting is in any way out of order. This feigned innocence is of
course a natural element in the creation of irony.").
36 See SHEPPERSON, supra note 7, at 3-4 ("During its first century, the novel re-
ceived from the serious critics only the most fitful and grudging atten-
tion.... In the absence of formal criticism, it is not surprising to find that
parody and burlesque should have proved powerful agents in controlling
the excesses of this youthful literary form.").
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Parody may also use comic imitation as a vehicle for social criticism. 37
Many of the most effective parodies target not only the parodied text but
also the societal values and mores of the audience that has made the origi-
nal popular.3 8 Comic incongruity can also be used to target serious topics
by depicting them in a frivolous or lighthearted manner, as is often true of
political satire.39 The parody form is used in order to demonstrate the
pervasive influence of accepted political thought upon a well-known piece
of popular culture, 40 and to make the parodist's criticism more palatable
to the audience by mixing it with humor.4 1 Because of its topicality and
humor, "[o]ften a parody is more powerful in its influence on affairs of
37 See ROSE, supra note 6, at 26 ("[R]idicule is society's most effective means of
curing inelasticity. It explodes the pompous, corrects the well-meaning ec-
centric, cools the fanatical, and prevents the incompetent from achieving
success. Truth will prevail over it, falsehood will cower under it.") (quoting
CHRISTOPHER STONE, PARODY (1914)).
38 See ROSE, supra note 6, at 89-90 (parody may "identify its target text with a
certain reader ... or with the attitude of a particular group of readers, and
make the latter a target of its critical analysis and comedy."); see also ROSE,
PARODY//META-FIcriON, supra note 31, at 109 ("Parody of a more satirical
kind, as if often found in political literature and rhetoric, may ... aim at
changing the opinion of its audience about a text or its supporters.") (em-
phasis added).
39 See RoSE, PARODY//META-FIcriON, supra note 31, at 133 ("in political propa-
ganda, as well as in the criticism of ideological texts and literary fiction,
parody has often played a role in the changing of opinion."); HOLMAN &
HARMON, supra note 11, at 344 ("The parody is in literature what the cari-
cature and the [political] cartoon are in art.") (emphasis in original).
Greek Old Comedy is often cited as a prime example of the use of parodic
imitation in political satire. See DANE, supra note 6, at 24 (In Aristophanes,
"[o]ften the target of the chorus's advice to the audience is related only to
the political situation of the performance, and not to the dramatic situation
at all."); SNODGRASs, supra note 11, at 128 ("The genius of the era [of
Greek comedy] lies in its ability to lace together the comic and grotesque
behaviors of fantasy figures, while lampooning real events and attitudes to-
ward war, government, religion, and social interaction.").
40 See SHEPPERSON, supra note 7, at 8 ("parody-burlesques have appeared when
some individual novel . . . has presented an absurd view of life or a corrupt,
specious system of morality.").
41 See ROSE, supra note 6, at 30 ("the target text may be the object of some
reform or rewriting by the parodist, but may also be the object of satire, or a
mask used to allow other targets to be attacked or reformed in an
'Aesopian' or covert manner."). See also SNODGRASS, supra note 11, at 408
("Concealed in the folds of humor, . .. satire enables the writer to afflict the
pompous, unscrupulous, or infamous, then take refuge in the laughter of the
audience, thus shielding the originator from reprisal.").
554
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current importance - politics, for instance - than an original
composition." 42
When viewed in this manner, both parody and burlesque are consid-
ered to be specific forms of satire. 43 The Encyclopedia Britannica defines
satire as an "artistic form . . . in which human or individual vices, follies,
abuses, or shortcomings are held up to censure by means of ridicule, deri-
sion, burlesque, irony, or other methods."44 In common with other au-
thorities, however, the Encyclopedia also recognizes that literary satire is
merely one manifestation of a universal human impulse toward mockery
of every type.45 Thus, the Encyclopedia also defines satire more generally
as:
42 HOLMAN & HARMON, supra note 11, at 344 (emphasis deleted). See also
ROSE, PARODY//META-FIcrION, supra note 31, at 115 ("Particularly in peri-
ods of political crisis or religious dispute, preformed beliefs and prejudices
have been seen by satirists and parodists as the locus of the expectations of
their public, and their attacks [on those expectations] . . . have hence also
been presented as attacks of broader social significance."); Geri J. Yonover,
The "Dissing" of Da Vinci: The Imaginary Case of Leonardo v. Duchamp:
Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use, 29 VAL. U. L. REv. 935, 970-71 (1995)
(citing examples of political parody in the United States).
43 See DANE, supra note 6, at 10 (Parody "is seen as a variant of other official
genres, the most important of these being satire. A century ago, Delepierre
described parody, caricature, grotesque, and burlesque as the various
'weapons' employed by satire to combat equally various tyrannies (feudal,
clerical, monarchical, and popular)."); 23 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA 174 (15th ed. 1993) ("The satirist has at his disposal an im-
mense variety of literary and rhetorical devices," including parody and bur-
lesque); 24 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 294 (Grolier 1990) ("Irony,
burlesque, travesty, and parody are modes and forms of indirect satire.").
44 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 467 (15th ed. 1993). See also 14 OXFORD
ENGLISH DICrIONARY 500 (2d ed. 1991) ("A poem, or ... prose composi-
tion, in which prevailing vices or follies are held up to ridicule."); THE NEW
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1154
(1973 ed.) ("A literary work in which irony, derision, or wit in any form is
used to expose folly or wickedness.").
45 See, e.g., TEST, supra note 8, at ix ("what is commonly referred to as satire is
merely the aesthetic manifestation of a universal urge so varied as to elude
definition."); SNODGRASS, supra note 11, at xiii ("satire thrives throughout
the humanities as a natural outgrowth of the human need to examine self
and milieu in a perpetual act of betterment."); id. at xiv (satire is both "a
useful literary device and a ubiquitous glimmer or shading in every form of
expression.").
Scholars have identified the roots of satire in the rituals and folk behavior of
cultures throughout the world. See generally TEST, supra note 8, at pp. 37-
99; see also ROBERT C. ELLIOTT, THE POWER OF SATIRE: MAGIC, RITUAL,
ART (1960). Test notes that:
A surprising variety of societies have allowed certain persons the free-
dom to mock other individuals and social institutions in rituals. From
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[A] mocking spirit or tone that manifests itself in many literary
genres but can also enter into almost any kind of human commu-
nication. Wherever wit is employed to expose something foolish
or vicious to criticism, there satire exists, whether it be in song or
sermon, in painting or political debate, on television or in the
movies. In this sense, satire is everywhere.46
In a similar vein, scholar George A. Test has defined satire in terms of four
elements that are present in varying combinations: aggression or attack,
play (both wordplay and game-playing), laughter, and judgment or criti-
cism.47 Test uses this four-part structure to evaluate how various forms of
satire are related to one another. Thus, while some parodies may be con-
tent with eliciting laughter through play,48 the best parodies use play and
laughter to convey more-or-less aggressive judgments, either about the ar-
tistic worth of the imitated work or about the society that values it.49
According to Test, parodic imitation is "used in two basic ways by
satirists":
earliest times the same freedom has been claimed by and granted to so-
cial groups at certain times of the year, as can be seen in such festivals as
the Saturnalia, the Feast of Fools, Carnival, and similar folk festivals in
India, nineteenth-century Newfoundland, and the ancient Mediterranean
world.
TEST, supra note 8, at 9. In these contexts, satire helps to resolve tension
between groups of different social status through the use of mockery and
humor. Id. When confined within such officially sanctioned limits, satire
may ironically have the effect of ratifying the existing social structure. Id. at
65-66; see also 23 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 175 (15th ed. 1993). When
exercised outside those limits, however, satire is likely to incur the wrath of
prevailing authorities. See notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
46 23 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 173 (15th ed. 1993). See also TEST, supra note
8, at 4 ("Satire, whether literary or oral, whether expressed through cere-
mony or in art forms, seems to occur in all societies and conditions of hu-
manity, in all periods and stages of history, at all levels of society.").
47 TEST, supra note 8, at 15-36. These elements are also implicit in many of the
definitions offered by other scholars. See, e.g., SNODGRASS, supra note 11,
at 405 ("A vigorous, sharply pointed, and, at times, embarrassingly or cru-
elly effective rhetorical device or genre," and "the art of telling truth
through laughter"); PETRO, supra note 8, at 128 ("Satire is the meeting
point of humor and criticism in a literary work.") (emphasis deleted).
48 Citing the example of impressionist Rich Little, Test states that "[w]ithout a
judgment and lacking an attack, parody, burlesque, and travesty are
[merely] forms of humor." TEST, supra note 8, at 34. While this may be
true for some parodies, Rose has criticized this view of parody as ignoring
the subtler messages that parody may contain. See notes 18-30 and accom-
panying text.
49 See notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
556
HeinOnline  -- 45 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 556 1997-1998
How the Grinch Silenced a Parody
One is to attack the specific form itself, its style, manner, struc-
ture, and content and thereby the ideas, attitudes and values ex-
pressed or represented. The other use is as a conveyance for
satirizing what satirists usually attack, that is, persons, institu-
tions, behavior, and ideas. In the first instance the satirist is
making an aesthetic and usually a moral judgment that involves
the technique and form of presentation. In the second case the
form or manner becomes a tool for the satirist and not an object
of mockery.50
As will be seen, some courts have seized upon such distinctions and have
drawn a dichotomy between imitation that targets a particular work (la-
beled "parody") on the one hand, and imitation that targets some other
aspect of society (labeled "satire") on the other.51 This approach presents
at least two serious difficulties from an artistic point of view. First, it "as-
sumes that a distinction can be made between style and content, between
manner and structure, without losing sight of the intimate and ultimately
interdependent nature of the two," 5 2 thereby imposing a false dichotomy
upon what is actually a continuum of imitative usage. Second, it assumes
that courts can definitively determine an author's intent in writing a partic-
ular work, a task that many literary scholars argue is both foolish to at-
tempt5 3 and impossible to achieve. 54
50 TEST, supra note 8, at 159.
51 See notes 178-191 and 203-207, and accompanying text.
52 See TEST, supra note 8, at 160.
53 See, e.g., ROGER WEBSTER, STUDYING LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUC-
TION 22 (2d ed. 1996) ("The whole idea that the 'intention' of the author is
the proper subject of literary history seems, however, quite mistaken. The
meaning of a work of art is not exhausted by, or even equivalent to, its
intention.") (quoting RENE WELLEK & AUSTIN WARREN, A THEORY OF
LITERATURE (1949)).
One of the major precepts of the objective theory of art is that "the design or
intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for
judging the success of a work of literary art." William K. Wimsatt and
Monroe C. Beardsley, The Intentional Fallacy (1946), reprinted in WILLIAM
K. WIMSATT, THE VERBAL ICON: STUDIES IN THE MEANING OF POETRY 3
(1954). Entire volumes have been devoted to debating the validity of Wim-
satt & Beardsley's thesis. See, e.g., INTENTION AND INTERPRETATION (Gary
Iseminger ed., 1992); ON LITERARY INTENTION: CRITICAL ESSAYS (David
Newton-De Molina ed. 1976).
54 See, e.g., THE LEXINGTON INTRODUCTION TO LITERATURE 3 (Gary Waller, et
al. eds 1987) ("No work of literature contains meanings in itself apart from
interpretation, that is, apart from the understanding (and questions) that a
reader brings to it.. . . [T]here are no unchanging, correct, objective mean-
ings to the literature we read."); id. at 4-5 ("literary theory has shifted from
assuming that meaning exists objectively in texts to assuming that meaning
is relative, not fixed or absolute, and that meaning arises as the result of a
557
HeinOnline  -- 45 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 557 1997-1998
Journal, Copyright Society of the U.S.A.
Two additional salient features of parody are worth noting. First, par-
ody is unabashedly a parasitic art. Its existence depends upon the well-
known predecessors from which the parodist borrows, and upon the audi-
ence's familiarity with those models. In describing parody as a form of
satire, Test states:
Both approaches require the reader to know a style, manner,
form, set of conventions, a pattern exterior to the satiric work, in
order to understand and fully appreciate the satire. The satirist
uses the prior knowledge of the audience and the presumed abil-
ity of those in the audience to detect the incongruity, contradic-
tion, or incompatibility between what they know of the original
style or form and what they perceive before them.55
Consequently, "the truest parodies are those that tamper least with the
material they are spoofing. Just enough to blow them sky-high. That's
all."5 6
Second, because parody depends upon audience recognition of its
models, the window of opportunity for the parodist is often extremely
short in duration. In order to make its satiric point, a parody must appear
while the targeted work is still fashionable and current in the minds of the
audience. Test explains:
The works and forms that a satirist can appropriate are theoreti-
cally endless, but in fact the minds and memories of the audience
imposes limitations on what the satirist can choose from. Audi-
ences in the last quarter of the twentieth century are less and less
familiar with biblical and classical literature and more or better
acquainted with the artifacts of commerce, popular culture, and
government . . .57
complex interaction between the reader and the text - and the cultures
from which both emerge.").
55 TEST, supra note 8, at 159-60.
56 Charles Poore, Ardent Plea for the Art of Parody, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE,
March 9, 1958, at 33. See also HOLMAN & HARMON, supra note 11, at 344
("Note that the craft of parody prizes minimal tampering."); Robert J.
Kapelke, Comment, Parody or Piracy: Never the Twain, 38 U. COLO. L.
REv. 550, 565 (1966) ("To make his parody complete and effective the paro-
dist has always tended to stick very closely to the script of the original....
Sometimes it is the very slightest twist which makes the parody so outra-
geously funny.").
57 Id. at 171. See also MACDONALD, supra note 31, at xi ("Parody ages faster
than any other literary form").
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Consequently, a legal doctrine that restricts the ability of the parodist to
borrow from contemporary works necessarily shackles the parodist's abil-
ity to comment upon contemporary culture.58
Because parody and satire are often used to attack powerful and pop-
ular political and social institutions, 59 they sometimes provoke responses
of indignation and outrage from the audience.60 Whenever this happens,
calls for censorship inevitably follow. 6 1 Many authors have been called
upon to defend themselves against charges stemming from their satires,62
and history demonstrates that parodists and satirists are often among the
58 See ROSE, PARODY//META-FICTION, supra note 31, at 181 (discussing "how
restricted parodists have felt in parodying contemporary works to which
laws of copyright protecting them from parody applied."); Kapelke, supra
note 56, at 561 ("Recognizing that burlesque is often a form of criticism,
how realistic is it to tell a critic he must confine himself to works more than
fifty-six years old?"). Compounding the problem is the fact that, following
the recent enactment of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-298, the duration of copyright is now the life of the author
plus 70 years, or 95 years for works made for hire and works copyrighted
before January 1, 1978. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-04 (1994).
59 See ROSE, PARODY//META-FIcrION, supra note 31, at 169 ("Parody has been
put to work in the cause of subverting established canons-of literary, polit-
ical, and ideological kinds."); Harriette K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation
and the Law of Libel, Trademark, and Copyright: Remedies Without
Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. REV. 923, 924 (1985) ("In the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, satiric journals were the most influential political me-
dia, regularly targeting the political, religious, and social leaders of the
day.").
60 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (suit for intentional
infliction of emotional distress for publication of parody advertisement that
ridiculed respondent); ROSE, PARODY//META-FICTION, supra note 31, at 21
("the attribution of the comic effect to parody has misled many . . . into
seeing the parodist as merely a mocker of other texts, and to condemning
parody on moral grounds."); Dorsen, supra note 59, at 964 ("A good satire
will likely offend someone.").
61 See ROSE, PARODY//META-FICTION, supra note 31, at 32 ("In the post-Refor-
mation period when satire and biblical parody were regarded as lower
forms of wit, the interconnection between political censorship and the deni-
gration of parody must also be kept in mind.").
62 In addition to Aristophanes (see note 66 and accompanying text), Voltaire was
briefly imprisoned for his use of satire, ROSE, PARODY//META-FICrION,
supra note 31, at 32, and "[i]n England in 1599 the Archbishop of Canter-
bury and the Bishop of London issued an order prohibiting the printing of
any satires whatever and requiring that the published satires of [Joseph]
Hall, John Marston, Thomas Nashe, and others be burned." 23 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA BRITANNICA 176 (15th ed. 1993). More recently, the Nobel Prize-
winning playwright and actor Dario Fo was censored, banned from televi-
sion and briefly jailed for his satirical criticisms of the Italian government
and the Catholic Church.
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first victims of a dictatorship. 63 Indeed, it has been argued that parody,
burlesque and satire can only flourish in a free democracy," and that the
relative amount of parody and satire permitted can be used an indicator of
the political freedom of a society. 6 5 It is noteworthy that parody first
came to prominence in ancient Athens, where authors enjoyed a great
deal of freedom despite attacks from some public officials. 66
The extreme measures taken to silence parody and satire demonstrate
the power of these art forms to bring about social change.67 Film director
Taylor Hackford explains:
Holding up the most powerful institutions and individuals in so-
ciety to sardonic scrutiny is a time-honored practice. It is used to
ensure that those with great influence and power, at the very
least, risk embarrassment if they abuse the trust we invest in
them.68
63 In Nazi Germany, Werner Finck, a well-known cabaret actor, was imprisoned
in Dachau by Joseph Goebbels for attempting to "make party and State
institutions ridiculous." CLINTON-BADDELEY, supra note 7, at 12, and in
Soviet Russia, the poet Osip Mandelstam was imprisoned and killed for
writing a satirical poem about Joseph Stalin. 23 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITAN-
NICA 176 (15th ed. 1993).
64 See CLINTON-BADDELEY, supra note 7 at 11 ("It is at least certain that bur-
lesque is a joke which can flourish only in a free and prosperous
democracy").
65 See 23 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 176 (15th ed. 1993) (noting that "political
analysts use the amount and character of satire permitted in the U.S.S.R. as
a gauge of political pressure at any given time.").
66 In one play, Aristophanes describes how he triumphed in court against a politi-
cian that he had previously lampooned:
Aye and I know what I myself endured
At Cleon's hands for last year's comedy.
How to the Council house he haled me off,
And slanged, and lied, and slandered, and
betongued me.
Bear me no grudge, spectators, if, a beggar,
I dare to speak before the Athenian people
about the city in a comic play.
For what is true even comedy can tell.
And I shall utter startling things but true.
Nor now can Cleon slander me because,
With strangers present, I defame the State.
THE ACHARNIANS (426 B.C.) (trans. BENJAMIN BICKLEY ROGERS), lines
377-80, 596-602, reprinted in CLINTON-BADDELEY, supra note 7, at 11.
67 See ROSE, PARODY//META-FICTION, supra note 31, at 133-34 ("Controls such
as censorship on parody as a literary form have tacitly acknowledged the
potential power of parody in fulfilling critical tasks.").
68 Taylor Hackford, A Cinematic Satire With Purpose, Los ANGELES TIMES, No-
vember 17, 1997, at F5. See also SNODGRASS, supra note 11, at 411 (satire
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Even considered purely as artistic forms, however, parody and satire are
deserving of legal protection. 69 In Test's words:
What does all this satire accomplish? A modem aesthetic Pilate
might ask, what does art accomplish? For whatever else it is,
satire is art, however peculiar and baffling it may be.... [And]
were the disposition for satire somehow to disappear from the
makeup of human beings, and the variegated expressions of it
were to vanish, the dance of life would be diminished by the ab-
sence of a strange and vital gesture.70
The importance of parody as art can be demonstrated by the wide
variety of authors whose parodies have enriched the world's literature and
culture, from the Greek comedies of Aristophanes7' to Cervantes' Don
Quixote72 and the comedies of Moliere.7 3 In England, Chaucer,74 Shake-
speare,75 Ben Jonson,76 Francis Beaumont,7 7 George Villiers,78 Alexander
"serves as a necessary vehicle for effective criticism of society's failings.");
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1988) ("satirical cartoons
. . . have undoubtedly had an effect on the course and outcome of contem-
poraneous debate.").
69 "[E]ven if many parodies do not rise to the level of ambitious and important
criticism, it cannot be denied that if the first amendment's objective is the
maximization of the spectrum of available thought, parody is part of that
spectrum." Richard A. Bernstein, Parody and Fair Use in Copyright Law,
31 COPYR. L. SYMp. (ASCAP) 1, 31 (1984).
70 TEST, supra note 8, at 35-36.
71 See, e.g., THE ACHARNIANS (425 B.C.); THE KNIGHTS (424 B.C.); THE BIRDS
(414 B.C.); THE FROGS (405 B.C.). See also CLINTON-BADDELEY, supra
note 7, at 14 ("[A]t the height of Greek civilization the plays of Aristopha-
nes contained every known element of laughter. Their themes were satiri-
cal; there was farce and comedy in their unfolding, and parody in their
language."); SNODGRASS, supra note 11, at 35-37, 127-28.
72 MIGUEL DE CERVANTES, DON QUIXOTE (1605). Cervantes' most famous
work is considered to be a parody of medieval chivalric romance in general,
rather than a parody of any particular work.
7 See SHEPPERSON, supra note 7, at 63-64; SNODGRASS, supra note 11, at 333-37.
74 The Tale of Sir Thopas in THE CANTERBURY TALES (1387). See discussion in
MACDONALD, supra note 31, at 3-11.
75 The "Pyramus and Thisbe" sequence from A MIDSUMMER NIGHT'S DREAM
(1594) is considered a parody of Richard Edwards' DAMON AND PYTHIAS
(1565); while many critics believe the depiction of Ajax in TROILUS AND
CRESSIDA (1602) is a burlesque caricature of Ben Jonson. See ROSE, PAR-
ODY//META-FICTION, supra note 31, at 72; CLINTON-BADDELEY, supra note
7, at 2 & n.3, 17-18; see also id. at 16-17 (describing the use of burlesque in
LOVE's LABOURS LOST (1593)); Jump, supra note 12 at 27 (describing Fal-
staff's use of parody in HENRY IV, PART I (1597)); MACDONALD, supra
note 31, at 14-18 (collecting excerpts).
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Pope,79 Jonathan Swift,80 John Gay,81 Henry Fielding,82 Richard Brinsley
Sheridan,8 3 Jane Austen,8' Lord Byron,85 William Thackery,86 Lewis Car-
76 Examples of burlesque can be found in Jonson's VOLPONE (1607), BARTHOLO-
MEw FAIR (1614) and EVERYMAN Our OF His HUMOUR (1599). See CLIN-
TON-BADDELEY, supra note 7 at 18-20.
77 THE KNIGHT OF THE BURNING PESTLE (1607). See JUMP, supra note 12 at 52-
58.
78 "The first lengthy parody in post-Chaucerian literature was The Rehearsal
(1671), a mock-heroic play mostly by George Villiers, the second Duke of
Buckingham." MACDONALD, supra note 31, at 20. The Rehearsal parodied
several "extravagant and bombastic" plays by John Dryden. Id. at 20-22;
see also CLINTON-BADDELEY, supra note 7 at 31-37; JUMP, supra note 12, at
58-60.
79 THE RAPE OF THE LOCK (1713); THE DUNCIAD (1727).
80 Swift's best-known work, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS (1726), contains many parodic
elements, but is principally a satire that examines utopian and anti-utopian
ideals in four fictional lands. Swift also wrote other satires, such as A MOD-
EST PROPOSAL (1720), and parodies and burlesques, such as BAUCIS AND
PHILEMON (1709).
81 THE BEGGAR'S OPERA (1728); THE WHAT D'YE CALL IT (1715); THE SHEP-
HERD'S WEEK (1714). See CLINTON-BADDELEY, supra note 7 at 43-51.
82 Both Fielding's AN APOLOGY FOR THE LIFE OF MRS. SHAMELA ANDREWS
(1741) and JOSEPH ANDREWS (1742) are parodies of an earlier novel by
Samuel Richardson, PAMELA, OR VIRTUE REWARDED (1741). See also THE
TRAGEDY OF TRAGEDIES; OR, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF TOM THUMB THE
GREAT (1731), discussed in CLINTON-BADDELEY, supra note 7, at 53-58,
and in JUMP, supra note 12, at 60-64.
83 THE CRITIC (1779). This work "not only attacked all the follies of the contem-
porary stage at once, but revived and preserved within the compass of the
work almost the whole canon of the burlesque tradition." CLINTON-BAD-
DELEY, supra note 7, at 72. See also ROSE, PARODY//META-FCTION, supra
note 31, at 73-74.
84 NORTHANGER ABBEY (1818) "may be taken as a well-known example of the
use of parody in a novel which takes its surface plot features from the
novels which are the object of its satire." ROSE, PARODY//META-FcION,
supra, note 31, at 69-70; see also MACDONALD, supra note 31, at 41 ("The
target is the Gothic novel, especially Mrs. Radcliffe's Mysteries of
Udolpho."). Recent scholarship has also uncovered LOVE AND FRIENDSHIP
(c. 1789), an early work not published until 1922, in which "the youthful
Jane Austen turns into ridicule the stock devices of the contemporary novel-
ists. . . . Coincidence, the willing slave of most of her contemporaries, is
overworked to a ludicrous degree." SHEPPERSON, supra note 7, at 137; see
also MACDONALD, at 41-51 (reprinting excerpts). Shepperson notes that
much of this early material was reworked in Austen's later novels, and ar-
gues that Austen's development as an author can be traced to her appren-
ticeship as an author of parody. SHEPPERSON at 130-53; see also
SNODGRASS, supra note 11, at 39-41.
85 DON JUAN (1824) contains elements of parody. Byron also wrote shorter par-
odies, such as the brief Epilogue in the style of Wordsworth, reprinted in
MACDONALD, supra note 31, at 95.
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roll, 87 Gilbert & Sullivan,8 8 George Bernard Shaw, 89 James Joyce, 90 and
Tom Stoppard9 l all wrote parodies; prominent parodists in the United
States include Mark Twain,92 Bret Harte,9 3 Robert Benchley, 94 James
Thurber, 95 E.B. White, 96 and Richard Armour.9 In the late 20th Century,
86 See SHEPPERSON, supra note 7, at 206-33 (discussing Thackery's parodies of Sir
Edward Bulwer-Lytton and Sir Walter Scott).
87 Both ALICE IN WONDERLAND (1865) and THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS
(1872) contain several "nonsense poems," the most familiar of which is "Fa-
ther William," that are parodies of well-known verses of Carroll's time, See
MACDONALD, supra note 31 at 277-93 (reprinting both Carroll's parodies
and the original verses). Carroll also wrote several other short parodies.
See, e.g., JUMP, supra note 12, at 25 (reprinting The Three Voices, a Carroll
verse parody of the Tennyson poem The Two Voices.).
88 W.S. Gilbert wrote many short parodies before his famed partnership with
composer Arthur Sullivan. Their comic opera PRINCESS IDA (1884) was de-
scribed by Gilbert as "a respectful perversion" of Tennyson's epic poem
THE PRINCESS (1847); while PATIENCE (1881) satirizes the "aesthetic"
movement associated with Oscar Wilde. Many of the other comic operas of
the duo burlesque English culture and political figures in varying degrees.
See CLINTON-BADDELEY, supra note 7 at 114-20. Sullivan's music also par-
odies the music of other composers. For example, the melody known in the
U.S. as "Hail, Hail, The Gang's All Here" comes from Gilbert & Sullivan's
THE PIRATES OF PENZANCE (1877), and is a parody of the "Anvil Chorus"
from Giuseppe Verdi's IL TROVATORE (1853).
89 THE ADMIRABLE BASHVILLE (1901); ANDROCLES AND THE LION (1912). See
CLINTON-BADDELEY, supra note 7, at 120-22.
90 Joyce's ULYSSES (1922) is modeled closely after Homer's Odyssey, with each
episode in the original having a parallel in Joyce's novel, but with the time
frame compressed into a single day. In addition, the "Oxen of the Sun"
episode contains several parodies of the styles of various English authors.
See JUMP, supra note 12, at 32-34; MACDONALD, supra note 31, at 522-43
(identifying the authors) One scholar considers Ulysses to be "a model for
the modernist use of parody." ROSE, PARODY//META-FcrION, supra note
31, at 42; see also id. at 76-77.
91 TRAVESTIES (1975) uses a production of Oscar Wilde's The Importance of Be-
ing Earnest as a background for the action; while ROSENCRANTZ AND
GUILDENSTERN ARE DEAD (1967) is based on two minor characters from
Shakespeare's Hamlet. See ROSE, PARODY//META-FicrION, supra note 31,
at 74-75.
92 Several short stories, including Grandfather's Old Ram, reprinted in MACDON-
ALD, supra note 31, at 434-39.
93 CONDENSED NOVELS AND OTHER PAPERS (1867); SENSATION NOVELS CON-
DENSED (1871). See SHEPPERSON, supra note 7, at 234-36; see also Muck-a-
Muck, a parody of James Fenimore Cooper, reprinted in MACDONALD,
supra note 31, at 97-103.
94 Benchley wrote many short parodies for magazines such as The New Yorker.
Three are reprinted in MACDONALD, supra note 31, at 111-14 and 212-17.
95 BATEMAN COMES HOME (1957) is described as a parody of "several recent
novels about the Deep South."
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parodies have flourished on television98 and in motion pictures,99 as those
media began to replace literature as the primary focus of popular culture.
Parody is also prominent in both music and the visual arts.1oo Although
many of these parodies have outlived the works that inspired them, and
therefore much of their critical humor is lost on modern audiences, their
collective impact on the development of literature and the arts cannot be
underestimated. 01
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAIR USE DEFENSE
FOR PARODY
A. Basic Principles of Copyright Law
U.S. copyright law has its basis in the Patent and Copyright Clause of
the Constitution, which provides:
The Congress shall have Power . .. To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries. 102
96 See MACDONALD, supra note 31, at 145-146, 251-54 (reprinting parodies of
Walt Whitman and Ernest Hemingway).
97 THE CLASSICS RECLASSIFIED (1960); TWISTED TALES FROM SHAKESPEARE
(1957); AMERICAN LIT RELIT (1964).
98 Parodies have always been a popular feature of television sketch comedy
shows, such as The Jack Benny Show (1950-64) (see notes 146-150 and ac-
companying text); Sid Caesar's Your Show of Shows (1950-58) (see notes
151-153 and accompanying text); The Danny Kaye Show (1963-67); and The
Carol Burnett Show (1967-79); and, more recently, Saturday Night Live
(1975-present) (see notes 179-184 and accompanying text), In Living Color,
and MAD TV.
99 See, e.g., BLAZING SADDLES (1973), YOUNG FRANKENSTEIN (1974), HIGH
ANXIETY (1977), SPACEBALLS (1987), ROBIN HOOD: MEN IN TIGHTS
(1993), and DRACULA: DEAD AND LOVING IT (1995), all written by Mel
Brooks; AIRPLANE! (1980), Top SECRET! (1984), and THE NAKED GUN
(1988), written by David Zucker, Jerry Zucker and Jim Abrahams; HOT
SHOTS! (1991) (Abrahams); FATAL INSTINCT (1993); NATIONAL LAMPOON'S
LOADED WEAPON I (1993); and Spy HARD (1996).
100 See Yonover, supra note 42, at 971-72 (listing many examples). Yonover also
notes that "[s]uch icons of musical Americana as 'Yankee Doodle,' 'The
Star-Spangled Banner,' and 'My Country 'Tis of Thee' started out as Eng-
lish ballads and were then made into political song parodies." Id. at 970.
101 See ROSE, PARODY//META-FIcTION, supra note 31, at 119 ("The history of
'successful' parodies - of their break with the past of which their own work
may earlier have been a part - demonstrates in broader terms the process
by which new discourses enter into written history as the supersession of
others.").
102 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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As the Supreme Court has recognized, this clause reflects the view that the
public welfare in artistic works will be maximized by the provision of an
economic incentive to authors:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music and the other arts. The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return
for an author's creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good. 10 3
"The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the individual author in
order to benefit the public." 104
It has been recognized, however, that a rigid application of the copy-
right statute would sometimes stifle the very creativity that the law is
designed to foster.' 05 Implicit in the notion of "progress" is the idea that
one must be able to study and build upon what has gone before. Science
and the arts progress by incremental degrees, by criticizing, refining, syn-
thesizing, reinterpreting, and occasionally rejecting, the theories and styles
that are currently accepted or fashionable. Zoologists must be free to use
the accepted system of scientific classification; it would be absurd if each
author had to come up with his or her own system from scratch. Histori-
ans need to review the findings and interpretations of others in order to
place their own contributions to the historical debate in context. Those
who study and practice law construct their persuasive arguments using
quotations from treatises, articles and reported cases. Those who study
literature need to quote excerpts from the works of others in order to
make their criticisms of those works comprehensible. Composers and
painters traditionally have used themes from other works as a point of
departure in creating their own works. In short, "[e]very book in litera-
ture, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much
which was well known and used before." 106 If copyright could be used to
103 Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); see also
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(copyright law "is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and
inventors by the provision of a special reward . . .").
104 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985)
(citation omitted).
105 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).
106 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 (quoting Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619
(C.C.D. Mass. 1845)). See also Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair
Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1109 (1990) ("First, all intellectual
creative activity is in part derivative. There is no such thing as a wholly
original thought or invention.").
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prevent such borrowing, innovation in science and the arts would cease to
exist. 07
Thus, "[flrom the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity
for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill
copyright's very purpose."108 In the absence of legislative guidance,
courts were left with the difficult task of balancing the level of copyright
protection that would provide authors and publishers with a sufficient eco-
nomic incentive to create new works, on the one hand, while permitting
sufficient freedom to those authors to draw upon the works of others in
creating new works, on the other. Over time, courts developed two doc-
trines designed to achieve such a balance: the idea/expression dichotomy,
which provides that copyright protects only an author's expression, and
does not extend to any facts and ideas contained in the copyrighted
work;109 and the fair use doctrine, which permits a second author to copy a
limited amount of expression from a copyrighted work in creating a new
work.110
Curiously, the U.S. Supreme Court played an insignificant role in the
early development the fair use doctrine."' Its first two attempts to ad-
dress fair use ended in affirmances by an equally divided court, thus pro-
ducing no written opinions.' 12 Lower federal courts embraced the
doctrine, however, and by 1961 fair use "was firmly established as an im-
plied limitation on the exclusive rights of copyright owners."113 Subse-
quently, when Congress enacted a comprehensive revision of the
107 See Leval, supra note 106, at 1109 ("Monopoly protection of intellectual prop-
erty that impeded referential analysis and the development of new ideas out
of old would strangle the creative process.").
108 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575 (citation omitted). See also Note, Parody and Copy-
right Infringement, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 585, 595 (1956) ("Although fair use
was not included by Congress in its [original] formulation of the statutory
scheme of copyright, the doctrine has a definite place in the constitutional
plan for literary protection.").
109 See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880). The idea/expression dichotomy
is now codified at 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) ("In no case does copyright
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery ... ").
110 See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (Story, J.). The
fair use doctrine is now codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107. See note 114 and ac-
companying text, below.
111 For an excellent overview of the historical development of the fair use doctrine
in the U.S., see WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPY-
RIGHT LAw 19-63 (2d ed. 1995).
112 See Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958); Williams & Wil-
kins Co. v. United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
113 REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
TE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (July 1961).
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Copyright Act in 1976, it codified the existing fair use doctrine in Section
107. As amended in 1992, that section reads:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the
fair use of a copyrighted work ... for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, news reporting, or research, is not
an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to
be considered shall include -
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding
of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all of the
above factors.114
In light of this history, it is clear that "[f]air use should not be considered a
bizarre, occasionally tolerated departure from the grand conception of the
copyright monopoly. To the contrary, it is a necessary part of the overall
design."115
The Supreme Court's first published opinion on fair use came in 1984.
In Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,116 two movie studios sued
Sony to enjoin sales of the Betamax videotape recorder, on the grounds
that it was being promoted and used to infringe copyrighted movies. By a
5-4 vote, the Court held that the unauthorized home videotaping of broad-
cast movies for time-shifting purposes was a fair use." 7 Although the
works were creative rather than factual, and were copied in their entirety,
the majority reasoned that timeshifting was a noncommercial use," 8 and
114 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). The last sentence was added in 1992, in response to
two decisions in the Second Circuit that seemed to make the unpublished
character of the work virtually dispositive. See Act of October 24, 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-492, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 106 Stat. 3145; see also note 139,
infra.
115 Leval, supra note 106, at 1110; see also id. at 1107 ("Fair use should be per-
ceived . . . as a rational, integral part of copyright, whose observance is
necessary to achieve the objectives of that law.").
116 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
117 Id. at 447-55.
118 Id. at 449.
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that there was no demonstrated harm to the market for the copyrighted
works.119 Instead, timeshifting would allow more people to watch the tel-
evision broadcast, which might lead to increased revenue from advertis-
ers.120 The dissent argued that fair use should be limited to "productive"
uses that result in the creation of new works, rather than "reproductive"
uses that simply act as a substitute for the original work.121
The following year, in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation En-
terprises,122 the Court held, 6-3, that an unauthorized publication of ex-
cerpts from former President Gerald Ford's memoirs was not a fair use.
Harper & Row had licensed Time Magazine to publish excerpts of Ford's
memoirs one week before the book was shipped to stores. Working from
a purloined copy of the manuscript, The Nation "scooped" Time by pub-
lishing an article containing key quotes from the book two weeks before
its release. As a result, Time canceled its contract with Harper & Row.123
The majority first considered and rejected the defendant's First
Amendment defense, holding that any free speech concerns in using copy-
righted material were adequately addressed by the idea-expression dichot-
omy and the fair use doctrine.124 The court then considered the four fair
use factors listed in the statute. Although the use was for a traditional
purpose, news reporting,125 the majority held that the use was commercial
and in bad faith, because "the user stands to profit from exploitation of the
copyrighted material without paying the customary price."126 The major-
ity acknowledged that factual works could be more freely copied than
works of fiction, but it ruled that because Ford's memoirs had not yet been
published, the exclusive right of first publication outweighed the need to
use verbatim quotes.127 Likewise, the majority acknowledged that 300
words quoted were "an insubstantial portion" of the 200,000 word manu-
script, but it approved the district court's qualitative assessment that
"[Tihe Nation took what was essentially the heart of the book."128 Fi-
nally, the majority noted that the use had actually resulted in harm to the
119 Id. at 451, 454.
120 Id. at 452-53 & n.38. Although the Betamax was also being used to make
copies of movies for permanent retention, the Court declined to issue an
injunction against Sony, holding that the Betamax was "capable of substan-
tial non-infringing uses." Id. at 442.
121 Id. at 477-80 (dissenting opinion).
122 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
123 Id. at 542-43.
124 Id. at 555-60.
125 Id. at 561.
126 Id. at 562.
127 Id. at 563-64.
128 Id. at 564-65.
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market for prepublication excerpts of the work, i.e., the cancellation of the
agreement with Time.129
Both Sony and Harper & Row could be cited as examples of the prin-
ciple that "hard cases make bad law."o30 Both cases were complicated by
unusual issues: in Sony, it was the extent to which a manufacturer could
be held responsible for infringement by home users; 31 in Harper & Row,
it was the fact that The Nation had used a stolen copy of the manuscript
instead of waiting until after the book was published.132 Perhaps as a re-
sult,133 in both cases the Court's reasoning seemed to raise as many ques-
tions as it resolved.134 Many of those questions were answered in 1994,
however, by the Court's unanimous decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc.'as That decision, which involved an alleged rap music parody
of the popular song "Oh, Pretty Woman," is discussed in Part II.D.,
below.'36
Many authors have explained "fair use" in economic terms, arguing
that a court should find "fair use" only in cases of market failure.' 37 Thus,
for example, a court should permit fair use in cases in which the cost of
129 Id. at 566-67.
130 See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 111, at 243-51 (criticizing Sony); Robin Feingold,
When 'Fair is Foul': A Narrow Reading of the Fair Use Doctrine in Harper
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 218
(1986) (criticizing Harper & Row); Gary L. Francione, Facing the Nation:
The Standards for Copyright, Infringement, and Fair Use of Factual Works,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 519 (1986) (same); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing
the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1659, 1668-86 (1988) (criticizing
both); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History,
72 CORNELL L. REv. 857, 896-99 (1987) (same).
131 Sony, 464 U.S. at 434-42.
132 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 543.
133 Arguably, both cases would have been decided differently if those factors had
not been present. For example, in every copyright case involving videotap-
ing subsequent to Sony, the copyright owner successfully sued the entity
that had done the actual taping. See PATRY, supra note 111, at 251-57. And
in Harper & Row, the majority relied heavily on the facts that the manu-
script was stolen and had not yet been published. 471 U.S. at 564 (noting
"even substantial quotations might qualify as fair use in a review of a pub-
lished work"); id. at 550-55, 562-64.
134 See L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV.
1, 65 (1987) ("Sony and Harper & Row are more sound in their results than
in their reasoning.").
135 510 U.S. 569 (1994). See Pierre N. Leval, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice
Souter's Rescue of Fair Use, 13 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19 (1994).
136 See notes 195-222 and accompanying text.
137 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L.
REv. 1600 (1982); William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 357-61 (1989); Lydia
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negotiating a license would exceed the benefit to the user or to the public
that would be expected to result.138 Permission to quote short excerpts
from a work in biography or other scholarly work is an example.139 Like-
wise, fair use should be permitted where the copyright holder tries to use
the copyright to suppress the flow of information instead of for economic
gain.140 Examples include the use of a work in critical reviews141 and par-
odies,142 as well as in comparative advertising.143 More generally, any use
Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era
of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1997).
138 Gordon, supra note 137, at 1627-30; Landes & Posner, supra note 137, at 357-
58.
139 See, e.g., Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affd,
953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991); New Era Publications Int'l ApS v. Henry Holt
& Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), affd on other grounds, 873 F.2d
576 (2d Cir.), petition for rehearing en banc denied, 884 F.2d 659 (2d Cir.
1989); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
rev'd, 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987). It should be noted that following these
decisions, Congress amended the Copyright Act to provide that "[tihe fact
that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use." 17
U.S.C. § 107 (1994). See note 114, infra. These cases and the subsequent
amendment are discussed in PATRY, supra note 111, at 88-100 and 394-98.
140 Gordon, supra note 137, at 1632-35; Landes & Posner, supra note 137, at 359.
141 Cases involving actual reviews of books and movies are scarce, apparently be-
cause such reviews are so often cited as a paradigm example of fair use.
See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564
(1985) ("even substantial quotations might qualify as fair use in a review of
a published work"); Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley
Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d 1400, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986) ("A common type of
'fair use' is quotation of a passage in a book review."); Wainwright Sec., Inc.
v. Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977) ("a classic
illustration of fair use is quoting from another's work in order to criticize
it"); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976) (listing "quotation of excerpts in a
review or criticism for purposes of illustration or comment" among exam-
ples of fair use); Landes & Posner, supra note 137, at 358 ("A standard
example of fair use is the book review that quotes brief passages from the
book being reviewed.").
142 As will be seen below, cases involving parody have been frequently litigated.
See notes 145-230 and accompanying text.
Many scholars have tried to develop an economic analysis of the parody prob-
lem. See, e.g, Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me? Notes on
Market Failure and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q. J. 305
(1993); Richard A. Posner, When is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67
(1992); Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won't Sell: Parody, Fair Use, and Ef-
ficiency in Copyright Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 79 (1991); Michael A.
Chagares, Parody or Piracy: The Protective Scope of the Fair Use Defense to
Copyright Infringement Actions Regarding Parodies, 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L.
& ARTs 229 (1988); Sheldon N. Light, Parody, Burlesque, and the Economic
Rationale for Copyright, 11 CONN. L. REv. 615 (1979). While all these au-
thors agree that some protection for parody should be provided, there is
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which contributes to the creation of a new work without excessively dimin-
ishing the economic incentive provided to the original author should be
considered a fair use.144
B. Case Law Prior to 1976
Although the roots of a parody defense based on fair use can be
found in a handful of cases from early in the 20th century,145 the first case
to address the parody defense in detail was Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System.146 In Loew's, the author of the suspense drama Gas-
light and the producers of the motion picture version of the play sued Jack
Benny and CBS to enjoin the television broadcast of a parody entitled
"Auto-light."1 47 U.S. District Judge James M. Carter rejected Benny's fair
use defense in sweeping terms:
substantial disagreement concerning the boundaries of that protection. For
an excellent overview and criticism of the various models, see Anastasia P.
Winslow, Rapping on a Revolving Door: An Economic Analysis of Parody
and Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 767, 800-08
(1996). Winslow concludes that fair use protection for parody should de-
pend primarily on three factors: the likelihood of a voluntary exchange; the
public interest in dissemination; and the degree to which the parodist made
substantial adaptations or contributions to the original work. Id. at 809-12.
143 See, e.g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626
F.2d 1171, 1176 & n.13 (5th Cir. 1980); Keep Thompson Governor Comm.
v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957 (D.N.H. 1978).
144 See Leval, supra note 106, at 1110 ("the use must be of a character that serves
the copyright objective of stimulating productive thought and public in-
struction without excessively diminishing the incentives for creativity.");
Loren, supra note 137, at 48 ("uses whose external benefits outweigh any
perceived damage to the creators' incentive to create"); Parody and Copy-
right Infringement, supra note 108, at 595 ("Fair use thus can be defined as a
use which will not seriously discourage progress by artists or a use whose
social value greatly outweighs any detriment to the artist whose work is
borrowed."). See also Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in
Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REv. 989, 1078 (1997) ("courts must
be willing to permit a use in circumstances where it adds a great deal of
value relative to what has been copied, even if the result is to harm the
market for the original copyrighted work.").
145 See Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 125 F. 977 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903); Green v.
Minzensheimer, 177 F. 286 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909); Green v. Luby, 177 F. 287
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909); Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y.
1914). These cases are discussed in PATRY, supra note 111, at 48-49 and 51-
52.
146 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), affd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239
F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1956), affd by an equally divided court sub nom. Colum-
bia Broad. Sys. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
147 The complete facts were somewhat more complicated. In 1945, one year after
the movie was released, Benny broadcast a 15-minute parody of Gaslight on
his radio program. Loew's had prior knowledge of the radio show and im-
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[W]e conclude that plaintiffs have a property right in "Gaslight"
which defendant may not legally appropriate under the pretense
that burlesque as fair use justifies a substantial taking; that
parodized or burlesqued taking is to be treated no differently
from any other appropriation; that as in all other cases of alleged
taking, the issue becomes first one of fact, i.e., what was taken
and how substantial was the taking; and if it is determined that
there was a substantial taking, infringement exists.148
The Loew's opinion is badly flawed because of one major error: Judge
Carter's refusal to concede that parody serves a legitimate fair use pur-
pose.149 His holding amounted to a complete rejection of the fair use de-
fense for any parody, the sole inquiry being the substantial similarity test
for infringement. Judge Carter also rejected Benny's argument that his
taking had no economic effect on the original, stating that "[t]he mere
absence of competition or injurious effect upon the copyrighted work will
not make a use fair." 5 0
pliedly consented to it. 131 F. Supp. at 168-69. In 1952, Benny broadcast a
15-minute television parody of the movie on his 30-minute television show.
Id. at 169. (The Ninth Circuit incorrectly stated that this parody was 30
minutes in length. 239 F.2d at 533.) This time, Loew's complained immedi-
ately after the broadcast. 131 F. Supp. at 169. One year later, Benny and
CBS prepared a third version that the district court characterized as "a mo-
tion picture for television." Id. Unfortunately, neither opinion states ex-
actly how long this third version was. Since it was intended to be broadcast
on Benny's television show, it was probably no longer than 30 minutes; and
the district court stated that "[t]he three burlesques . . . are generally and
basically the same," 131 F. Supp. at 185, which suggests that the third ver-
sion might have been only 15 minutes long as well.
148 131 F. Supp. at 183.
149 Thus, while Judge Carter correctly noted that fair use was intended "for the
advancement of the science or art," he added, "[w]e do not think . . . the
word art was used in a sense broad enough to include a T.V. program alleg-
edly taken from a motion picture." Id. at 175.
150 Id. at 184.
Many subsequent commentators have attempted to justify the Loew's decision
on the ground that Benny's skit was not a parody at all, but simply a comic
adaptation of the original play. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 137,
at 360 ("Benny was not attacking Gas Light any more than Abbott and
Costello were attacking Frankenstein in Abbott and Costello Meet Franken-
stein."); 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 10.2.1.2.a, at 10:26 (2d ed. 1996)
("In the court's view, defendant's burlesque was little more than an abbre-
viated version of plaintiff's motion picture, one that plaintiff might itself
have made or licensed."). Others have emphasized the fact that, at the
time, television was believed to pose a strong competitive threat to the en-
tire motion picture industry. Patry, supra note 111, at 164; Note, supra note
108 at 604; Victor S. Netterville, Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody,
Mimicry and Humorous Commentary, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 225, 233 (1965).
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Not surprisingly, Loew's was immediately appealed to the Ninth Cir-
cuit. While the decision was pending, Judge Carter was given a chance to
reconsider his views in another case involving a television parody. Colum-
bia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co.151 involved Sid Caesar's
parody of the movie From Here to Eternity, entitled "From Here to Ob-
scurity." While Judge Carter stuck to his emphasis on the substantiality of
the taking, he backed off somewhat from his view that a parody was enti-
tled to no special consideration:
Since a burlesquer must make a sufficient use of the original to
recall or conjure up the subject matter being burlesqued, the law
permits a more extensive use of the protectible portion of a
copyrighted work in the creation of a burlesque of that work
than in the creation of other fictional or dramatic works not in-
tended as a burlesque of the original.152
Judge Carter concluded that "[u]nlike Loew's, here there was a taking of
only sufficient [sic] to cause the viewer to recall and conjure up the origi-
nal," 153 and held in favor of NBC.
In the words of one commentator, Judge Carter's retreat "breathed
some life back into the mangled body of parody."154 Parody remained in
critical condition, however, because less than a month later, the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed Judge Carter's harsh Loew's opinion in Benny v. Loew's,
Inc.155 The panel specifically approved Judge Carter's initial view that
parody was to be treated no differently from any other taking, and reiter-
ated that parody was "no defense" to infringement.156 Defendants' argu-
ment that parody was a form of literary criticism was dismissed as "a
parody on the meaning of criticism."' 5 7 The decision was appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court, where it was affirmed by an equally divided court.158
These views are supported by the fact that Loew's later permitted the par-
ody to be broadcast after being paid a substantial amount of money. Net-
terville, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. at 233. Nevertheless, the uncompromising
language in Judge Carter's opinion provoked a great deal of criticism, in-
cluding a law review article by the then-Chief Judge of the Southern District
of California. See Leon J. Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of
Copyright, 33 CAN. B. REv. 1130, 1148-52 (1955).
151 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
152 Id. at 354.
153 Id. at 351.
154 Bernstein, supra note 69, at 20.
155 239 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd by an equally divided court sub nom. Colum-
bia Broad. Sys. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
156 Id. at 537.
157 Id.
158 Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
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The parody defense remained in this troubled state until Berlin v.
E.C. Publications,159 which involved Mad Magazine's publication of satiri-
cal lyrics which could be sung to the tunes of 25 of the plaintiffs' copy-
righted songs. The district court granted summary judgment to the
defendants on 23 of the songs, finding that the parody lyrics were not sub-
stantially similar to the originals.160 On appeal, the Second. Circuit af-
firmed without difficulty:
[A]s a general proposition, we believe that parody and satire are
deserving of substantial freedom - both as entertainment and
as a form of literary and social criticism. . . . At the very least,
where, as here, it is clear that the parody has neither the intent
nor the effect of fulfilling the demand for the original, and where
the parodist does not appropriate a greater amount of the origi-
nal work than is necessary to 'recall or conjure up' the object of
his satire, a finding of infringement would be improper.161
The court was politely critical of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Benny, not-
ing that it had been widely criticized in academic commentary,162 and
holding that the taking in Berlin satisfied the "substantiality" test of
Benny, "even if we were to find the rationale of that opinion
persuasive."1 63
C Case Law Under The Copyright Act of 1976
In 1976, Congress passed the first comprehensive revision of U.S.
copyright law since the 1909 Act. The 1976 Act gave statutory recognition
to the judicially developed fair-use doctrine for the first time.'" Although
parody was not listed among the illustrative uses in the statute, the legisla-
tive history of the 1976 Act expressly recognized that the "use in a parody
of some of the content of the work parodied" could be a fair use.' 65
Despite the fact that the Section 107 was "intended to restate the
present judicial doctrine of fair use, [and] not to change, narrow, or en-
large it in any way,"166 the guidelines that it provided were not followed
159 219 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), affd, 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964).
160 219 F. Supp. at 914.
161 329 F.2d at 545.
162 Id. at 544-45. See Comment, Parody and the Law of Copyright, 29 FORDHAM
L. REv. 570 (1961); Note, Parody and Burlesque - Fair Use or Copyright
Infringement?, 12 VAND. L. REV. 459 (1959); Note, Parody and Copyright
Infringement, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 585 (1956).
163 329 F.2d at 545.
16 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). See notes 111-115 and accompanying text.
165 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5678.
166 Id. at 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5680.
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by the Ninth Circuit in the next important parody case, Walt Disney Pro-
ductions v. The Air Pirates.167 In Air Pirates, the defendants had pub-
lished an underground comic book which depicted several Disney
characters as "active members of a free-thinking, promiscuous, drug-in-
gesting counterculture."1 68 The district court, constrained by the restric-
tive opinion in Benny, granted summary judgment to the plaintiff. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed, reinterpreting Benny in the process to clarify the
distinction between fair use and infringement:
The language in Benny concerning the substantiality of copying
. . . [should be] understood as setting a threshold that eliminates
from the fair use defense copying that is virtually complete or
almost verbatim. . .. Benny should not be read as taking the
drastic step of virtually turning the test for fair use into the test
for infringement.169
The court added in a footnote that "in so construing Benny, we necessarily
disagree with the dictum that parody is treated no different [sic] than any
other taking."1 70
Having disposed of Benny's most troublesome holding, the court then
adopted the "conjure up" test that had been used in both Columbia Pic-
tures and Berlin. Unlike the court in Berlin, however, it interpreted the
"conjure up" test as a limitation on how much of the original could be
used.171 Thus, the court found that "given the widespread public recogni-
tion of the major characters involved here, . . . very little would have been
necessary to place Mickey Mouse and his image in the minds of the read-
ers."1 72 The court also asserted that "an alternative that involves less
copying is more likely to be available" when the object of the parody is a
comic book rather than a speech or other literary work.' 7 3 Finally, the
court indicated its skepticism of the defendants' parodic purpose:
167 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978).
168 Id. at 753.
169 Id. at 756-57.
170 Id. at 757 n.13.
171 Id. at 757 ("In the absence of near-verbatim copying, other courts have ana-
lyzed the substantiality of copying by a parodist by asking whether the paro-
dist has appropriated a greater amount of the original work than is
necessary to 'recall or conjure up' the object of his satire.").
172 Id. at 757-58.
173 Id. at 758. Compare Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broad. Cos., Inc., 720
F.2d 231, 241-42 (2d Cir. 1983) (indicating that copying of "substantial por-
tions" of a literary work is likely to be infringement despite the addition of
original material, whereas substantial copying of a graphic or three-dimen-
sional work can be more easily justified because "[s]ignificant dissimilarities
between two works of this sort inevitably lessen the similarity that would
otherwise exist").
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Also significant is the fact that the essence of this parody did not
focus on how the characters looked, but rather parodied their
personalities, their wholesomeness and their innocence. Thus,
arguably defendants' copying could have been justified as neces-
sary more easily if they had paralleled closely (with a few signifi-
cant twists) Disney characters and their actions in a manner that
conjured up the particular elements of the innocence of the char-
acters that were to be satirized. While greater license may be
necessary under those circumstances, here the copying of the
graphic image appears to have no other purpose than to track
Disney's work as a whole as closely as possible.17 4
Unfortunately, the meaning of this convoluted paragraph is elusive at best.
How could an artist "conjure up" particular "elements" of a cartoon char-
acter's personality without also conjuring up other elements? What more
could the defendants have done to "conjure up" the innocence of Disney's
characters in order to justify copying their appearance more closely? Is
the court simply saying that the defendants' parody wasn't effective
enough? It is clear that the Ninth Circuit felt that the Disney characters
had been copied too closely under the circumstances, but it is unclear
what, if anything, the defendants could have done to avoid a finding of
infringement. 75
Despite this impenetrable passage, however, the greatest failing of the
Air Pirates opinion was its refusal to consider whether the defendant's par-
ody would have usurped the demand for the original or licensed derivative
works.176 Instead, the court focused solely on the substantiality of the tak-
ing, to the exclusion of the other factors:
174 581 F.2d at 758.
'75 See Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 960, 972 (1993)
("I have a hard time imagining how you could do that type of parody with-
out using the actual characters.").
The Ninth Circuit may have been concerned that the depiction of the Disney
characters in the defendants' parody was so similar to the originals that chil-
dren or adults might be confused as to whether Disney sponsored or en-
dorsed the parody; or it might have believed that the images of the
characters would be tarnished by their association with illegal activities. Id.
at 972. If so, however, it should have analyzed the issue as one of trade-
mark infringement or dilution rather than fair use. See notes 372-73, 409-
477 and accompanying text; cf 581 F.2d at 760 (remanding state unfair com-
petition claim with directions to consider evidence of likelihood of confu-
sion). Instead, it limited its discussion of trademark infringement to
defendants' use of the title "Silly Sympathies," finding no likelihood of con-
fusion to plaintiffs registered trademark "Silly Symphonies." Id. at 759.
176 See id. at 756 ("while some commentators have urged that the fair use defense
depends only on whether the infringing work fills the demand for the origi-
nal, this Court and others have also consistently focused on the substantial-
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Because the amount of defendant's copying exceeded permissi-
ble levels, summary judgment was proper. While other factors in
the fair use calculus may not be sufficient by themselves to pre-
clude the fair use defense, this and other courts have accepted
the traditional American rule that excessive copying precludes
fair use.177
In so holding, the court came perilously close to "virtually turning the test
for fair use into the test for infringement," the very error for which it had
criticized the Benny opinion.
In a footnote, the Air Pirates opinion also introduced an important
limitation on the use of copyrighted works to satirize society in general:
[W]e do not regard it as fatal . . . that the "Air Pirates" were
parodying life and society in addition to parodying the Disney
characters. Such an effect is almost an inherent aspect of any
parody. To the extent that the Disney characters are not also an
object of the parody, however, the need to conjure them up
would be reduced if not eliminated.' 78
In Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co.,179 however, the dis-
trict court expressly disagreed with this dictum, stating that even a pure
satire was deserving of fair use protection. Elsmere involved a Saturday
Night Live parody of the successful "I Love New York" advertising cam-
paign, which portrayed officials of the biblical town of Sodom discussing
ways to improve their city's image, and concluded with the cast singing "I
Love Sodom" to the tune of "I Love New York." The plaintiff argued that
the sketch did not qualify as a fair use, because although it satirized New
York City and its problems, it did not parody the theme song itself. The
district court disagreed, holding that the song was in part a target of the
parody, and adding:
[E]ven if it were found that "I Love Sodom" did not parody the
plaintiff's song itself, that finding would not preclude a finding of
fair use. . . . [T]he issue to be resolved by a court is whether the
use in question is a valid satire or parody, and not whether it is a
parody of the copyrighted song itself. To the extent that ... Walt
ity of the taking."). Despite the use of the word "also," the Air Pirates
court did not consider at all whether the parody would affect the potential
market for the original.
177 Id. at 758. The court cited both Benny and Berlin to support this proposition.
Berlin, of course, had said nothing of the sort. It merely found it unneces-
sary to address the issue of whether any greater taking was permissible.
178 Id. at 758 n.15.
179 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) (per
curiam).
How the Grinch Silenced a Parody 577
HeinOnline  -- 45 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 577 1997-1998
Journal, Copyright Society of the U.S.A.
Disney can be read to require that there be an identity between
the song copied and the subject of the parody, this Court
disagrees.180
Having disposed of the threshold issue, the court held that the parody was
a fair use, since it did not have the effect of fulfilling the demand for the
original.'81 The court also rejected the argument that the repetition of
one four-note phrase at the end of the sketch was greater than necessary
to "conjure up" the original, since that phrase was repeated continuously
throughout the original advertisements.182
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed "on Judge Goettel's thorough
opinion."183 In a footnote, however, the court proposed a more lenient
interpretation of the "conjure up" test:
[W]e note that the concept of "conjuring up" an original came
into the copyright law not as a limitation on how much of an
original may be used, but as a recognition that a parody fre-
quently needs to be more than a fleeting evocation of an original
in order to make its humorous point. A parody is entitled to at
least "conjure up" the original. Even more extensive use would
still be a fair use, provided the parody builds upon the original,
using the original as a known element of modern culture and
contributing something new for humorous effect or
commentary.184
Less than one year after the Second Circuit's Elsmere decision, how-
ever, another panel of the Second Circuit rejected the view that a satire
need not parody the copyrighted work itself in order to qualify as a fair
use. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson'85 involved a take-off on the popular song
"Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy (of Company B)." The allegedly infringing
song, entitled "Cunnilingus Champion of Company C," was presented as
part of an off-Broadway play called Let My People Come - A Sexual
Musical. The court said:
We agree . . . that a permissible parody need not be directed
solely to the copyrighted song but may also reflect on life in gen-
eral. However, if the copyrighted song is not at least in part an
object of the parody, there is no need to conjure it up....
The district court held that defendant's song was neither a par-
ody or burlesque of Bugle Boy nor a humorous commentary on
180 482 F. Supp. at 746 (footnotes omitted).
181 Id. at 747.
182 Id.
183 623 F.2d at 253.
184 Id. at n.1. 253.
185 425 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981).
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the music of the 40's. We are not prepared to hold that a com-
mercial composer can plagiarize a competitor's copyrighted
song, substitute dirty lyrics of his own, perform it for commercial
gain, and then escape liability by calling the end result a parody
or satire on the mores of society. Such a holding would be an
open-ended invitation to musical plagiarism.' 86
Judge Mansfield wrote a critical dissent, relying largely on the fourth fair
use factor. The majority had dismissed this factor by noting that both
works were exploited in records, in stage performances, and in printed
copies.' 87 Judge Mansfield argued that this analysis was "fatally defec-
tive," saying:
The issue is not whether the parody uses the same media as the
copyrighted work - most parodies do - but whether it is "ca-
pable of serving as a substitute for the original," which depends
on demand and product overlap rather than on the market in
which the two products were vended. Applying this correct stan-
dard, it is eminently clear that the two works respond to wholly
differing demands and that a customer for one would not buy the
other in its place.' 88
Judge Mansfield also argued that fair use should apply even if the work
itself was not a target of the parody, arguing that "[p]ermissible parody,
whether or not in good taste, is the price an artist pays for success, just as
the public figure must tolerate more personal attack than the average
citizen."189
In 1986, the Ninth Circuit summarized the state of parody law in
Fisher v. Dees.190 Fisher concerned a 29-second parody of the popular
song "When Sunny Gets Blue" entitled "When Sunny Sniffs Glue." The
Fisher court agreed with Air Pirates and MCA that "a humorous or satiric
work deserves protection under the fair-use doctrine only if the copied
work is at least partly the target of the work in question."191 However, it
expressly endorsed Elsmere's expansive reading of the "conjure up" test,
rejecting the argument that courts should "limit the amount of permissible
copying to that amount necessary to evoke only initial recognition in the
listener."1 92 The court also paid particular attention to the fourth fair use
factor, saying:
186 677 F.2d at 185.
187 Id. at 183, 185.
188 Id. at 190 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
189 Id. at 191 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
190 794 F.2d 432, 434 (9th Cir. 1986).
191 Id. at 436.
192 Id. at 438.
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Copyright law is not designed to stifle critics. . . . Accordingly,
the economic effect of a parody with which we are concerned is
not its potential to destroy or diminish the market for the origi-
nal - any bad review can have that effect - but rather whether
it fulfills the demand for the original.193
Comparing the two works, the court concluded that there was no cogniza-
ble economic effect on the original:
We do not believe that consumers desirous of hearing a romantic
and nostalgic ballad such as the composers' song would be satis-
fied to purchase the parody instead. Nor are those fond of par-
ody likely to consider "When Sunny Gets Blue" a source of
satisfaction.194
D. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
In 1994, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its first written opinion in a
copyright case involving parody.195 In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc.,196 the Sixth Circuit had ruled that a rap music parody of the popular
song "Oh, Pretty Woman" recorded by the controversial rap group 2 Live
Crew was not a fair use of the plaintiff's copyrighted work because of the
parody's "commercial" character.197 A unanimous Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that "a parody's commercial character is only one element
to be weighed in a fair use enquiry,"' 9 8 and remanded for further fact-
finding on the likely effect of the parody on the potential market for a
non-parody rap version of the song.19 9 In so holding, the Court com-
mented extensively on the four factors that comprise the fair use doctrine.
1. Purpose and Character of the Use
According to the Court, the "central purpose" of the first factor is to
determine
193 Id. at 437-38.
194 Id. at 438.
195 The Court had previously decided one case involving an alleged parody of a
copyrighted work, but it had not issued an opinion because the Court was
equally divided. See Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp.
165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th
Cir. 1956), affd by an equally divided court sub nom. Columbia Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958), discussed in notes 146-158 and ac-
companying text.
196 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
197 Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd,
510 U.S. 569 (1994).
198 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572.
199 Id. at 593-94.
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whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the orig-
inal creation, or instead adds something new, with a further pur-
pose or different character, altering the first with new expression
meaning or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what
extent the new work is "transformative." 20 0
Although a transformative use is not necessary to a finding of fair use,
"the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally fur-
thered by the creation of transformative works."201 Because parody "can
provide social benefit, by shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the
process, creating a new one," it "has an obvious claim to transformative
value," and may qualify as a fair use under §107.202
In its opinion, the Court recognized a possible distinction between
parody and satire:203
[T]he heart of any parodist's claim to quote from existing mate-
rial, is the use of some elements of a prior author's composition
to create a new one that, at least in part, comments on that au-
thor's works. If, on the contrary, the commentary has no critical
bearing on the substance or style of the original composition,....
the claim to fairness in borrowing from another's work dimin-
ishes accordingly (if it does not vanish) . . . Parody needs to
mimic the original to make its point, and so has some claim to
use the creation of its victim's (or collective victims') imagina-
tion, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires
justification for the very act of borrowing.204
Although this passage suggests that a parody or satire must target the orig-
inal work in order to qualify as a fair use, in a footnote the Court retreated
from this extreme position:
If a parody whose wide dissemination in the market runs the risk
of serving as a substitute for the original or licensed derivatives
... ,it is more incumbent on one claiming fair use to establish
the extent of transformation and the parody's critical relation-
ship to the original. By contrast, where there is little or no risk
of market substitution, whether because of the large extent of
transformation of the earlier work, the new work's minimal dis-
tribution in the market, the small extent to which it borrows
200 Id. at 579 (citations and internal quotes omitted).
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 The Court quoted two definitions of "satire" as a work "in which prevalent
follies or vices are assailed with ridicule," or are "attacked through irony,
derision, or wit." Id. at 581 n.15 (citations omitted).
204 Id. at 580-81.
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from the original, or other factors, taking parodic aim at the orig-
inal is a less critical factor in the analysis, and looser forms of
parody may be found to be fair use, as may satire with lesser justi-
fication for the borrowing than would otherwise be required.205
Taken together, these passages suggest that even a satire that does not
target the original work may legitimately be deemed a fair use as long as
only a small amount of original expression is taken and the satire does not
act as a market substitute for the original or for authorized derivative
works. This interpretation is supported by the Court's insistence that
"parody, like any other use, has to . .. be judged case by case, in light of the
ends of the copyright law." 206 In a concurring opinion, however, Justice
Kennedy indicated that he would reject such an interpretation. 207
Next, the Court held that the Sixth Circuit erred "[i]n giving virtually
dispositive weight to the commercial nature of the parody." 208 The Sixth
Circuit had relied on a passage from the Supreme Court's Sony opinion
stating that "every commercial use of copyrighted material is presump-
tively ... unfair." 209 The Supreme Court, however, rejected the view that
the quoted language created a per se rule against commercial uses, saying:
If, indeed, commerciality carried a presumptive force against a
finding of fairness, the presumption would swallow nearly all of
the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of §107, in-
cluding news reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholar-
ship, and research, since these activities "are generally
conducted for profit in this country." Congress could not have
intended such a rule . . .210
Instead, the Court held only that "the fact that a publication was commer-
cial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to weigh against
205 Id. at 580 n.14 (emphasis added).
206 Id. at 581 (emphasis added).
207 Id. at 597 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The parody must target the original, and
not just its general style, the genre of art to which it belongs, or society as a
whole (although if it targets the original, it may target those features as
well).").
208 Id. at 584.
209 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451
(1984). See also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 562 (1985) (quoting Sony).
210 Id. at 584, quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 592 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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a finding of fair use," 211 and cautioned that "even the force of that ten-
dency will vary with the context." 212
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The Court agreed with the general proposition that under the second
factor, creative works are entitled to greater copyright protection than fac-
tual works, but added that this factor is of little significance in a parody
case, because "parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive
works." 213
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
In assessing the third factor, "attention turns to the persuasiveness of
a parodist's justification for the particular copying done." 214 The Court
held that parody often will require copying of qualitatively important por-
tions of a work, because "the parody must be able to 'conjure up' at least
enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit recogniza-
ble." 215 The Court also recognized that the "conjure up" test did not de-
lineate the maximum amount that could be taken, saying that "[o]nce
enough has been taken to assure identification, how much more is reason-
able will depend" on the other fair use factors.216 Finally, the Court indi-
cated that the amount copied should be compared to the amount of
original comment added by the parodist:
[T]he question of fairness asks what else the parodist did besides
go to the heart of the original. It is significant that 2 Live Crew
not only copied the first line of the original, but thereafter de-
parted markedly from the Orbison lyrics for its own ends. 2 Live
Crew not only copied the bass riff and repeated it, but also pro-
duced otherwise distinctive sounds, interposing "scraper" noise,
overlaying the music with solos in different keys, and altering the
drum beat. This is not a case, then, where "a substantial por-
tion" of the parody itself is composed of "verbatim" copying of
the original. It is not, that is, a case where the parody is so insub-
211 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585, quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.
212 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585. For example, the use "of a copyrighted work to
advertise a product, even in a parody, will be entitled to less indulgence ...
than the sale of a parody for its own sake." Id.
213 Id. at 586.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 588 (emphasis added), citing Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broad. Co.,
623 F.2d 252, 253 n.1 (2d Cir. 1980); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438-39
(9th Cir. 1986).
216 Id.
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stantial, as compared to the copying, that the third factor must
be resolved as a matter of law against the parodists.217
4. Effect upon the Potential Market or Value
The fourth factor requires courts to "take account not only of harm to
the original but also of harm to the market for derivative works."2 18 The
Court again held that it was error for the Sixth Circuit to presume a likeli-
hood of harm to the market from the commercial character of the use,
saying:
No "presumption" or inference of market harm that might find
support in Sony is applicable to a case involving something be-
yond mere duplication for commercial purposes.... But when,
on the contrary, the second use is transformative, market substi-
tution is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so
readily inferred. Indeed, as to parody pure and simple, it is more
likely that the new work will not affect the market for the origi-
nal in a way that is cognizable under this factor, that is by acting
as a substitute for it. . . . This is so because the parody and the
original usually serve different market functions.2 19
The Court cautioned that any diminution in market value caused by the
critical aspects of the parody is not actionable, endorsing the view that
"the role of the courts is to distinguish between biting criticism that merely
suppresses demand and copyright infringement, which usurps it." 22 0 It
also noted that "the unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will
license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such
uses from the very notion of a potential licensing market." 22 1 Instead, the
pertinent inquiry would be the effect of 2 Live Crew's rap parody on the
market for a non-parodic rap version of the original. Since neither party
had introduced evidence concerning the market for such potential deriva-
tive uses, the Court remanded the case for further consideration. 222
E. Case Law Subsequent to Campbell
Other than the Dr. Seuss case, only one published Court of Appeal
opinion has applied Campbell to a copyright case involving parody.223 In
217 Id. at 589 (footnote and citation omitted).
218 Id. at 590, quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568.
219 Id. at 591 (citations omitted).
220 Id. at 592 (internal quotes omitted).
221 Id.
222 Id. at 592-94.
223 Other Court of Appeals opinions have discussed the possible application of
Campbell to other types of intellectual property. See Elvis Presley Enters.
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Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,224 the Second Circuit considered a
parody of the famous photograph of a nude, pregnant Demi Moore on the
cover of Vanity Fair magazine. The parody, which appeared in a newspa-
per ad for the movie The Naked Gun 33-1/3: The Final Insult (itself a par-
ody of police detective movies), superimposed the smirking face of the
film's male star, Leslie Nielsen, onto the body of a nude pregnant model,
carefully posed to imitate the original.225 The Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court's opinion granting summary judgment in favor of the de-
fendant. 226 The Court held that the advertisement was a "transformative"
work that "may reasonable be perceived as commenting, through ridicule,
on what a viewer might reasonably think is the undue self-importance" of
the original photograph,227 and that "the strong parodic nature of the ad
tips the first factor significantly toward fair use, even after making some
discount for the fact that it promotes a commercial product."228 The court
noted that the ad "took more of the Leibovitz photograph than was mini-
mally necessary to conjure it up," but it gave the third factor "little, if any,
weight . . . so long as the first and fourth factors favor the parodist." 229
Finally, the court agreed that the ad "did not interfere with any potential
market for [plaintiff's] photograph or for any derivative works based on
it."230
IV. DR. SEUSS ENTERPRISES V. PENGUIN BOOKS USA, INC.
The Cat in the Hat is one of the most well-known of the 47 children's
books written by Theodor S. Geisel under the pseudonym Dr. Seuss. In
the district court's words, "Dr. Seuss's works are designed to hold a child's
interest through playful rhymes and illustrations which describe and depict
extremely fanciful creatures and situations." 2 3 1 In The Cat in the Hat, two
v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 198-200 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting parody defense to
trademark infringement in name and decor of defendant's restaurant, "The
Velvet Elvis"); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95
F.3d 959, 968-976 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that baseball cards featuring
parodies of major league baseball players were protected by the First
Amendment against claims based on the players' rights of publicity).
224 948 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998).
225 137 F.3d at 111-12.
226 The district court reasoned that the ad "was intended to make a mockery of an
image that had become a 'cultural icon,"' and that there was no evidence
that the ad would adversely affect the sale or licensing of the original photo.
948 F. Supp. at 1221, 1226.
227 137 F.3d at 114.
228 Id. at 115.
229 Id. at 116.
230 Id.
231 Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1561 (S.D.
Cal. 1996), affd, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
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young children are left alone in their house on a rainy day. Their boredom
is interrupted by the arrival of the Cat, a "mischievous but well-meaning
character" who is "almost always depicted with his distinctive scrunched
and somewhat shabby red and white stove-pipe hat."232 With his friends
Thing 1 and Thing 2, the Cat wreaks havoc on the neat and orderly home.
The children persuade the Cat to return the house to normal and the Cat
departs just as their parents return, leaving the children to wonder
whether they should tell their parents about the unauthorized visitor.233
In 1995, Alan Katz wrote and Chris Wrinn illustrated The Cat NOT in
the Hat!, a satire of the O.J. Simpson double-murder trial, in the style of
Dr. Seuss. Penguin Books USA, Inc. and Dove Audio, Inc., agreed to
publish and distribute the book in hardbound and audio formats.234 The
story begins in Brentwood:
A happy town
Inside L.A.
Where rich folks play
The day away
But under the moon
The 12th of June
Two victims flail
Assault! Assail!
Somebody will go to jail!
Who will it be?
Oh my! Oh me!235
The district court found that The Cat NOT in the Hat! was not based on
any one Dr. Seuss book in particular. Rather, "Penguin's book appears to
wander through Dr. Seuss's works, picking up an illustration here, [and] a
rhyme there."236 Thus, the third page mimics the title poem of Dr. Seuss'
One Fish / Two Fish / Red Fish / Blue Fish with the words "One Knife? /
Two Knife? / Red Knife / Dead Wife." 237 Later, the book depicts Simp-
son's houseguest Kato Kaelin in a manner similar to Dr. Seuss' Horton the
Elephant,238 together with a take-off on the familiar refrain of "Horton
Hatches The Egg":
I meant what I said
232 109 F.3d at 1396.
233 DR. SEUss, THE CAT IN THE HAT (1957).
234 109 F.3d at 1396.
235 Id. at 1401.
236 924 F. Supp. at 1561.
237 924 F. Supp. at 1563.
238 924 F. Supp. at 1579.
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And I said what I meant
An elephant's faithful
One hundred percent!239
Which was altered to read:
He said what he meant
A houseguest is faithful
One hundred percent.
Although the district court found that these instances were substantially
similar to the originals, it held that the taking from One Fish / Two Fish /
Red Fish / Blue Fish was not substantial enough to warrant a finding of
infringement, 240 and that the taking from Horton Hatches The Egg was
justified under the fair use doctrine as a criticism of "the original work's
endorsement of unquestioning faithfulness." 241
Thus, the only similarities on which the district court based its prelim-
inary injunction were the similarities between Dr. Seuss' illustrations of
the Cat in the Hat, and the parody's front and back cover illustrations of
O.J. Simpson and the narrator, respectively, wearing the Cat's stove-pipe
hat.2 4 2 The court held that Penguin was not entitled to a parody defense,
because "[c]ourts have allowed parody claims only where there was a dis-
cernable direct comment on the original." 243 The court found Penguin's
claims that its book critically commented on the original work to be "com-
pletely unconvincing," 244 and endorsed Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion in Campbell, which had questioned the majority opinion's charac-
terization of 2 Live Crew's parody as "a comment on the naivete of the
original. "245
On an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Penguin elaborated
on its claim that the work was both a satire of the O.J. Simpson trial and a
parody of Dr. Seuss' works:
The Parody is a commentary about the events surrounding the
Brown/Goldman murders and the O.J. Simpson trial, in the form
of Dr. Seuss parody the transposes the childish style and moral
content of the classic works of Dr. Seuss to the world of adult
concerns. The Parody's author felt that, by evoking the world of
239 DR. SEUss, HORTON HATCHES THE EGG (1940).
240 924 F. Supp. at 1566.
241 Id. at 1570.
242 Id. at 1564. The illustrations relied on by the district court are reproduced in
924 F. Supp. at 1577-78, and in the Ninth Circuit's opinion in 109 F.3d at
1407-08.
243 924 F. Supp. at 1569.
244 Id.
245 Id., quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 599 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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the Cat in the Hat, he could (1) comment on the mix of frivo-
lousness and moral gravity that characterized the culture's reac-
tion to the events surrounding the Brown/Goldman murders, (2)
parody the mix of whimsy and moral dilemma created by Seuss
works such as The Cat in the Hat in a way that implied that the
work was too limited to conceive the possibility of a real trickster
"cat" who creates mayhem along with his friends Thing 1 and
Thing 2, and then magically cleans it up at the end, leaving a
moral dilemma in his wake. 246
The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court that this was a "post-
hoc characterization of the work" that was "pure shtick" and "completely
unconvincing." 24 7
In analyzing the first fair use factor, the Ninth Circuit correctly ob-
served that "the inquiry is whether The Cat NOT in the Hat! merely super-
sedes the Dr. Seuss creations, or whether and to what extent the new work
is 'transformative,' i.e., altering The Cat in the Hat with new expression,
meaning or message." 248 However, it refused to find that The Cat NOT in
the Hat! was a parody, which it defined as "a literary or artistic work that
broadly mimics an author's characteristic style and holds it up to ridi-
cule." 249 The court said:
Although The Cat NOT in the Hat! does broadly mimic Dr.
Seuss' characteristic style, it does not hold his style up to ridicule.
The stanzas have "no critical bearing on the substance or style
of" The Cat in the Hat. Katz and Wrinn merely use the Cat's
stove-pipe hat, the narrator ("Dr. Juice") and the title (The Cat
NOT in the Hat!) "to get attention" or maybe even "to avoid the
drudgery in working up something fresh." Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S.
at 580, 114 S.Ct. at 1172. While Simpson is depicted 13 times in
the Cat's distinctively scrunched and somewhat shabby red and
white stove-pipe hat, the substance and content of The Cat in the
Hat is not conjured up by the focus on the Brown-Goldman
murders or the O.J. Simpson trial.250
Because it was unable to perceive any parodic character in the work, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that "there is no effort to create a transformative
work with 'new expression, meaning or message," 25' and added that "the
246 109 F.3d at 1402-03.
247 Id. at 1403.
248 109 F.3d at 1400.
249 Id. at 1401.
250 Id.
251 Id.
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infringing work's commercial character further cuts against the fair use
defense." 252
The court held that the second factor also favored the plaintiff, but it
conceded that "this factor typically has not been terribly significant in the
overall fair use balancing."25 3
Next, the court stated that the third factor "really raises the question
of substantial similarity discussed in the preceding section [on infringe-
ment], rather than whether the use is 'fair." 254 The court observed that
"the Cat's image is the highly expressive core of Dr. Seuss' work," 255 and
rejected the defendants' claim that "they selected The Cat in the Hat as the
vehicle for their parody because of the similarities between the two
stories." 256
Finally, the court presumed that The Cat NOT in the Hat! presented a
likelihood of harm to the potential market for the original and licensed
derivatives of the original:
Because, on the facts presented, Penguin and Dove's use of The
Cat in the Hat original was nontransformative, and admitted
commercial, we conclude that market substitution is at least
more certain and market harm may be more readily inferred.257
The Court also held that Penguin and Dove "must bring forward favorable
evidence about relevant markets," and that their "failure to submit evi-
dence on this point" disentitled them to rely on the fair use defense.258
V. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION
A. Fair Use Defense to Copyright Claim
In holding that the defendants were not entitled to rely upon a fair
use defense, the Ninth Circuit held that The Cat NOT in the Hat! was not a
parody; that as a satire it was not a "transformative" use of the original;
that as a result, the defendants had no permissible justification for using
the Cat's "image" 259 and stove-pipe hat on the front and back cover (and
252 Id.
253 Id. at 1402.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 1403.
258 Id.
259 Although the court repeatedly characterizes the allegedly infringing work as
having "appropriated the Cat's image," 103 F.3d at 1398, 1402, this state-
ment is misleading because the Cat in the Hat does not appear anywhere in
the defendant's work. See notes 234-242 and 324-330 and accompanying
text.
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13 times in the text); 260 and that harm presumptively existed to the poten-
tial market for the original or for licensed derivative works. Each of these
holdings was in error.
1. Purpose and Character of the Use
According to Campbell, "[tihe threshold question when fair use is
raised in defense of parody is whether a parodic character may reasonably
be perceived." 26 1 In the case of The Cat NOT in the Hat!, not only may a
parodic character reasonably be perceived, but the work manifestly satis-
fies several traditional and judicial definitions of parody.
In Campbell, the Supreme Court quoted a dictionary definition of
parody as a "literary or artistic work that imitates the characteristic style
of an author or a work for comic effect or ridicule." 262 By contrast, the
Ninth Circuit quoted a slightly different definition: a "literary or artistic
work that broadly mimics an author's characteristic style and holds it up to
ridicule." 263 The Ninth Circuit found that although the defendant's work
did broadly mimic the characteristic style of Dr. Seuss, it did not ridicule it.
But under the definition quoted by the Supreme Court, is not necessary
that the original be held up to ridicule; it is sufficient that the alleged par-
ody seeks to achieve a comic effect through exaggerated imitation. Like-
wise, in Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co.,264 the Second
Circuit stated that a parody is a fair use if it "builds upon the original,
using the original as a known element of modem culture and contributing
something new for humorous effect or commentary. "265
260 While the Ninth Circuit emphasized several times the use of the Cat's hat in
the text, the district court's holding was based only on the front and back
cover of the defendants' work. 924 F. Supp. at 1563-64 (discussing similari-
ties), id. at 1566 (dismissing some similarities as insubstantial), id. at 1570
(dismissing some similarities as fair use); see also 109 F.3d at 1399 (injunc-
tion based only on back cover).
261 510 U.S. at 582.
262 Id. at 580 (emphasis added). See also Nike Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d
1225, 1227 (7th Cir. 1993) ("a writing in which the language and style of an
author or work is closely imitated for comic effect or in ridicule").
263 109 F.3d at 1401 (emphasis added).
264 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
265 623 F.2d at 253 n.1. This decision was cited with approval by the Supreme
Court in Campbell. 510 U.S. at 580. See also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L &
L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 321 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that t-shirt using
recognizable trade dress of Budweiser label to extol virtues of Myrtle
Beach, S.C., was a trademark parody); compare id. at 327 (Powell, retired
Associate Justice, dissenting) ("It does not ridicule Budweiser or offer so-
cial commentary on the evils of alcohol.").
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One way of achieving a humorous effect or comment on the original
work is re-imagine the original work in an incongruous context.266 Thus,
the Oxford English Dictionary defines parody as a "composition in prose
or verse in which the characteristic turns of thought and phrase in an au-
thor or class of authors are imitated in such a way as to make them appear
ridiculous, especially by applying them to ludicrously inappropriate sub-
jects."267 Although the Supreme Court quoted only the first portion of
this definition in Campbell,268 it did not hold, or even suggest, that paro-
dies involving "ludicrously inappropriate subjects" could not qualify as a
fair use. Indeed, the rap music parody involved in the Campbell case itself
relied heavily on this type of parodic incongruity.269
Viewed in this light, it is clear that The Cat NOT in the Hat! is at least
in part a parody. By juxtaposing the childish style of Dr. Seuss' works with
the events surrounding the O.J. Simpson case, the parody succeeds in com-
menting both on society's fixation on the trial and on the "naivete of the
original."270 By placing O.J. Simpson in the Cat's hat, the authors not
only comment on Simpson's evasion of responsibility for his actions, but
they also subtly suggest that the Cat in the Hat may be seen as a sinister
266 See Berlin v. E.C. Publications, 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir. 1964) ("the humor-
ous effect achieved when a familiar line is interposed in a totally incongru-
ous setting, [is] traditionally a tool of parodists"); Anheuser-Busch, 962 F.2d
at 321 (defining a trademark parody as "a simple form of entertainment
conveyed by juxtaposing the irreverent representation of the trademark
with the idealized image created by the mark's owner."); see also notes 31-
36 and accompanying text.
267 11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 247 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis added), quoted
in L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987)
(holding that magazine's parody of the L.L. Bean catalog entitled "L.L.
Beam's Back-To-School-Sex-Catalog" was protected speech under the First
Amendment).
268 510 U.S. at 580 & n.13.
269 Id. at 583 ("2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose
fantasy comes true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a
sigh of relief from paternal responsibility. The later words can be taken as a
comment on the naivete of the original of an earlier day").
270 Id. See Gregory K. Jung, Comment, Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books,
13 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 119, 130 (1998) (noting that the authors' charac-
terization of the work as a parody "does not seem any more implausible
than 2 Live Crew's characterization of its version of "Pretty Woman" as a
criticism of the banality of Orbison's version."); Mary L. Shapiro, Com-
ment, An Analysis of the Fair Use Defense in Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Pen-
guin, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 1, 31 (1998) (noting several similarities
between The Cat NOT in the Hat! and 2 Live Crew's parody, and conclud-
ing that "both commented on society and the naivete of the original
work.").
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and dangerous figure, instead of the merely mischievous character de-
picted in the original work.271
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how else Dr. Seuss' work could be
parodied except by applying his characteristic style to patently adult sub-
ject matter. Dr. Seuss' work is already comic and often even satirical in
nature, so merely employing Seussian characters and rhymes in a humor-
ous children's work would be a flattering imitation at best, and piracy at
worst. Only by using the works of Dr. Seuss to comment on "ludicrously
inappropriate subjects" such as the O.J. Simpson trial can Dr. Seuss' style
be held up to ridicule. What better way could there be to criticize or make
fun of the character of the mischievous Cat, who manages to evade re-
sponsibility for his actions by disappearing into the night, than by compar-
ing the Cat to a real-life multiple murderer who accomplished the same
goal?
The Ninth Circuit, however, refused to accept the authors' characteri-
zation of the work as a parody.272 Instead, it rejected their argument as a
"post hoc characterization" that was "pure shtick" and "completely un-
convincing."2 7 3 In doing so, the panel overlooked the fact that all literary
criticism is a "post hoc characterization" of the work being examined, and
that regardless of the authors' intent, a work can have many different
meanings to different people. 274 Instead of following the Supreme Court's
directive to inquire only "whether a parodic character may reasonably be
perceived," 275 the Ninth Circuit panel allowed its own views concerning
the artistic merits of the work to color its judgment, an error which the
Supreme Court and other courts have repeatedly cautioned against.276 By
271 See Jason M. Vogel, Note, The Cat in the Hat's Latest Bad Trick: The Ninth
Circuit's Narrowing of the Parody Defense to Copyright Infringement in Dr.
Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 20 CARDozo L. REv. 287,
317 (1998) ("The Cat NOT in the Hat! implicitly asserts that, in some re-
spects, O.J. Simpson is like the Cat in the Hat. This creates the reciprocal
implication that the Cat in the Hat is somewhat like O.J. Simpson. This
inference should be construed as commenting upon Dr. Seuss's work.").
272 See notes 246-252 and accompanying text.
273 109 F.3d at 1403.
274 See notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
275 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582.
276 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582 ("Whether, going beyond that, parody is in good
taste or bad does not and should not matter to fair use."); Bleistein v. Don-
aldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) ("It would be a danger-
ous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves
final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest
and most obvious limits."); University of Notre Dame du Lac v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 256 N.Y.S.2d 301, 307 (App. Div. 1965) ("Whether
'John Goldfarb, Please Come Home' is good burlesque or bad, penetrating
satire or blundering buffoonery is not for us to decide. It is fundamental
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refusing to recognize the parodic content of The Cat NOT in the Hat!, the
Ninth Circuit ignored these admonitions, and instead joined the ranks of
those courts that have, in effect, shielded Disney and other cultural icons
of childhood from any type of critical comment in the form of parody.277
In rejecting the defendants' claim of parody, the Ninth Circuit relied
in part on the Second Circuit's opinion in Rogers v. Koons,278 in which the
court stated that "though the satire need not be only of the copied work
and may ... also be a parody of modem society, the copied work must be,
at least in part, an object of the parody." 279 That statement, however,
must be considered in the context of the facts of that case. Pop sculptor
Jeff Koons had taken a copyrighted photograph, removed the copyright
notice, and directed his artisans to copy the photograph as closely as possi-
ble in three-dimensional form.280 He attempted to avoid a finding of in-
fringement by claiming that his sculpture was a criticism of "the mass
production of commodities and media images" and was intended to be a
comment on "the political and economic system that created it."281 Be-
cause Koons did not make any serious attempt to add any original expres-
sion of his own, the Second Circuit properly held that his sculpture was not
a parody. In doing so, however, it explained:
By requiring that the copied work be an object of the parody, we
merely insist that the audience be aware that underlying the par-
ody there is an original and separate expression attributable to a
different artist. This awareness may come from the fact that the
copied work is publicly known or because its existence is in some
manner acknowledged by the parodist in connection with the
parody. 282
In this case, Dr. Seuss' work is well known to the public; the defendants
clearly acknowledged the existence of the prior work, both by labeling
their work a parody and identifying the original in their advertising, and
by recognizable allusions to the title (The Cat NOT in the Hat!) and the
that courts may not muffle expression by passing judgment on its skill or
clumsiness, its sensitivity or coarseness, or whether it pains or pleases.").
277 See Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1978) (hold-
ing that "a rather bawdy depiction of the Disney characters as active mem-
bers of free thinking, promiscuous, drug ingesting counterculture" was not a
fair use); Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that repeated use of the Mickey Mouse March in
a pornographic movie featuring sex acts with teenagers in Mouseketeer hats
was not a fair use).
278 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
279 Id. at 310.
280 Id. at 305.
281 Id. at 309.
282 Id. at 310.
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author ("Dr. Juice") of the original; and the defendants created a new
work that commented on the original by adding substantial original and
separate expression of their own. In this instance, therefore, Rogers does
not militate against a finding of fair use.
In any event, the Ninth Circuit made an even more egregious error
when it concluded that since the The Cat NOT in the Hat! was not a par-
ody, "there is no effort to create a transformative work with 'new expres-
sion, meaning, or message." 283 Although the majority in Campbell
indicated that a satire may require a greater justification for borrowing
from another's work than a parody, it did not hold that a satire could not
be a fair use.2 8 4 Indeed, it stated that a satire could be a fair use if "there
is little or no risk of market substitution, whether because of the large
extent of transformation of the earlier work, . . . [or] the small extent to
which it borrows from the original." 285 In holding that The Cat NOT in
the Hat! was not a transformative use entitled to fair use protection, the
Ninth Circuit erred in relying on Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion,286
which was dictum endorsed by only one justice.
In Campbell, the Supreme Court endorsed the theory of "transforma-
tive use" set forth in a law review article by U.S. District Judge Pierre N.
Leval. 287 In Judge Leval's words:
[If] the secondary use adds value to the original - if the quoted
matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of
new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understand-
ings - that is the very type of activity that the fair use doctrine
intends to protect for the enrichment of society.288
Thus, in a case involving an alleged parody of the cover of the Old
Farmer's Almanac by New York magazine, Judge Leval eloquently de-
fended satire as a fair use:
But the dispute as to whether New York's cover was a parody
misses the point. Yankee's argument implies that the special
considerations emanating from the First Amendment depend on
whether the allegedly infringing work is one of parody. That is
not correct. . . . [P]arody is merely an example of the types of
expressive content that are favored in fair use analysis under the
283 109 F.3d at 1401.
284 See notes 203-206 and accompanying text.
285 510 U.S. at 580 n.14.
286 See 109 F.3d at 1400 (quoting concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy).
287 510 U.S. at 575, 576 n.8, 578 & n.10, 579, 587, 590 n.21, 591, 592, 593 n.23, citing
Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1105 (1990).
288 Leval, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1111, cited in Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
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copyright law and First Amendment deference under the trade-
mark law.... New'York's commentary on the times - that the
reeling economy may be toppling New York from its glamorous,
free-spending perch toward the Yankee thrift characteristic of
the Almanac - is an expressive message that is fully entitled to
First Amendment deference, as much so as in the case of typical
parody.289
In such a case, the justification for permitting borrowing from the creative
works of another is that works of popular culture are common points of
reference for our society.290 They come to symbolize certain ideas and
values through the characters they contain and the events they portray.29 1
Unreasonably restricting the use of well-known works to satirize society
therefore runs the risk of restricting the free communication of ideas.2 92
289 Yankee Publ'g Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 279 (S.D.N.Y.
1992). Yankee Publishing was also cited with approval in Campbell. 510
U.S. at 583. See also Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d
Cir. 1964) ("as a general proposition, we believe that parody and satire are
deserving of substantial freedom - both as entertainment and as a form of
social and literary criticism.").
290 Cf White v. Samsung Elects. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1512 n.6 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., joined by O'Scannlain & Kleinfeld, JJ., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc) (listing 23 uses of trademarks as cultural references in
books, movies, fine art and popular songs).
291 See, e.g., Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 933-35 (D.D.C.
1985) (holding that defendant's use of plaintiff's trademark "Star Wars" to
refer to the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative was pro-
tected by the First Amendment).
292 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) ("we cannot indulge in the
facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running
a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process."); see also Cardtoons,
L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 972 (10th Cir.
1996):
[C]elebrities are "common points of reference for millions of individuals
who may never interact with one another, but who share, by virtue of
their participation in a mediated culture, a common experience and a col-
lective memory." Through their pervasive presence in the media, sports
and entertainment celebrities come to symbolize certain ideas and val-
ues. . . . Celebrities, then, are an important element in the shared com-
municative resources of our cultural domain.
Because celebrities are an important part of our public vocabulary, a par-
ody of a celebrity does not merely lampoon the celebrity, but exposes the
weakness of the idea or value that the celebrity symbolizes in society. ...
In order to effectively criticize society, parodists need access to images
that mean something to people, and thus celebrity parodies are a valuable
communicative resource. Restricting the use of celebrity identities re-
stricts the communication of ideas.
How the Grinch Silenced a Parody 595
HeinOnline  -- 45 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 595 1997-1998
Journal, Copyright Society of the U.S.A.
As the Second Circuit stated in Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcast-
ing Companies:293
Especially in an era of mass communications, it is to be expected
that phrases and other fragments of expression in a highly suc-
cessful copyrighted work will become part of our language....
It is decidedly in the interests of creativity, not piracy, to permit
authors to take well-known phrases and fragments from copy-
righted works and add their own contributions of commentary or
humor.294
In his concurring opinion in Campbell, Justice Kennedy argued
against permitting the unauthorized use of a copyrighted work as a
"weapon" to attack targets other than the original work (a use the major-
ity labeled "satire"). 295 He argues that although a parody of a particular
work must borrow from the original, the satirist has a wide range of poten-
tial weapons to choose from, including the entire store of public domain
works. 296 But even assuming that a workable distinction could be drawn
between the use of parody as a "weapon" and as a "target," 297 this argu-
ment is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, it ignores the fact that the
work used as a weapon must be current enough to enable the audience to
identify it.298 The vast majority of public domain works are more than 75
293 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983).
294 Id. at 242. See also Leval, supra note 106, at 1109 ("Monopoly protection of
intellectual property that impeded referential analysis and the development
of new ideas out of old would strangle the creative process.").
295 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 597 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The parody must target
the original, and not just its general style, the genre of art to which it be-
longs, or society as a whole"); see also 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT
§ 10.2.1.2.b. at 10:27 (2d ed. 1996) ("Unlike parody, satire should fall en-
tirely outside the scope of fair use.").
296 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 597 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("If the copyrighted song
is not at least in part an object of the parody, there is no need to conjure it
up.") (quoting MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981)); see
also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 295, at 10:27-28 ("There will rarely be a
shortage of other works, including public domain works, that, with some
ingenuity, can be made to serve as equally effective vehicles for the in-
tended satire."); Julie Bisceglia, Parody and Copyright Protection: Turning
the Balancing Act Into a Juggling Act, 34 COPYR. L. Svnr. (ASCAP) 1, 26
(1987) ("[U]sing a copyrighted work to snipe at other targets does not in-
volve the same urgency. It is reasonable in that case to require the parodist
to get permisison or to use something in the public domain. His criticism
will not be stifled, since it does not depend on a single text.").
297 But see notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
298 See notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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years old. 299 Even those few works that are still readily recognized by
older adults may not have any meaning or cultural significance for
younger adults, who are likely to view them as outdated and irrelevant.300
Second, "a parodist's choice of a particular weapon as embodying some-
thing else that is the ultimate 'target' is not accidental."3 01 By choosing a
particular work, the parodist is making an artistic decision that the work is
best suited for his or her purposes. The reason may be a felicitous meter
or rhyme scheme, the identification of the work in the public's mind with a
particular time period or other target, or a previously unrecognized con-
nection of artistic themes; but it is an inherently artistic judgment that
should be left to artists, not judges.302 Third, unless the copyright holder is
willing to license the work for use in satires, drawing a weapon/target dis-
tinction would deprive the satirist of a range of artistic choices without any
299 Prior to passage in 1998 of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-298, the maximum term of copyright for works published
before Jan. 1, 1978 was 75 years from the date of first publication. The
maximum term for such works has now been extended to 95 years. 17
U.S.C. § 304. For works created on or after Jan. 1, 1978, the term of copy-
right has been extended to life of the author plus 70 years, or in the case of
works made for hire, the earlier of 95 years from the date of first publica-
tion or 120 years from the date of creation. 17 U.S.C. § 302. These dura-
tions are so long that secondary authors will rarely live to see the familiar
works of their childhood fall into the public domain.
300 Moreover, in an increasingly diverse, multi-cultural society, it is myopic to as-
sume that there is a core of public domain works that is familiar to the
majority of the public. By contrast, it is a reasonable assumption that most
people have at least a passing familiarity with the most popular current
songs, movies and television shows.
301 Merges, supra note 142, at 311; see also Susan Linehand Faaland, Comment,
Parody and Fair Use: The Critical Question, 57 WASH. L. REv. 163, 185
(1981) ("Defendants might have a logical reason for conjuring up a song
without intending to parody the song itself."); Vogel, supra note 271, at 315
("Artistic ideas of the satirist are likely to be inextricably tied to the under-
lying borrowed material."); TEST, supra note 8, at 160 (noting the "intimate
and ultimately interdependent nature" of weapon and target).
302 The Supreme Court has cautioned that judges are ill-equipped to make artistic
judgments of this type. See note 276 and accompanying text. See also
Kathryn D. Piele, Three Years After Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.:
What is Fair Game for Parodists?, 18 Loy. L.A. ENr. L.J. 75, 98 (1997)
("Courts should not have discretion to make a subjective determination
about what an original work represents or what a secondary work is at-
tempting to say about it."); Paul Tager Lehr, Note, The Fair Use Doctrine
Before and After "Pretty Woman's" Unworkable Framework: The Adjusta-
ble Tool for Censoring Distasteful Parody, 46 FLA. L. REV. 443, 474-75
(1994) ("Judges surely are not equipped to determine what a work of art
means, nor are they equipped to distinguish a parody that comments on the
original work from a satire that uses the original work to comment on
society").
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countervailing societal benefit. Denying permission would serve only to
permit government-sanctioned censorship, and would not serve the copy-
right holder's economic interest.30 3 For these reasons, the majority of aca-
demic commentators agree that the use of parody as a "weapon" to attack
targets other than the copyrighted work should be given protection under
the fair use doctrine.3o4
In this case, The Cat NOT in the Hat! contains an expressive message
that is deserving of fair use protection. It suggests that O.J. Simpson be-
haved like a naughty child in trying to place the blame for the Brown-
Goldman murders on a mysterious unknown visitor, when in reality, Simp-
son and the "Cat" were one and the same:
JUICE
+ST
JUSTICE
Hmm ... take the word JUICE.
Then add ST.
Between the U and I, you see.
And then you have JUSTICE.
Or maybe you don't.
Maybe we will.
And maybe we won't.
'Cause if the Cat didn't do it?
Then who? Then who?
Was it him?
Was it her?
303 This argument is more fully developed in the discussion of the fourth factor.
See notes 357-374 and accompanying text.
304 See, e.g., Winslow, supra note 142, at 803-05 (arguing that no distinction should
be made between weapon parody and target parody); Merges, supra note
142, at 311-12 ("Perhaps one might even argue that 'weapon' cases are more
deserving of fair use 'protection' since they presumably serve the goal of
promoting criticism of and commentary on 'larger' social issues and val-
ues."); Faaland, supra note 301, at 186 n.137 ("a parody which does closely
track the original's wording and structure can quite legitimately carry social
criticism without criticizing the original."); Dorsen, supra note 59, at 958
("Satire is a creative literary form using copyrighted material to fashion
something entirely new, rather than merely reproducing the product of the
copyright owner."); Vogel, supra note 271, at 310-16 (arguing that rationale
for protecting parody applies equally to satire); L. David McBride, Note,
Copyright: Same Song, Different Verse: Parody as Fair Use After Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 48 OKLA. L. REv. 627, 646-47 (1995) (same).
Both Paul Goldstein and Judge Richard A. Posner have expressed the con-
trary view. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 295, at 10:27-28; Posner, supra note
142, at 71, 73-74. For additional criticism of their views, see notes 362-369
and accompanying text.
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Was it me?
Was it you?
Oh me! Oh my!
Oh my! Oh me!
The murderer is running free.305
While many commentators expressed the view that Simpson was in fact
guilty of the Brown-Goldman murders, most of them did so in a stultify-
ingly serious, pompous and self-important manner. By framing their social
satire with a common cultural reference that would be instantly recogniza-
ble to everyone, the defendants were attempting to convey their message
in a unique manner to an audience already satiated with the coverage of
the traditional media. In addition, using a well-known children's book to
comment on the trial acted as a "comment on the mix of frivolousness and
moral gravity that characterized the culture's reaction to the events sur-
rounding the Brown/Goldman murders."306 In so doing, the defendants
did not merely supersede the original; instead, they "add[ed] something
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with
new expression, meaning or message."307 As such, the defendants' use
was a "transformative" use that was deserving of fair use protection.
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
In Campbell, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the second factor
has little role to play in parody cases, because "parodies almost invariably
copy publicly known, highly expressive works." 308 This fact, however, sug-
gests that the purpose of copyright, to encourage the creation of new crea-
tive works, is little served by protecting such works against limited use by
others as vehicles for parody and satire:
After all, any work of sufficient notoriety to be the object of par-
ody has already secured for its proprietor considerable financial
benefit. According that proprietor further protection against
parody does little to promote creativity, but it places a substan-
tial inhibition on the creativity of authors adept at using parody
to entertain, inform, or stir public consciousness. 309
305 109 F.3d at 1402 (quoting The Cat NOT in the Hat!).
306 Id. (quoting the defendants' opening brief on appeal).
307 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
308 510 U.S. at 586.
309 Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broad. Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231, 242-43 (2d Cir.
1983). Posner correctly points out that this argument assumes an ex post
point of view rather than an ex ante one. Posner, supra note 142, at 72-73.
However, it is likely that the effect of protecting parody and satire as fair
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Moreover, "[tihe public interest [in dissemination of the parody] should
increase in direct proportion to the publicity received by the object of the
parody, as our nation is committed to an 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open' debate on public issues, and the more public a work is, the more
available it should be for use in commentary."3 10
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
According to the Supreme Court, "[tihe third factor asks whether the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole . . . are reasonable in relation to the purpose of
the copying."3 11 The Ninth Circuit found that the defendants "appropri-
ated the Cat's image, copying the Cat's Hat and using the image on the
front and back covers and in the text (13 times)," and held that such copy-
ing was unreasonable, because "the Cat's image is the highly expressive
core of Dr. Seuss' work." 312
The Ninth Circuit's rationale is misleading as a factual matter, be-
cause it implies that the character of the Cat in the Hat (the Cat's "im-
age") was copied verbatim by the defendants. That is incorrect. The
character of the Cat in the Hat does not appear at all in the defendant's
work. What appears is a caricature of O.J. Simpson drawn in the style of
Dr. Seuss, wearing the Cat's distinctive red-and-white stove-pipe hat.3 13 It
is only the hat that makes the allusion to The Cat in the Hat recognizable.
Without the hat, the defendant's drawings would still be Seussian in gen-
eral appearance, but no particular character (and certainly not the Cat)
could be identified. Thus, the Ninth Circuit's ruling amounts to a virtual
monopoly on any use of a red-and-white stovepipe hat.
But even accepting the Ninth Circuit's finding that the defendant cop-
ied the "highly expressive core" of the plaintiff's work, that finding is
merely the beginning of the analysis. As the Supreme Court explained in
Campbell:
use on the economic incentives to the original author are extremely modest.
See notes 340-349 and accompanying text.
310 Winslow, supra note 142, at 811 (footnote deleted; emphasis in original); see
also notes 384-399 and accompanying text (discussing public interest under
First Amendment of permitting parodies of celebrities and other public
figures).
311 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (citation and internal quote omitted).
312 109 F.3d at 1402.
313 See 924 F. Supp. at 1577. The back cover also features a drawing of the narra-
tor wearing a red-and-white stovepipe hat. While this drawing bears some
similarities to the plaintiffs drawing of the Cat, it is a recognizably human
character, and could not be mistaken for the Cat in the Hat. Id. at 1578.
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Parody's humor, or in any event its comment, necessarily springs
from recognizable allusion to its object through distorted imita-
tion. Its art lies in the tension between a known original and its
parodic twin. When parody takes aim at an original work, the
parody must be able to "conjure up" at least enough of that orig-
inal to make the object of its critical wit recognizable. What
makes for this recognition is quotation of the original's most dis-
tinctive or memorable features, which the parodist can be sure
the audience will know.314
Thus, "[c]opying does not become excessive in relation to parodic purpose
merely because the portion taken was the original's heart. If 2 Live Crew
had copied a significantly less memorable part of the original, it is difficult
to see how its parodic character would have come through."315 Similarly,
if the defendants in Dr. Seuss had refrained from copying the red-and-
white stovepipe hat, it is difficult to see how their intended message, the
comparison of O.J. Simpson to the Cat, could have been made.
The Ninth Circuit, however, ignored this aspect of the Campbell opin-
ion, and instead endorsed a more restrictive analysis:
This court has adopted the "conjure up" test where the parodist
is permitted a fair use of a copyrighted work if it takes no more
than is necessary to "recall" or "conjure up" the original. 316
This statement of the "conjure up" test is both unnecessarily grudging and
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's more generous standard in Camp-
bell. The Supreme Court stated that "the parody must be able to 'conjure
up' at least enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit
recognizable,"3 17 and recognized that an even greater taking might be
permissible:
Once enough has been taken to assure identification, how much
more is reasonable will depend, say, on the extent to which the
song's overriding purpose and character is to parody the original,
or, in contrast, the likelihood that the parody may serve as a
market substitute for the original.318
In addition, the Supreme Court specifically cited a footnote in the Second
Circuit's Elsmere decision, in which the court stated:
[W]e note that the concept of "conjuring up" an original came
into the copyright law not as a limitation on how much of an
314 510 U.S. at 588 (citations omitted).
315 Id. at 588-89.
316 103 F.3d at 1400.
317 510 U.S. at 588 (emphasis added).
318 Id.
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original may be used, but as a recognition that a parody fre-
quently needs to be more than a fleeting evocation of an original
in order to make its humorous point. A parody is entitled at
least to "conjure up" the original. Even more extensive use
would still be fair use, provided the parody builds upon the origi-
nal, using the original as a known element of modern culture and
contributing something new for humorous effect or
commentary. 319
The Ninth Circuit's continued reliance on an outdated, restrictive version
of the "conjure up" test was therefore error.
Instead, the Supreme Court's opinion in Campbell directs lower
courts to inquire "what else the parodist did besides go to the heart of the
original." 320 If a substantial portion of the alleged parody was copied ver-
batim from the original, and the parodic element added by the defendant
is "insubstantial, as compared to the copying," then the third factor will
weigh heavily against the defendant. 321 But if the parodist has merely
copied some "distinctive or memorable features" in order to "conjure up"
the original, 322 and has "thereafter departed markedly from the [original]
for its own ends," the copying cannot be said to be "excessive in relation
to its parodic purpose."323
In the Dr. Seuss case, the defendants did not copy any portion of the
text of the plaintiff's works verbatim. Instead, the defendants evoked the
works of Dr. Seuss primarily through the use of simple rhymes, a similar
poetic meter, and illustrations drawn in the style of Dr. Seuss.324 They
also used a title that was similar to, but recognizably different from, one of
the plaintiff's well-known works, and a pseudonym ("Dr. Juice") that
rhymed with the plaintiff's, but was obviously also a take-off on O.J. Simp-
son's nickname. The district court found only two similarities between the
319 Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broad. Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 n.1 (2d Cir.
1980) (per curiam), cited in Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588. Accord, Fisher v.
Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438-39 (9th Cir. 1986), cited in Campbell, 510 U.S. at
588; Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440, 447
(N.D. Ill. 1991) ("while the copyright law imposes limitations on the extent
to which a parody may borrow from an original, the 'conjure up' test does
not articulate this upper limit.").
320 510 U.S. at 589.
321 Id. at 589. See also id. at 587-88 ("a work composed primarily of an original,
particularly its heart, with little added or changed, is more likely to be a
merely superseding use, fulfilling demand for the original.").
322 Id. at 588.
323 Id. at 589.
324 924 F. Supp. at 1565 ("Penguin's book mimics the illustration and rhyming
style of Dr. Seuss. Although these elements are not copyrightable, they are
relevant to whether copying took place.").
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text of the allegedly infringing work and any of the plaintiff's works,325
and it held that both uses were permissible. 326
The only similarities on which the district court based its injunction
were the front and back cover illustrations, and in each the principal fea-
ture was the Cat's red-and-white stovepipe hat.3 2 7 The hat, of course, is a
"distinctive or memorable feature" of the original, but one that was copied
only to "conjure up" the original in order to drive home the defendants'
comparison of O.J. Simpson to the Cat.32 8 Thereafter, the defendants
"departed markedly" from the original, using the hat not to illustrate the
story of a mischievous cat who wreaks havoc upon a child's house on a
rainy day, but to illustrate the caricature of O.J. Simpson in retelling the
story of the Brown/Goldman murders and the subsequent criminal trial.329
The other illustrations that accompany the defendants' original text were
also substantially original, incorporating fragments from the plaintiff's
325 924 F. Supp. at 1563-64.
326 Id. at 1566, 1570. The Court also held that the one illustration of Kato Kaelin
that was similar to Horton The Elephant was permissible. Id. at 1570.
327 924 F. Supp. at 1564. The district court also noted some specific similarities in
the illustrations. Id. While most of these similarities can be attributed to
the use of a similar style of illustration, the back-cover illustration of The
Cat NOT in the Hat! is recognizably derived from the cover illustration of
The Cat in the Hat. Id. Again, however, the copying is not verbatim; the
back-cover illustration shows a recognizably human figure, rather than the
Cat himself. Id. at 1578. Thus, "out of Dr. Seuss's original, sixty-one page,
fully-illustrated work, the defendants infringed no text and only one illustra-
tion." Vogel, supra note 271, at 307.
328 The alleged repetitive use of the hat 13 times in the illustrations accompanying
the text is justified by the context in which the hat appears. In each case it
accompanies a caricature of O.J. Simpson, thereby reinforcing both the
comparison of O.J. Simpson to the Cat and highlighting the distinction be-
tween the original and the parody, rather than merely supplanting the origi-
nal. Cf Campbell, 510 U.S. at 589 n.19 (noting that repetition "may serve to
heighten the comic effect of the parody" in certain circumstances), citing
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 747 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (holding that repetition of four-note musical theme in song parody
was justified in view of the amount of repetition in the original), affid, 623
F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam). As in Elsmere, moreover, the repeti-
tion in this case is a characteristic of the original work. Literary scholars
agree that the best parodies are those that tamper least with the original
material. See notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
329 The cover illustration, for example, depicts Simpson in the Cat's hat, wearing a
suit and holding a bloody glove, with a carefree smirk on his face. 924 F.
Supp. at 1577. In quantitative terms, "the district court found no infringing
text and only one infringing image in this parody, which contained over
forty-four illustrated pages." Vogel, supra note 271, at 305.
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works only in order to "conjure up" the style of the original.330 Certainly
The Cat NOT in the Hat! cannot be characterized as "a work composed
primarily of an original, . . . with little added or changed," or as a work in
which the parodic element added by the defendants was "insubstantial"
compared to the copying. Given the Ninth Circuit's failure to apply the
proper test in considering the third factor, its conclusion that the third
factor favored the plaintiff was clearly erroneous.
4. Effect upon the Potential Market or Value
Under the fourth factor, courts must consider "whether unrestricted
and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant ... would
result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market" for the
original and licensed derivatives of the original.331 In Campbell, the Sixth
Circuit had quoted from a previous Supreme Court opinion, Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,332 in which the Supreme Court had
said: "If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood [of mar-
ket harm] may be presumed. But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, that
likelihood must be demonstrated." 333 The Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that it was error for the Sixth Circuit to presume market harm in this
manner and limiting the scope of its previous opinion in Sony:
No "presumption" or inference of market harm that might find
support in Sony is applicable to a case involving something be-
yond mere duplication for commercial purposes. Sony's discus-
sion of a presumption contrasts a context of verbatim copying of
the original in its entirety for commercial purposes with the non-
commercial context of Sony itself (home copying of television
programming). In the former circumstances, what Sony said
simply makes common sense: when a commercial use amounts
to mere duplication of the entirety of an original it clearly super-
sedes the objects of the original and serves as a market replace-
ment for it, making it likely that cognizable market harm to the
original will occur. But when, on the contrary, the second use is
transformative, market substitution is at least less certain, and
market harm may not be so readily inferred. Indeed, as to par-
ody pure and simple, it is more likely that the new work will not
330 See 924 F. Supp. at 1564 (finding significant similarities in only three of seven
illustrations alleged to be similar).
331 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590, quoting NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][4]
(1993).
332 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding that home videotaping of copyrighted works
broadcast on television for time-shifting purposes was a fair use). For a
summary of the Sony case, see notes 116-121 and accompanying text.
333 Id. at 451.
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affect the market for the original in a way that is cognizable
under this factor, that is by acting as a substitute for it. . . . This
is so because the parody and the original usually serve different
market functions. 334
In the Dr. Seuss case, however, the Ninth Circuit committed the same
error as the Sixth Circuit did in Campbell, relying on a presumption of
market harm based on the commercial nature of the alleged parody:
Because, on the facts presented, Penguin and Dove's use of The
Cat in the Hat original was nontransformative and admittedly
commercial, we conclude that market substitution is at least
more certain and market harm may be more readily inferred.335
The Ninth Circuit's inference cannot be justified under Campbell. The Cat
NOT in the Hat! did not consist of "verbatim copying of the original in its
entirety for commercial purposes."336 Instead, it consisted of borrowing a
small amount of protected expression for the purpose of creating a new
work that commented on both the original and on the O.J. Simpson
double-murder trial. As such, it was unquestionably a "transformative"
use,337 rendering Sony's presumption of market harm inapplicable.
Of course, a finding that the defendant's use was "transformative"
does not end the inquiry. All derivative works are "transformative"
uses,338 and the copyright holder's exclusive rights include the right "to
prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work." 339 Thus, the
task is to distinguish between those transformative uses that are exclu-
sively reserved to the copyright holder and those that are permitted to
others under the fair use doctrine.
Some courts are inclined to find market harm whenever the copyright
holder has lost potential revenue in the form of royalties for permission to
use excerpts of the original work.340 A more well-reasoned analysis, how-
ever, recognizes that the lost royalties argument is inherently circular: it
assumes that the copyright owner is entitled to permission fees in evaluat-
334 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (citations and internal quotes omitted).
335 109 F.3d at 1403.
336 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
337 See notes 283-307 and accompanying text.
338 Cf 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) ("A 'derivative work' is a work based on one or
more preexisting works, such as a translation, . . . abridgement, condensa-
tion, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted.") (emphasis added).
339 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1994).
340 See, e.g., Los Angeles News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119,
1122-23 (9th Cir. 1997); Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document
Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1387-88 & n.4 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc); American
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929-31 (2d Cir. 1995).
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ing whether the use is fair; but no such entitlement exists unless the use is
not fair.341 In Judge Leval's words:
By definition every fair use involves some loss of royalty revenue
because the secondary user has not paid royalties. Therefore, if
an insubstantial loss of revenue turned the fourth factor in favor
of the copyright holder, this factor would never weigh in favor of
the secondary user. ... The market impairment should not turn
the fourth factor unless it is reasonably substantial.34 2
To determine whether market impairment is "reasonably substantial," the
court should keep in mind the ultimate goal of copyright, which is to en-
courage the creation of new works. 34 3 This goal is threatened only when
there is market competition (actual or potential) between the allegedly
infringing work and the original or an authorized derivative work.344 If
there is little or no likelihood that the third-party use will compete with an
authorized derivative work, then the public interest is served by permitting
the unauthorized use: the public gets the benefit of a new creative work,
341 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585 n.18 ("If the use is otherwise fair, then no per-
mission need be sought or granted."); Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1397
(Merritt, J., dissenting) ("If the publishers have no right to the fee in many
of the instances in which they are collecting it, we should not validate that
practice by now using the income derived from it to justify the further impo-
sition of fees."); see generally Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market
Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 38-48 (1997) (identifying six problems resulting from
allowing "lost" permission fees to constitute market harm).
342 Leval, supra note 106, at 1125; see also id. ("When the injury to the copyright
holder's potential market would substantially impair the incentive to create
works for publication"); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 ("substantially adverse
impact on the potential market"); id. at 593 ("Evidence of substantial
harm" to the market for derivative works).
343 See TWentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("the
ultimate aim [of copyright] is . . . to stimulate artistic creativity for the gen-
eral public good."); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 948 F. Supp.
1214, 1223 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("the core purpose of copyright ... [is] to foster
the creation and dissemination of the greatest number of creative works."),
affd, 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1988).
344 See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986) ("infringement occurs
when a parody supplants the original in markets the original is aimed at, or
in which the original is, or has reasonable potential to become, commer-
cially valuable."); Eveready Battery Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp.
440, 448 (N.D. Ill. 1991) ("the type of harm to the market with which the
court is concerned is limited to the harm likely to be caused by the chal-
lenged work usurping or replacing the demand for the original."). See also
Leval, supra note 106, at 1125 ("The fourth factor disfavors a finding of fair
use only when the market is impaired because the quoted material serves
the consumer as a substitute").
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without substantially diminishing the creative incentive to the copyright
holder.345 Likewise, if the copyright holder seeks to suppress the unau-
thorized use not to protect his or her own works from economic competi-
tion, but to suppress the third-party's point of view, that is an improper
purpose that conflicts with the goals of both copyright and the First
Amendment. 346
Because the goal of copyright law is to encourage the creation of new
works, one could ask whether an author might be deterred from creating a
work because of the fear that his work might become the subject of a
parody or satire in the future. No court has expressly relied on this ration-
ale, and the few courts and authors that have considered the possibility
have properly rejected it.347 Any author who ventures to place his or her
work before the public runs the risk that it may be criticized and that por-
345 See Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 948 F. Supp. 1214, 1223 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) ("the defendant's transformation of the plaintiff's photograph has re-
sulted in public access to two distinct works, serving distinct markets, with
little risk that the creator of the first work will be disinclined to create fur-
ther works that may be open to parody."); affd, 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998);
Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1377 (2d
Cir. 1993) ("In the cases where we have found the fourth factor to favor a
defendant, the defendant's work filled a market niche that the plaintiff sim-
ply had no interest in occupying."); see also MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d
180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981) (fourth factor calls for striking a balance "between
the benefit the public will derive if the use is permitted and the personal
gain the copyright owner will receive if the use is denied."). Although the
Ninth Circuit quoted Wilson on this point, 109 F.3d at 1403, it failed to
make such an analysis. See notes 375-382 and accompanying text.
346 See, e.g., Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 631 F. Supp. 1432, 1438 (S.D.N.Y.)
(holding that quotation of excerpts from a book containing interviews of
women who had abortions in an essay critical of abortion was a fair use),
affd, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986); cf Girl Scouts of U.S.A. v. Personality
Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (refusing to enjoin dis-
tribution of poster of pregnant girl in a Girl Scout uniform with the motto
"Be Prepared"). See also notes 386-399 and accompanying text.
347 See Leibovitz, 948 F. Supp. at 1226 (finding "little risk that the creator of the
first work will be disinclined to create further works that may be open to
parody."); Merges, supra note 142, at 308 ("surely it is easier to imagine a
case where a copyright holder refuses a license out of contempt for the par-
odist, her work, or her point of view, than it is to imagine a hypothetical
creative person deterred from pursuing a muse because of the possible fu-
ture invocation of the parody defense."); Dorsen, supra note 59, at 960 ("it
is unreasonable to believe that any author would hesitate to create a work
for fear that the work might become a target of criticism through satire or
parody."); Vogel, supra note 271, at 315 ("it is unreasonable to suggest that
potential authors will be dissuaded from creating new works solely because
their product may later be used as 'unpermitted' and uncompensated ele-
ments of a satire.").
How the Grinch Silenced a Parody 607
HeinOnline  -- 45 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 607 1997-1998
Journal, Copyright Society of the U.S.A.
tions may be quoted in an unfavorable review. 3 4 8 Any marginal deter-
rence that might be caused by allowing criticism or satire in the form of
parody, therefore, probably would be de minimis.3 4 9
The Supreme Court recognized these principles in Campbell when it
stated:
[T]here is no protectable derivative market for criticism. The
market for potential derivative uses includes only those that cre-
ators of original works would in general develop or license
others to develop. Yet the unlikelihood that creators of imagina-
tive works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own
productions removes such uses from the very notion of a poten-
tial licensing market.3 50
Consequently, the proper inquiry is the competitive effect of the alleged
parody on the market for non-parody derivatives of the original.3 51 Since
neither party had introduced evidence on that issue in the lower courts,
the Court held that summary judgment was inappropriate, and remanded
for further factfinding.352
In the Dr. Seuss case, therefore, the proper inquiry is whether a satire
of the O.J. Simpson trial, written in the style of Dr. Seuss, is likely to com-
pete in the market with the works of Dr. Seuss and its authorized licen-
sees. To state the question is virtually to answer it, for the works of Dr.
Seuss and its licensees are intended primarily for children and their par-
ents, both as works of humorous entertainment and as educational tools
for encouraging reading and the development of moral values. 353 The Cat
NOT in the Hat!, on the other hand, is intended primarily for adults who
are either devotees of the O.J. Simpson saga or those who desire to see
either O.J. Simpson or Dr. Seuss satirized in a creative and merciless man-
ner. While both works depend upon humor for their appeal, the humor in
each is of an entirely different character: the innocent and playful humor
348 See note 141, supra.
349 See Merges, supra note 142, at 308 ("even conceding that at some margin off in
the receding distance a hyper-risk averse person (!) might possibly be de-
terred from creating something by the risk that a court might some day
force her to part with a license involuntarily, we ought to be willing to pay
that small (perhaps nonexistent) price in the service of the dissemination
principle.").
350 510 U.S. at 592.
351 Id. at 592-93.
352 Id. at 593-94.
353 Undoubtedly there are also adults without children who enjoy Dr. Seuss'
works, but their reasons for buying such works are likely to be either the
same as those with children, or else nostalgia for the familiar works of their
childhood.
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of Dr. Seuss versus the jaded, satirical and mocking tone of the parody. 354
Those who desire the former are not likely to be satisfied by the latter, and
vice versa. Indeed, one cannot imagine anyone buying the defendant's
parody as a substitute for a genuine Dr. Seuss story. This case, then, is an
instance in which the disparities between the markets for the two works
are so great that summary judgment for the defendants probably would be
appropriate.3 5 5
The district court questioned this conclusion, however, relying on the
distinction between satire and parody:
Both satire and parody are "transformative" uses posing little
threat of displacing the demand for the original work. As to de-
rivative works, however, while an author might license a satirist's
use of his work, the law presumes a reluctance to license paro-
dists, persons whose purpose it is to ridicule the author's work.
Thus while the unlicensed satirist deprives the author of poten-
tial license fees for derivative works, the parodist is presumed to
operate within a market imperfection. 356
Although the Supreme Court in Campbell declined to express an opinion
on this point,3 57 there are several problems with the district court's reason-
ing. First, it assumes that a court is capable of definitively determining the
"target" or targets of a parodic work of art, an assumption which is highly
354 See Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 948 F. Supp. 1214, 1223 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) ("The end result of the Nielsen ad parodying the Moore photograph
is that the public now has before it two works, vastly different in appeal and
nature, where before there was only one."), affd, 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir.
1998); see also Shapiro, supra note 270, at 45 ("Even a superficial analysis
shows that market substitution in Seuss Enterprises was virtually non-exis-
tent given the market segment the infringers targeted.").
355 See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986):
We do not believe that consumers desirous of hearing a romantic and
nostalgic ballad such as the composers' song would be satisfied to
purchase the parody instead. Nor are those fond of parody likely to con-
sider [the original] a source of satisfaction. The two works do not fulfill
the same demand. Consequently, the parody has no cognizable economic
effect on the original.
See also Leibovitz, 948 F. Supp. at 1226; Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National
Broad. Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d
Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc. 329 F.2d 541, 545
(2d Cir. 1964) ("it is clear that the parody has neither the intent nor the
effect of fulfilling the demand for the original").
356 924 F. Supp. at 1568-69 (footnotes and citations omitted).
357 510 U.S. at 592 n.22 ("We express no opinion as to the derivative markets for
works using elements of an original as vehicles for satire or amusement,
making no comment on the original or criticism of it.").
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questionable.35 8 Second, it depends on a finding that there is no element
of parody in the defendants' work, a finding that is not justified in this
case.359 Third, even assuming that the defendants' work is a "pure" satire
with no element of parody, it is inadequate to assert that an author
"might" license a satirist's use of his work, since an author "might" also
have a sufficiently well-developed sense of self-esteem to license a parody
of his or her own work.360 Instead, one should ask whether it is suffi-
ciently likely that an author would license a satirist to use his or her work
that a court should distinguish satire from the reasoning in Campbell and
other parody cases. 36 1
Judge Richard Posner is a leading proponent of the view that "the
[fair use] doctrine should provide a defense to infringement only if the
parody uses the parodied work as a target rather than as a weapon." 362
His reasoning, however, is purely rhetorical: if the parodied work is used
only as a weapon and not a target, he asks, "why should the owner of the
original be reluctant to license the parody?" 363 Posner's rhetorical ques-
tion has been answered by Robert Merges, who argues that Posner's as-
358 See Merges, supra note 142, at 311 ; Winslow, supra note 142, at 804, 808; see
also notes 50-54, 276 and 302, and accompanying text.
359 See notes 261-282 and accompanying text.
360 There have been a few instances in which parodies have been licensed by the
copyright owner. See Yonover, supra note 42, at 976 (citing examples from
the musical Forbidden Broadway). Yonover notes, however, that "[m]ost of
such licensed, so-called parodies have been kinder, gentler jabs - more
homage than sharp jibe - than the usual parodying work presents." Id.
In New Line Cinema Corp. v. Bertlesman Music Group, 693 F. Supp. 1517
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), the owners of the copyright in the movie A Nightmare on
Elm Street made a rap music video based on the movie. This case is some-
times cited by commentators as an example of a licensed parody. But
although the district judge in one instance referred to the plaintiff's video as
a "derivative parody" rather than a "derivative work," id. at 1524, there is
nothing in the description of the plaintiffs video to indicate that it was any-
thing other than a straight derivative work of a movie that already con-
tained elements of black humor. Likewise, it was established that
defendants' alleged parody was nothing more than a competing derivative
work: the similarities between the works were pervasive, not merely sub-
stantial, id. at 1522-23, and "the testimony elicited at the hearing indicated
that the term 'parody' was only applied to the [defendants'] work after an
awareness of the possibility of litigation." Id. at 1530.
361 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 ("The market for potential derivative uses in-
cludes only those that creators of original works would in general develop
or license others to develop.") (emphasis added).
362 Posner, supra note 142, at 71; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 295, §10.2.1.2.b.
at 10:27 ("Unlike parody, satire should fall entirely outside the scope of fair
use.").
363 Posner, supra at 71; see also GOLDSTEIN, supra at 10:27 ("the copyright owner
who is not willing to license a parody of his work may be more than willing,
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sumption "seems wrong, at least in those cases where the 'target' of the
parody is a set of values or cultural assumptions deeply cherished by the
copyright holder or at least widely held by the segment of the public loyal
to her." 3^  Merges' view is supported by the experiences of political sati-
rists such as The Capitol Steps, who note that "[a]sking permission for
such uses is interpreted by music publishers as seeking their endorsement
of the political ideas contained in our lyrics." 365 Drawing a distinction
between "weapon" and "target" parody would therefore allow the copy-
right holder to censor satirical opinions with which he or she disagrees.3 66
Because social criticism is arguably even more valuable to society than
criticism of particular works of art,367 Merges and others argue that satire,
like parody, should be protected as fair use whenever the copyright owner
refuses an offer to license the work for reasonable compensation.3 68 Con-
at a reasonable price, to license use of his work as a vehicle for social
comment.").
364 Merges, supra note 142, at 311; see also id. at 308 ("licensing, like many an-
other economic decision, is fraught with enough uncertainty, guile, strategy,
and outright nonrational behavior (e.g., spite, shortsightedness, fear of em-
barrassment, etc.), that only a doctrinaire purist whose fingers were worn
from reciting the neoclassical rosary could fail to come in touch with it.");
accord Vogel, supra note 271, at 313 ("satiric works causing inherently of-
fensive associations to be drawn to the underlying work are as unlikely to
be licensed as those that directly criticize the underlying work.").
365 Amici Curiae Brief of Capitol Steps Prods., Inc., Mark Russell, et al., in Sup-
port of Petitioners, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994)
(No. 99-1292), quoted in Yonover, supra note 42, at 976; see also id at 978
(quoting the affidavit of political satirist Mark Russell). The Capitol Steps
and Russell also note that seeking permission in a timely manner is impossi-
ble when using a work to comment upon newsworthy events that happened
only a few hours earlier. Id. at 977-78.
366 Merges, supra note 142, at 311; see also Winslow, supra note 142, at 804-05.
Posner and Goldstein also argue that, unlike the parodist, the satirist has
alternatives to borrowing from a copyrighted work. This argument is criti-
cized at notes 295-304 and accompanying text.
367 Merges, supra, at 311-12; Winslow, supra, at 805.
368 Merges, supra, at 310 ("As long as the parodist offers a royalty to the copyright
holder that will adequately compensate her, we should not sanction refusals
to license. This is so because in these cases we know the refusal to license is
based on a noneconomic motive, and we know that copyright law's prefer-
ence for dissemination is too strong to give any credence to such motives in
such cases."); Gordon, supra note 137, at 1635 ("If a market bargain would
be possible, fair use should be denied, unless the court perceives a danger
that the owner might use his market right to distort the satiric content.");
Winslow, supra, at 803 ("Initially, a key economic consideration in parody
cases is whether the copyright owner would voluntarily license the use. . ..
The distinction between weapon and target parody is probably the least
favorable approach to resolve this issue.").
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sequently, the fourth factor should focus on "whether a reasonable market
transaction for the right to parody [or satirize] can be envisioned." 3 6 9
To answer this question, one only has to imagine the probable reac-
tion of Dr. Seuss Enterprises to an offer by the defendants to license The
Cat in the Hat for use in a satire of the O.J. Simpson case. The answer
almost certainly would have been a polite but very firm refusal, regardless
of the generosity of the terms offered. Dr. Seuss Enterprises would very
likely view any biting satire of adult subject matter as incompatible with its
"image" as a provider of wholesome family entertainment. 370 Of course,
it is precisely this incompatibility that gives the defendant's work its pa-
rodic character;3 71 but in any event, the incompatibility of the satire with
the plaintiff's "image" demonstrates that the plaintiff's desire to suppress
the defendant's work is not for the purpose of protecting the plaintiff's
works from economic competition, but for the purpose of suppressing the
defendant's message.
Because the fourth factor considers "the effect of the use upon the
market for or value of the copyrighted work," 372 it could be argued that
harm to the plaintiff's "image," either because consumers are confused
about the source of the parody or because the defendant's work somehow
"tarnishes" the plaintiff's image or reputation, should be considered in de-
termining whether a use is fair. According to Campbell, however, the sup-
pression of non-competitive messages is not a legitimate purpose of
copyright law, regardless of the effect that the defendant's use may have
on consumer demand for the original. 373 This concern, therefore, raises
369 Merges, supra, at 312. See also Winslow, supra, at 809-10 (proposing that "The
Likelihood of a Voluntary Exchange" should be one of three factors consid-
ered in parody cases).
370 Dr. Seuss, of course, often satirizes the foibles of adults, but he does so in a
manner that is consistent with the innocent and playful children's world he
has created. It is simply inconceivable that Dr. Seuss would publish a chil-
dren's book about a double murder whose perpetrator escaped justice.
371 See notes 261-282 and accompanying text.
372 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1994) (emphasis added).
373 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-92 ("We do not, of course, suggest that a parody
may not harm the market at all, but when a lethal parody, like a scathing
review, kills demand for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable
under the Copyright Act."); accord, Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150
F.3d 104, 110 (2d Cir. 1998) ("fair use does not condemn the suppression or
even destruction of the market by .. . a parody. Rather, it is concerned with
secondary uses that, by offering a substitute for the original, usurp a market
that properly belongs to the copyright holder."); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d
432, 437-38 (9th Cir. 1986) ("the economic effect of a parody with which we
are concerned is not its potential to destroy or diminish the market for the
original . . . but rather whether it fulfills the demand for the original."); see
also Vogel, supra note 271, at 307 (Campbell "clearly indicated that reputa-
tional harm is not cognizable under copyright law."); id. at 295 ("only harm
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issues that are more properly the domain of trademark and trade dispar-
agement laws, the effect of which will be considered below. 3 74
The Ninth Circuit did not engage in any analysis of harm to actual or
potential markets. Instead, it reasoned that the defendants were not enti-
tled to relief from the preliminary injunction because of their failure to
submit evidence concerning the relevant markets for the two works.375 In
so holding, it relied on the following passage from Campbell:
Although 2 Live Crew submitted uncontroverted affidavits on
the question of market harm to the original, neither they, nor
Acuff-Rose, introduce evidence or affidavits addressing the
likely effect of 2 Live Crew's parodic rap song on the market for
a non-parody, rap version of "Oh, Pretty Woman.".. . The Dis-
trict Court essentially passed on this issue, observing that Acuff-
Rose is free to record "whatever version of the original it
desires"; the Court of Appeals went the other way by erroneous
presumption. Contrary to each treatment, it is impossible to
deal with the fourth factor except by recognizing that a silent
record on an important factor bearing on fair use disentitled the
proponent of the defense, 2 Live Crew, to summary judgment.37 6
This passage, however, does not justify the Ninth Circuit's conclusion.
Campbell arose in the context of the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, where the question is whether there was a "genuine issue of any
material fact,"37 7 thereby necessitating a trial. Since fair use is an affirma-
tive defense,3 78 on which the defendant has the burden of proof at trial, 2
Live Crew, as the moving party, could not demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact on the issue of market harm without intro-
ducing evidence or affidavits on that issue.37 9 Dr. Seuss, however, arose in
that results from actual market substitution, and not from injury to that
author's moral integrity, is relevant to the inquiry."); Lemley, supra note
144, at 1033 ("copyright law has created what is at base an economic rather
than a moral right.").
374 See notes 409-477 and accompanying text.
375 109 F.3d at 1403.
376 510 U.S. at 593-94 (citation omitted).
377 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
378 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
379 See Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992); International
Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991); Stutz
Motor Car of Am., Inc. v. Reebok Int'l, Ltd., 909 F. Supp. 1353 (C.D. Cal.
1995); cf Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("If the moving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial,
that party must support its motion with credible evidence"). This portion of
Brennan's exposition was not contradicted by the majority. But see Vogel,
supra note 271, at 308 n.187 ("The Supreme Court has vacillated in its allo-
613How the Grinch Silenced a Parody
HeinOnline  -- 45 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 613 1997-1998
the context of the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction. In order
to prevail, the plaintiff needed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on
the merits, which includes the burden of showing a likelihood that it would
prevail against any affirmative defenses raised by the defendant.38 0 Since
a motion for a preliminary injunction is generally made at the outset of the
case, before either party has had the benefit of discovery, the absence of
evidence on one or more issues is not a surprising matter.3 8 ' Instead, the
court must predict, on the basis of the materials before it, which party will
prevail after discovery has been taken and, if necessary, a trial has oc-
curred.382 In this case, therefore, not only would drawing an inference
about the unlikelihood of market harm from the nature of the two works
at issue have been proper, but it was necessary to correct the district
court's erroneous presumption to the contrary.
Because The Cat NOT in the Hat! does not compete with any use that
is reasonably likely to be made by the plaintiff, its publication would have
no cognizable effect on the plaintiff's economic incentive to create new
works. Consequently, the fourth factor should have been held to favor the
defendants.
cation of the burden of proving market impairment in fair use cases.") (cit-
ing contradictory passages from Campbell, Harper & Row and Sony).
380 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm. Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231,
1242 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("plaintiffs, as the parties moving for a preliminary
injunction, have the burden of proving a likelihood of success on their in-
fringement claim, including the fair use defense."); Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 837 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (applying Ninth
Circuit law) (copyright plaintiff must show a likelihood that it will overcome
affirmative defenses); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chew-
ing Gum, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1034 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (same); Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., 479 F. Supp. 351,
355 (N.D. Ga. 1979); cf New England Braiding Co. v. A.W. Chesterton Co.,
970 F.2d 878, 882-83 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (although challenger has burden of
persuasion at trial on issue of patent invalidity, on motion for preliminary
injunction, "the patentee must show that the alleged infringer's defense
lacks substantial merit.").
381 See University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) ("given the
haste that is often necessary . . ., a preliminary injunction is customarily
granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is
less complete than a full trial on the merits."); Compuserve, Inc. v. Cyber-
promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (same; copyright
case).
382 New England Braiding Co., 970 F.2d at 882-83 ("At this preliminary stage, the
trial court does not resolve the validity question but rather must . . . make
an assessment of the persuasiveness of the challenger's evidence, recogniz-
ing that it is doing so without all evidence that may come out at trial.").
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5. Balancing the Factors
A brief summary of the four factors demonstrates that the issuance of
a preliminary injunction was an abuse of discretion. The defendant's
work, whether considered a parody or a satire, was a transformative use
entitled to fair use consideration. It was also a commercial use, so the first
factor contains elements favoring both parties. The second factor favors
the plaintiff, but it has been recognized as being not very important in the
context of a parody case. The amount taken by the defendants was mini-
mal (a red-and-white stovepipe hat, some similarity in a few illustrations,
and a few catch phrases), and certainly was not excessive, given the sub-
stantial original comment added by the defendants. Finally, there is no
evidence that the defendants' work would have had any effect on the mar-
ket for the original or licensed derivatives; indeed, given the satirical na-
ture of the parody, it is highly unlikely that Dr. Seuss would have chosen
to license a similar work. Permitting the defendants to publish it, there-
fore, would result in "public access to two distinct works, serving distinct
markets, with little risk that the creator of the first work will be disinclined
to create further works."3 83
One further consideration deserves mention: the public interest in
permitting the defendants to express their views on the O.J. Simpson trial.
The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment does not create a
defense to the Copyright Act separate and distinct from the fair use doc-
trine,3 84 but that is because the fair use doctrine is deemed to already re-
flect First Amendment values. 38 5 If the fair use doctrine is to serve its
purpose, therefore, those values should at least implicitly be taken into
consideration in determining the scope of fair use.
The First Amendment interest in this case can be easily seen if one
assumes that the plaintiff were O.J. Simpson, rather than Dr. Seuss Enter-
prises. If Simpson sued on the grounds that the book was libelous, or that
it intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him, he would have to
prove both that the book was false, and that the defendant's acted either
with knowledge that it was false or in reckless disregard as to whether or
not it was false.386 If Simpson sued on the grounds that the book violated
his right of publicity, the use would be protected, either as a news account
383 Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 948 F. Supp. 1214, 1226 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), aff'd, 137 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1998).
384 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., Inc., 471 U.S. 539, 560
(1985).
385 Id.
386 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); Hustler Mag-
azine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
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of the trial itself,3 87 or by the First Amendment as a parody of or social
commentary on a newsworthy celebrity. For example, in Cardtoons, L. C
v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n,388 the Tenth Circuit refused to
enjoin a series of trading cards featuring parodies of well-known baseball
players, saying:
Since celebrities will seldom give permission for their identities
to be parodied, granting them control over the parodic use of
their identities would not directly provide them with any addi-
tional income. It would, instead, only allow them to shield them-
selves from ridicule and criticism.389
The Tenth Circuit also noted that "fame is a double-edged sword - the
law cannot allow those who enjoy the public limelight to so easily avoid
the ridicule and criticism that sometimes accompany public
prominence." 390
Yet by applying copyright law in a mechanical and overly restrictive
manner, without regard to First Amendment values, the Ninth Circuit in
effect has given the fictional characters of Dr. Seuss greater protection
from comment or criticism than an actual person would enjoy. While criti-
cism of political activists and public officials may be nearer to the "core"
387 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(d) (Deering Supp. 1998) ("use of a name,
voice, signature, photograph, or likeness in connection with any news, pub-
lic affairs, or sports broadcast or account . . . shall not constitute a use for
which consent is required"); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 421-26, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 342, 349-52 (1983) (news account protected under First Amendment
unless it constitutes a knowing or reckless falsehood). It should be noted,
however, that the First Amendment would not necessarily protect a pur-
ported "news broadcast or account" that duplicated an artistic work in its
entirety. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)
(broadcast of plaintiffs "human cannonball" act on television news pro-
gram was not protected by First Amendment).
388 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
389 Id. at 974; see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1519 (9th
Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., joined by O'Scannlain and Kleinfeld, JJ., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) ("The last thing we need, the last thing
the First Amendment will tolerate, is a law that lets public figures keep
people from mocking them."). In light of the subsequent U.S. Supreme
Court opinion in Campbell, it seems likely that the panel opinion in White is
no longer good law. Cf Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 970, 972-73 (distinguishing
White as involving commercial speech, but noting its disagreement with the
decision and relying instead on both Campbell and Kozinski's dissent in
White).
390 95 F.3d at 976. See also Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1227
(7th Cir. 1993) ("When businesses seek the national spotlight, part of the
territory includes accepting a certain amount of ridicule.").
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of First Amendment protection,39 1 fictional characters should be subject
to at least as much criticism and comment as sports and entertainment
celebrities. 392 Certainly, the law should not authorize copyright holders to
exercise censorship over the content of another's creative parodic or sa-
tiric work in circumstances where a similarly situated public figure would
not be able to do so. 393
Consider, for example, the facts in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell.394
Hustler published a parody of a Campari Liqueur advertisement in which
celebrities talked about their "first times," that is, the first time they tasted
Campari.3 95 In the parody ad, Falwell's "first time" was depicted as "a
drunken incenstuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse." 396
Falwell sued Hustler for invasion of privacy, libel and intentional infliction
of emotional distress.3 97 Despite the highly offensive nature of the par-
ody, the Court unanimously held that it was protected by the First Amend-
ment.398 Surely the result should not be any different if Campari was the
plaintiff instead of Falwell, and the action was one for copyright or trade-
mark infringement instead of reputational injury.3 99
391 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) ("The sort of
robust political debate encouraged by the First Amendment is bound to
produce speech that is critical of those who hold public office or those pub-
lic figures who are 'intimately involved in the resolution of important public
questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to
society at large."') (citation omitted).
392 "[T]here is a public interest which attaches to people who, by their accomplish-
ments, mode of living, professional standing or calling, create a legitimate
and widespread attention to their activities. Certainly, the accomplishments
and way of life of those who have achieved a marked reputation or notori-
ety by appearing before the public such as actors ... may legitimately be
mentioned and discussed in print." Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 20
Cal. Rptr. 405, 414 (1962). Surely the characters of Dr. Seuss can be said to
have created "legitimate and widespread attention" and "achieved a
marked reputation ... by appearing before the public." Cf Dr. Seuss En-
ters., 109 F.3d at 1396 ("the Cat ... continues to be among the most famous
and well recognized of the Dr. Seuss creations.").
393 See National Life Ins. Co. v. Phillips Publ'g, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 627, 641 (D. Md.
1992) ("Corporations should not be given a greater right than an individual
to protect their reputation and to silence speech.").
394 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
395 Id. at 48.
396 Id.
397 Id. at 47-48.
398 Id. at 50-57.
399 See Mark A. Lemley and Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions
in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming Nov. 1998) (ex-
amining and rejecting traditional justifications for treating copyright cases
differently from other restrictions on speech for purposes of prior restraint
doctrine) (manuscript on file with author); David S. Welkowitz, Trademark
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The district court dismissed these considerations, arguing instead that
"the potential satirist has many alternatives to pilfering the protected ex-
pression of a copyrighted work."40 This argument has been rebutted
above. 40 1 The district court also reiterated an argument made by the
Ninth Circuit in the Air Pirates case, saying:
Of course, allowing free taking of distinctive elements from a
work in current favor might produce a more effective satire. The
court, however, must balance the interests of the public, the
copyright owner, and the parodist.402
This argument suggests that only a less effective satire would have been
deserving of First Amendment protection. But surely there is a greater
public interest in allowing satirists to express their views in an effective
manner rather than in an ineffective one.403 Moreover, the district court's
argument overlooks the fact that copyright law exists for the benefit of the
public rather than for the benefit of the copyright owner. It provides a
limited monopoly to authors to encourage the creation of artistic works in
order to benefit the public interest,404 and it tolerates that monopoly only
because of the limits placed upon it by copyright law itself.4 0 5 Thus, in the
words of Judge Leval:
Parody After Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, COMMUNICATIONS & THE LAW,
Dec. 1989, at 65-74.
400 924 F. Supp. at 1567.
401 See notes 295-304 and accompanying text.
402 924 F. Supp. at 1568; see also Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751,
758 (9th Cir. 1978) (copyright law "do[e]s not permit [defendants] to take as
much of a component part as they need to make the 'best parody.' Instead,
their desire to make the 'best parody' is balanced against the rights of the
copyright owner in his original expressions.").
403 See notes 37-42 and 59-68 and accompanying text (discussing the importance
of satire in social criticism). See also Jung, supra note 270, at 132 ("The
copyright system allows fair use protection for parody not because the idea
could not be expressed otherwise, but because parody is a very effective
way to communicate certain ideas. . . . [But] A well-produced satire can be
just as effective in making a generic idea dynamic and catchy, not to men-
tion entertaining.").
404 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985)
("The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the individual author in
order to benefit the public.").
405 Id. at 560 (noting that "First Amendment protections [are] already embodied
in the Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable expression and un-
copyrightable ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment tradition-
ally afforded by fair use."). Many commentators have likewise concluded
that copyright law is constitutional only because of the limits placed upon it
by the idealexpression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine. See, e.g., Lem-
ley & Volokh, supra note 399 (manuscript at 18-21); Paul Goldstein, Copy-
right and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 983 (1970); Melville B.
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Fair use is not a grudgingly tolerated exception to the copyright
owner's rights of private property, but a fundamental policy of
the copyright law. The stimulation of creative thought and au-
thorship for the benefit of society depends assuredly on the pro-
tection of the author's monopoly. But it depends equally on the
recognition that the monopoly must have limits. Those limits in-
clude the public dedication of facts (notwithstanding the author's
efforts in uncovering them); the public dedication of ideas
(notwithstanding the author's creation), and the public dedica-
tion of the right to make fair use of the material covered by the
copyright. 406
In light of this public purpose, the copyright owner's interest should be
considered only as a proxy for the public interest in encouraging the crea-
tion of new works. In the absence of any substantial harm to the copyright
holder's economic incentive, enjoining a parody or satire that contains
substantial original expression simply does not serve that public
interest. 407
In this case, the defendants relied on copyright's incentive in creating
on original work of humorous entertainment and social commentary. In
so doing, they "conjured up" the plaintiffs works by borrowing a minimal
amount of raw material - pieces of a few illustrations and a few well-
known phrases - in order both to parody the author's works and to sati-
rize the O.J. Simpson trial by comparing his exploits to those of a well-
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); Robert C. Denicola,
Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of
Expression, 67 CAL. L. REv. 283 (1980); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech,
Copyright and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1 (1987).
406 Leval, supra note 106, at 1135-36; see also id. at 1110 ("Fair use should not be
considered a bizarre, occasionally tolerated departure from the grand con-
ception of the copyright monopoly. To the contrary, it is a necessary part of
the overall design.").
407 This analysis accepts as a given the current judicial attitude favoring prelimi-
nary injunctions in copyright cases. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 399,
manuscript at 11-18 (describing the modern trend). There is, however, a
persuasive argument that such preliminary injunctions violate the First
Amendment's prohibition against prior restraints in any copyright case in
which a nonfrivolous defense of idea/expression or fair use is raised. Id. at
22-32 (describing prior restraint doctrine), 32-56 (rejecting distinctions be-
tween copyright and other restrictions on speech), and 57-59 (distinguishing
cases in which such credible defenses are raised from cases of verbatim
copying). At the very least, they suggest, courts should require clear and
convincing evidence of a high probability of success, and they should not
presume irreparable injury without evidence that damages would be inade-
quate. Id. at 52-54 & 57-59.
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known copyrighted character. The defendants conduct had a minimal ef-
fect, if any, on the plaintiff's economic incentive to create new works. The
defendant's work, therefore, should not be viewed as an "unreasonable
attempt to cash in on another's creativity," 408 but rather as a fair and rea-
sonable use of brief excerpts from the copyrighted work of another to cre-
ate a new work of a substantially different character, deserving of fair use
protection.
B. Trademark and Dilution Theories of Protection
. As discussed above, it is likely that Dr. Seuss was less concerned with
the minimal threat of economic competition posed by the defendants'
work, and more concerned about protecting its "image" as a provider of
wholesome family entertainment. 409 One way in which the plaintiff's "im-
age" could be threatened is the possibility that consumers might be con-
fused as to the source of the parody, and therefore seek to hold Dr. Seuss
responsible for what they perceived as an offensive and tasteless departure
from the author's usual standards of propriety.
The prevention of confusion among consumers as to the origin, spon-
sorship or approval of goods and services is the province of trademark and
unfair competition law.4 1 0 Like the fair use doctrine in copyright law, the
"likelihood of confusion" test in trademark law is a balancing test that
involves consideration of many factors.4 11 Many courts have applied those
factors to cases involving trademark parody.4 12 The majority of those
courts have concluded that although use in a parody is not a per se defense
to trademark infringement, it is a factor that may be taken into considera-
tion in determining whether likelihood of confusion exists.413 Several
408 924 F. Supp. at 1568.
409 See note 370 and accompanying text.
410 See, e.g, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1994) (use in commerce of registered trade-
mark which is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive"); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994) (use in commerce of unregistered
marks or false descriptions or representations which are "likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive").
411 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 21-23 (1995) (listing
eight factors, grouped into three categories). Unfortunately, each circuit
has adopted its own "list" of seven to thirteen factors, each of which con-
tains slight variations from their common source, § 731 of the 1938 Restate-
ment of Torts. See generally 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24.06[4][a] (3d ed. 1994)
(describing test in each circuit and citing cases).
412 See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 411, § 31.38; Dorsen, supra note 59, at
939-52; Robert J. Shaughnessy, Note, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and
First Amendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REv. 1079 (1986).
413 See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 194 (5th Cir. 1998);
Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 503 (2d Cir. 1996);
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cases have adopted the catch-phrase "[a] non-infringing parody is merely
amusing, not confusing." 414
Parody can affect the likelihood of confusion determination in many
ways. First, the parodist usually modifies the trademark in a humorous 4 15,
or at least distinctive,4 16 manner. Second, sometimes the parody is mar-
keted through different channels than the original mark.417 Third, there is
usually little likelihood that the trademark owner will seek to expand into
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 773-77 (8th Cir.
1994); Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir. 1993);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 320-22 (4th Cir.
1992); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886
F.2d 490, 495-97 (2d Cir. 1989); Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836
F.2d 397, 399-402 (8th Cir. 1987); Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd.,
828 F.2d 1482, 1485-88 (10th Cir. 1986).
414 MCCARTHY, supra note 411, § 31.38[1]; see, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major
League Baseball Players' Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 967 (10th Cir. 1996) ("As with
all successful parodies, the effect of the cards is to amuse rather than con-
fuse."); Nike, 6 F.3d at 1228 ("If the defendant employs a successful parody,
the customer would not be confused, but amused."); Jordache, 828 F.2d at
1486 ("the intent is not necessarily to confuse the public but to amuse").
415 See, e.g., Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1485 (defendant sold blue jeans for larger wo-
men using name "Lardashe," together with a smiling pig logo: "a large,
brightly colored [smiling] pig head and two hooves, giving the impression
that a pig is peering over the back pocket."); Nike, 6 F.3d at 1229-30 (T-
shirts bearing the name "Mike" and swoosh logo sold to people name Mike
or Michael).
416 See, e.g., Hormel, 73 F.3d at 503 (wild boar puppet given two-syllable name
"Spa'am" as a takeoff on SPAM luncheon meat); L & L Wings, 962 F.2d at
318-19 (T-shirts using Budweiser trade dress but replacing "Budweiser" and
"Anheuser-Busch" with "Myrtle Beach, S.C."). Defendants are more likely
to run afoul of trademark law if they fail to alter the most recognizable
feature of the trademark. See, e.g., Elvis Presley Enters., 141 F.3d at 201-02
(nightclub using name "The Velvet Elvis" displayed the "Elvis" portion in
bold letters, with "an almost unnoticeable 'Velvet' appearing alongside in
smaller script."); Balducci, 28 F.3d at 774 (in advertisement for fictitious
product "Michelob Oily," "[s]everal of Anheuser-Busch's marks were used
with little or no alteration.").
417 See, e.g., Hormel, 73 F.3d at 503-04 (name "Spa'am" always maketed in con-
nection with wild boar puppet and "Muppet Treasure Island" mark, instead
of on food products); Nike, 6 F.3d at 1229 (noting that defendant "does not
sell his shirts off the rack in stores. His was a mail-order business."). Likeli-
hood of confusion is somewhat more likely to be found when the marks are
used in similar contexts. See, e.g., Balducci, 28 F.3d at 774 ("Balducci pub-
lished the parody on the back cover of a magazine-a location frequently
devoted to real ads, even in Snicker. This location threatens to confuse con-
sumers accustomed to seeing advertisements on the back cover of
magazines.").
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the parodist's market by licensing a competing parody.4 18 The intent of
the parodist is usually an important consideration. 4 1 9 While some paro-
dists are willing to announce their parodic intentions, 420 others prefer a
stealth approach in which they seek to cause momentary or even pro-
longed (but temporary) confusion before revealing the true nature of the
parody.42 1 In either event, it is the dissonance between the audience's
knowledge of the original and the alteration made by the parodist that
gives the work its parodic character. 4 2 2 So long as the confusion is suc-
cessfully dissipated, this factor should not count against the parodist.4 2 3
418 See, e.g., Hormel, 73 F.3d at 504 ("Hormel has shown no intention of entering
the field of puppet entertainment"); but see Elvis Presley Enters., 141 F.3d
at 202-03 (noting that "EPE has plans to open a worldwide chain of Elvis
Presley restaurants," and "[t]he pervasiveness of EPE's marks across the
spectrum of products").
419 See Hormel, 73 F.3d at 503 ("Henson's use of the name 'Spa'am' is simply
another in a long line of Muppet lampoons. . .. [Consumers] are likely to
see the name 'Spa'am' as the joke it was intended to be."); Nike, 6 F.3d at
1232 ("Throughout this case Stanard has asserted that he intended only to
poke fun at Nike's corporate identity. He intended to use his own name to
play a witty prank on the perception of the viewer."); L & L Wings, 962
F.3d at 320 ("Berard testified that his intent in creating the T-shirt design
was to parody the Budweiser beer label."); Jordache, 828 F.2d at 14867
("An intent to parody is not an intent to confuse the public."); but see Mu-
tual of Omaha, 836 F.3d at 400 (intent to parody "is not dispositive, for
intent to pass off one's good as another's is not essential to an infringement
claim").
420 See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 496 ("The label 'A Satire' is also prominently
used five times on the cover (and four on the back) of Spy Notes"; advertis-
ing material contained the legend "The Outrageous Parody from the Cre-
ators of Separated at Birth"; and "the copyright notice page states 'Spy
Notes' is a parody of Cliffs Notes."'); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publ'g, Inc.,
811 F.2d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1987) ("The article was labelled as 'humor' and
'parody' in the magazine's table of contents section.").
421 See, e.g., Nike, 6 F.3d at 1227 ("Stanard admitted that his 'whole point' was to
give someone viewing from a distance the impression that the shirt actually
read NIKE."); Balducci, 28 F.3d at 774 ("The disclaimer is virtually
undetectable.").
422 See Nike, 6 F.3d at 1231 ("Parodies do not exist by mere happenstance. Actual
knowledge of the trademark by the presenter as well as by the observer or
consumer is virtually required."); see also notes 25-36 and accompanying
text.
423 See Nike, 6 F.3d at 1231 (defendant stated "that to be initially tricked at first
glance from across the room was 'the whole point.' But a jury could surely
conclude that any initial confusion ends with a closer look, when the ob-
server 'gets it."'); Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 494 ("A parody must convey two
simultaneous - and contradictory - messages: that it is the original, but
also that it is not the original and is instead a parody. To the extent it does
only the former but not the latter, it is not only poor parody but also vulner-
able under trademark law, since the customer will be confused."); Yankee
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Perhaps the most important consideration is whether there is any evi-
dence of actual confusion. 42 4 In a well-known case, for example, defend-
ant printed posters that read "Enjoy Cocaine" using the same script
lettering, color and format used by Coca-Cola.425 The court concluded
that "some persons of apparently average intelligence did attribute spon-
sorship to plaintiff and discontinued their use of Coca-Cola as an expres-
sion of resentment." 426 Where substantial actual confusion exists, 4 27 and
the infringing product or use is one of which a majority of consumers dis-
Publ'g, Inc. v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 267, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
("Even if the first glance at the cover were to cause momentary confusion, a
further look into the magazine would dispel it."); but see Elvis Presley En-
ters., 141 F.3d at 204 ("Despite the confusion being dissipated, this initial-
interest confusion is beneficial to the Defendants because it brings patrons
in the door. . . . Once in the door, the confusion has succeeded because
some patrons may stay, despite realizing the bar has no relationship with
EPE."). The Elvis court correctly noted that on those days when the de-
fendants imposed a cover charge, they would benefit from confusion before
it was dissipated. Id. However, to the extent the court based its injunction
on the benefit the defendants would receive in the absence of confusion, its
rationale was based on dilution or misappopriation rather than trademark
infringement. See notes 454-464 and accompanying text.
424 See Jordache, 828 F.3d at 1487 ("Obviously, the best evidence of a likelihood
of confusion in the marketplace is actual confusion.").
425 See Coca-Cola, Inc. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
The similarity was not entirely coincidental, of course, since the name
"Coca-Cola" was derived from the coca leaf plant, which is the source for
both cocaine and an extract used in flavoring Coca-Cola. Id. at 1189 n.7.
426 Id. at 1189. The plaintiff submitted affidavits from a a television news reporter
and a TV news director, both of whom received calls from numerous mem-
bers of the public complaining about the poster and "threatening a group
boycott of Coca-Cola." Id. at 1189 n.9.
427 In parody cases, unfortunately, some courts have relied upon relatively weak
evidence of actual confusion. See, e.g., Mutual of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 400
(noting that "approximately forty-two percent of those surveyed said that
Mutual of Omaha came to mind," and that "approximately ten percent of
all the persons surveyed thought that Mutual "goes along" with Novak's
products."). This finding should have been disregarded for three reasons.
First, the relevant test is not whether the parody "brings to mind" the paro-
died work; all parodies must "conjure up" the original in order to be effec-
tive. See Shaughnessy, supra note 412, at 1095-96; cf New Kids on the
Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992) (recogniz-
ing nominative use defense where trademark is used to refer to the plain-
tiff's goods or services, but does not suggest sponsorship or endorsement by
the trademark holder); id. at 309 ("The New Kids could not use the trade-
mark laws . . . to censor all parodies or satires which use their name.").
Second, the phrase "goes along with" is is a hopelessly vague substitute for
"sponsorship"; the former could be construed simply as a lack of objection
rather than sponsorship or authorization. But see Mutual of Omaha, 836
F.2d at 400-01 (rejecting this argument). Third, as the dissent noted, the
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approve, there is undoubtedly harm to the trademark owner428 that may
constitutionally be enjoined.429 Courts should be careful, however, to
guard against a "ratchet" effect caused by the inherently circular reasoning
of confusion as to sponsorship. Since most consumers are unfamiliar with
the law, a certain percentage of consumers is bound to believe that any
parody can only lawfully be produced with the approval of the trademark
owner. 430 If courts rely on this belief to enjoin all unauthorized parodies,
only authorized parodies will appear in the marketplace, which will rein-
force the perception that all parodies must be authorized. 431 For this rea-
son, courts should accommodate free speech concerns by giving parodies
the benefit of the doubt,432 particularly where it is clear that the majority
of consumers in the relevant market are not confused.433
survey was phrased in a "blatantly suggestive" manner. Id. at 404 (Heaney,
J., dissenting).
428 See MCCARTHY, supra note 411, § 31.38[1][a] ("Such a 'satire' skirts close to
trade libel because of the potential damage to business reputation caused by
consumers who will refuse to deal with" the trademark owner).
429 See Shaughnessy, supra note 412, at 1112 ("if a parody creates a genuine likeli-
hood that consumers will believe the trademark owner sponsored it ...
prohibition of the parody does not offend constitutional principles."); Lem-
ley & Volokh, supra note 399 (manuscript at 62-69) (concluding that trade-
mark law is substantively constitutional when applied to commercial
speech, but that preliminary injunctions may run afoul of the prior restraint
doctrine).
430 See, e.g., Balducci, 28 F.3d at 775 (although "[o]ver half of those surveyed
thought Balducci needed Anheuser-Busch's approval to publish the ad,"
only "[s]ix percent thought that the parody was an actual Anheuser-Busch
advertisement."); Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231,
246 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Perhaps some viewers will think that every program
with a dramatic courtroom lawyer was made by the producers of the Perry
Mason series").
431 See MCCARTHY, supra note 411, § 24.03[4][b] at 24-20 ("This is a 'chicken and
the egg' conundrum."); cf Loren, supra note 341, at 38-41 (criticizing a simi-
lar "inherent circularity" in permitting "lost" permission fees to constitute
market harm in copyright fair use cases).
432 See, e.g., Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 495 ("somewhat more risk of confusion is to
be tolerated when a trademark holder seeks to enjoin artistic expression
such as a parody."); RESTATEMENT, supra note 411, § 20, Reporter's Note,
comment b, at 219 ("in the context of expressive uses a court may require
more substantial evidence of confusion.") (approving Cliffs Notes); Warner
Bros., 720 F.2d at 246 ("The 'average lay observer' test, however, must be
applied by fact-finders within an outer limit of reasonable fact-finding
marked by judges. Otherwise the scope of protection . . . would be ex-
panded far beyond what Congress prescribed in the Lanham Act.").
433 See Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 496:
There may be a few purchasers who have been assigned to read the
novels who would buy the parody thinking it is a serious work and is
produced by Cliffs Notes. In view of the public interest in free expres-
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A cautious parodist might seek to guard against a finding of likeli-
hood of confusion by including a disclaimer on his or her product. 4 3 4
Courts agree that a label of "parody" or "satire," while not dispositive,
may "be helpful in avoiding confusion."4 35 An even more explicit dis-
claimer would inform consumers that the parody is unauthorized by the
trademark holder.436 Because many parodists thrive on their "unauthor-
ized" status, 4 3 7 one might expect that most parodists would be willing to
label their products in this manner. Other parodists, however, believe that
temporary confusion heightens the artistic effect of the parody. 438 For this
reason, courts have declined to impose a requirement that such a dis-
claimer be attached. 439
In the Dr. Seuss case, the defendants' work was "prominently subti-
tled 'A Parody,' and the author [was] described as 'By Dr. Juice as told to
Alan Katz and Chris Winn. "440 In addition, "[a] circular red sticker on the
back cover disclaims any relationship between The Cat Not in the Hat and
Dr. Seuss."44 1 Based in part on the disclaimers, the district court held that
the plaintiff had NOT established a reasonable likelihood of success on the
sion, that slight risk should be taken in order to allow the parody to be
sold. Similarly, it is conceivable, though hardly likely, that some pur-
chaser may mistakenly think that Cliffs Notes itself produced the parody,
but that small chance does not justify the injunction here.
See also Yankee Am. Publ'g, 809 F. Supp. at 281 ("the free speech interests
protected by the First Amendment here far outweigh Yankee's interest in
protecting its trademark from confusion that was unlikely to occur.").
434 See note 420 and accompanying text; see also Balducci, 28 F.3d at 774 ("no
significant steps were taken to remind readers that they were viewing a par-
ody and not an advertisement sponsored or approved by Anheuser-
Busch.").
435 Yankee Am. Publ'g, 809 F. Supp. at 281; see also Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 496
(defendant's work labelled "A Satire" five times on the front cover and four
on the back cover; "These measures should alert most consumers that Spy
Notes is, in fact, a parody.").
436 See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters., 924 F. Supp. at 1571 ("A circular red sticker on the
back disclaims any relationship between The Cat Not in the Hat and Dr.
Seuss."); Yonover, supra note 42, at 975 n.240 (noting that parody of best-
selling novel was stamped "unauthorized . . . a parody.").
437 See Yonover, supra note 42, at 993 (parody "thrives, perhaps, on its iconoclas-
tic and unpermitted status"; also noting "the zing that is the essence of par-
ody, the 'civil disobedience' of art," and "the transgressive quality of
parody.").
438 See notes 420-422 and accompaying text.
439 See Yankee Am. Publ'g, 809 F. Supp. at 281 ("There is no requirement that a
parody identify itself by a label stating 'a parody."').
440 924 F. Supp. at 1571.
441 Id.
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merits of its trademark claim.442 Nonetheless, the court enjoined sale of
the parody pending trial, on the grounds that the plaintiff had raised "seri-
ous questions providing a fair basis for litigation," and that "the balance of
hardships tips markedly in its favor."443 Although both the district court
and the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that the preliminary injunc-
tion constituted an unlawful prior restraint,4 " it has been persuasively ar-
gued elsewhere that the use of such a generous standard for preliminary
injunctions creates a serious risk of enjoining constitutionally protected
speech.445 The injunction cannot be justified on the grounds that it is con-
tent-neutral (it isn't)446 or that there are "reasonable alternative avenues
of communication" (there aren't);" 7 nor is it a reasonable "time, place
442 Id.; see also Balducci, 28 F.3d at 776 ("By using an obvious disclaimer,... [or]
altering the protected marks in a meaningful way, or doing some collection
of the above, [defendant] could have conveyed its message with substan-
tially less risk of consumer confusion.").
443 Id. at 1575.
444 Id. at 1574-75; 109 F.3d at 1403 n.11.
445 Lemley & Volokh, supra note 399 (manuscript at 62-69); see, e.g., Cliffs Notes,
Inc. v. Bantam Doublday Dell Publ'g Group, 718 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (preliminarily enjoining distribution of defendants' work based on
likelihood of success on the merits of plaintiff's trademark claim), rev'd, 886
F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding defendants' work to be non-infringing par-
ody protected by the First Amendment).
446 See, e.g, Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, 604 F.2d 200,
206 (2d Cir. 1979) ("The prohibition of the Lanham Act is content neutral
... and therefore does not arouse the fears that trigger the application of
constitutional 'prior restraint' principles."). Volokh and Lemley point out
that this is nonsense; both trademark and copyright prohibit the use of par-
ticular content, so they cannot be content-neutral. Lemley & Volokh, supra
note 399 (manuscript at 35 & 64). "These courts have apparently confused
viewpoint-neutrality with content-neutrality." Id. at 64; see Boos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312, 319 (1988) ("[A]lthough we agree the provision is not view-
point based . . . [that] does not render the statute content neutral.") (plural-
ity); id. at 1171 (Brennan, J., concurring) (agreeing that the statute is "a
content-based restriction").
447 See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 206; compare L.L. Bean,
Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 30-31 (1987) ("trademarks offer a
particularly powerful means of conjuring up the image of their owners and
thus become an important, perhaps indispensable, part of the public vocab-
ulary."); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308
(9th Cir. 1992) ("It is no more reasonably possible ... to refer to the New
Kids as an entity than it is to refer to the Chicago Bulls, Volkswagens or the
Boston Marathon without using the trademark."); White v. Samsung Elecs.
Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1512 n.6 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) (listing 23 uses of trademarks in songs,
books, movies and television). See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 397 (1990).
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and manner" restriction, since the injunction prevents any use of a red-
and-white stovepipe hat in the defendants' works, at any time or place." 8
As the Supreme Court has recognized, forbidding the use of particular
expression creates "a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the pro-
The "no alternative avenues" argument originated in a case rejecting the right
of war protesters to distribute leaflets on a shopping center owner's prop-
erty. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner. 407 U.S. 551, 566-67 (1972). Many authors
have pointed out that a restriction on the location of speech is merely a
time, place and manner restriction, and is quite different from a restriction
on the words that a speaker may use. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major
League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 971-72 (10th Cir. 1996); Rogers
v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998-99 (2d Cir. 1989); Robert C. Denicola, Trade-
marks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for
Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 158, 197; Shaughnessy,
supra note 412, at 1111-12.
448 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989) (holding that statute prohibiting
flag-burning was not a reasonable time, place or manner restriction); id. at
417 ("To conclude that the government may permit designated symbols to
be used to communicate only a limited set of messages would be to enter
territory having no discernable boundaries."); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S.
641, 648 (1984) ("In order to be constitutional, a time, place, and manner
regulation must . . . not be based upon either the content or subject matter
of speech.") (quotes omitted).
The strongest support for the notion that trademark law is a reasonable time,
place and manner restriction is San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987), in which the Supreme
Court held that a statute giving exclusive use of the word "Olympic" to the
USOC "restricts only the manner in which SFAA may convey its message."
Id. at 536. However, the majority emphasized that the statute "applies pri-
marily to commercial speech," and it refused to apply the overbreadth doc-
trine, saying "[t]here is no basis in the record to believe that the Act will be
interpreted or applied to infringe significantly on noncommercial speech
rights." Id. at 536 n.15. The court also noted that "[tihe possibility for con-
fusion as to sponsorship is obvious," id. at 539, even though it had ruled that
the statute did not require proof of confusion. Id. at 529-30. Finally, the
court cited with approval a case which allowed the use of the protected
Olympic symbols in a non-misleading and non-commercial manner. Id. at
536 n.14, citing Stop the Olympic Prison v. United States Olympic Comm.,
489 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); see also Lighthawk v. Robertson, 812 F.
Supp. 1095, 1099-1101 (W.D. Wash. 1993) (satirical, non-commercial use of
"Smokey Bear" protected by First Amendment; distinguishing San Fran-
cisco Arts & Athletics on these grounds). In overlooking these significant
qualifications in the majority opinion, the district court erred in applying
San Francisco Arts & Athletics to what it correctly acknowleged was non-
commercial speech. See Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (defining "commercial
speech" as "speech which does no more than propose a commercial transac-
tion."); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 399 (manuscript at 64-69)(trademark
law is constitutional only if the defendant's speech is commercial speech
and is in fact misleading).
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cess."449 While this risk is justified where necessary to serve a compelling
governmental interest,450 such as avoiding consumer confusion 4 51 or pro-
viding an economic incentive to create new works,452 it should not be im-
posed without a final determination that the work is infringing.453
In the absence of a likelihood of confusion, trademark owners have
turned to anti-dilution laws as a means of protecting their marks against
parody and satire.454 The dilution theory of trademark protection starts
from the proposition that a trademark is associated in the public's mind
with the quality of the goods and services provided by the trademark
owner.455 Permitting the use of the mark on other goods or services, even
if they are unrelated and non-competing, allows the public to associate
449 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (reversing conviction of petitioner
for wearing jacket reading "Fuck the Draft."); cf San Francisco Arts & Ath-
letics, 483 U.S. at 569 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("As Judge Kozinski ob-
served in dissent in the Court of Appeals, . . . a jacket reading 'I Strongly
Resent the Draft' would not have conveyed Cohen's message").
450 See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 118 (1991) (to justify a content-based restriction, "the State must show
that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.") (quotes and citation omitted).
451 See, e.g., Balducci, 28 F.3d at 776 (concluding that "the First Amendment
places no bar to the application of the Lanham Act in this case" because
"Balducci's ad parody was likely to confuse consumers as to its origin, spon-
sorship or approval."); L & L Wings, 962 F.2d at 322 ("The purpose of the
Lanham Act is to eliminate consumer confusion, not to banish all attempts
at poking fun or eliciting amusement.").
452 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (copyright clause); Harper & Row Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555-60 (1985) (holding that idealexpres-
sion dichotomy and fair use are sufficient to accommodate First Amend-
ment concerns).
453 Lemley & Volokh, supra note 399 (manuscript at 59) (concluding that prelimi-
nary injunctions are unconstitutional in copyright cases "[w]here the de-
fendant raises a credible argument worthy of trial that he didn't copy the
work, that he copied only the unprotectable elements, or that his copying
was protected by fair use."); id. at 62-69 (concluding that preliminary in-
junctions are unconstitutional in trademark cases when applied to non-mis-
leading, non-commercial speech).
454 See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 411, at § 24.13; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 411, at § 25; David S. Welkowitz, Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44
VAND. L. REV. 531, 550-58 (1991); Shaughnessy, supra note 412, at 1085-92,
and 1094-99.
455 See Shaughnessy, supra note 412, at 1086 ("For the trademark owner, the chief
value of the mark lies in its ability to associate favorable experiences or
impressions with the product to which it is attached, not simply in its capac-
ity to identify the source or sponsorship of that product. For the consumer,
the mark is valuable as an inexpensive and convenient source of informa-
tion about products - information the consumer could otherwise acquire
only through the expenditure of time and effort.") (footnotes omitted).
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another set of reputational images with the mark, thereby diminishing or
diluting the value of the mark to the senior user.4 5 6 Courts have recog-
nized two types of dilution: blurring, or the loss of distinctiveness that
may occur when a second party begins using the same mark;4 5 7 and
tarnishment, the association of the mark with goods or images that are
inappropriate or offensive, or at least inconsistent with the image pro-
moted by the senior user.45 8
While superficially appealing, neither of these rationales can with-
stand critical scrutiny in the context of a trademark parody.459 The blur-
ring rationale is inapposite, because the use of a trademark in a parody or
satire conjures up the images that are already associated with the mark,
and therefore reinforces, rather than dilutes, the mark's association with
the products of the senior user.460 To the extent that tarnishment depends
upon consumer confusion as to the source or sponsorship of the parody,
the plaintiff should have to prove that a likelihood of confusion exists
456 Shaughnessy, supra note 412, at 1086-87; see also Frank Schechter, The Ra-
tional Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927); Beverly
W. Pattishall, The Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protec-
tion, Its Progress and Prospects, 71 Nw. L. REV. 618 (1977); Posner, supra
note 142, at 75.
457 MCCARTHY, supra note 411, § 24.13[1][a][i]; RESTATEMENT, supra note 411,
§ 25(1)(a); Shaughnessy, supra note 412, at 1089; see, e.g, Hyatt Corp. v.
Hyatt Legal Servs., 736 F.2d 1153, 1157-58 (7th Cir. 1984).
458 MCCARTHY, supra note 411, § 24.13[1][a][ii]; RESTATEMENT, supra note 411,
§ 25(1)(b); Shaughnessy, supra note 412, at 1089-90; see L.L. Bean v. Drake
Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1987) ("The threat of tarnishment
arises when the goodwill and reputation of a plaintiffs trademark is linked
to products which are of shoddy quality or which conjure associations that
clash with the associations generated by the owner's lawful use of the
mark."); American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Lab. Corp., 10
U.S.P.Q.2d 2006 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (injunction against sale of imitation
American Express card containing a condom with the well-known slogan
"Don't Leave Home Without It").
459 See Shaughnessy, supra note 412, at 1094-99, 1105-07.
460 See, e.g., Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1489 ("parody tends to increase public identifi-
cation of a plaintiffs mark with the plaintiff."); Hormel, 73 F.3d at 506
(same); Denicola, supra note 447, at 188 ("the use of famous marks in paro-
dies causes no loss of distinctiveness, since the success of the use depends
upon the continued association of the mark with the plaintiff."); Yankee
Am. Publ'g, 809 F. Supp. at 282 (same).
If taken to its logical extreme, this rationale proves too much. All secondary
uses of a famous mark conjure up the images associated with that mark to
some extent. This suggests that courts are implicitly balancing the risk of
dilution against free speech concerns. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc.,
41 F.3d 39, 44 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Such uses risk some dilution of the identify-
ing or selling power of the mark, but that risk is generally tolerated in the
interest of maintaining broad opportunities for expression.").
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among consumers in the relevant market.4 61 If, on the other hand, it is
clear that consumers are not confused, then any harm to the plaintiff re-
sults solely from the effectiveness of the parody in persuading consumers
to view the plaintiff's carefully-crafted "image" in a more critical and less
ingenuous manner.462 For this reason, some courts have held that apply-
ing anti-dilution statutes to suppress parody violates the First
Amendment:
Trademark parodies, even when offensive, do convey a message.
The message may be simply that business and product images
need not always be taken too seriously; a trademark parody re-
minds us that we are free to laugh at the images and associations
linked with the mark. The message also may be a simple form of
entertainment conveyed by juxtaposing the irreverent represen-
tation of the trademark with the idealized image created by the
mark's owner. . . . While such a message lacks explicit political
content, that is no reason to afford it less protection under the
first amendment. Denying parodists the opportunity to poke fun
at symbols and names that have become woven into the fabric of
461 See Welkowitz, supra note 454, at 545 ("Assuming that the associational values
of the second user differ from the original mark, the confusing second use
may alter consumer perceptions of and reactions to the mark.") (emphasis
added); id. at 580 (asserting the "probable nonexistence of a definable state
of dilution separate from confusion" and suggesting that "courts view dilu-
tion as related closely to confusion, using something like a 'possibility of
confusion' test.").
Even proponents of dilution as a separate theory acknowledge that "[f]or dilu-
tion to occur, the relevant public must make some connection between the
senior user's mark and the junior user's unauthorized usage of it." MCCAR-
THY, supra note 411, §24.13[1][b] at 24-107 (emphasis added); see also id. at
24-109 ("the dilution theory presumes some kind of mental association in
the reasonable buyer's mind between the two parties' uses of the mark.")
(emphasis in original). Dilution therefore could be conceived as merely
shifting the burden of proof on the issue of confusion where the plaintiff's
mark is unusually strong. See Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The
Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 789, 846-47 (1997) ("Dilution law thus creates no new rights in truly
famous marks, but simply relieves the senior users of such marks from hav-
ing to make a confusion showing."); cf RESTATEMENT, supra note 411, at
§25(1) (dilution statutes may impose liability "without proof of a likelihood
of confusion") (emphasis added). To date, however, neither legislatures nor
courts have recognized the absence of confusion as a defense to anti-dilu-
tion statutes.
462 See Shaughessy, supra note 412, at 1113 ("A trademark parody dilutes its tar-
get only by adding a humorous picture of the mark to the collection of
images the owner has created for it.").
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our daily life would constitute a serious curtailment of a pro-
tected form of expression."63
Likewise, the Restatement of Unfair Competition excludes from the defini-
tion of dilution the unauthorized use of a mark "to comment on, ridicule,
parody, or disparage the [owner's] goods, services, business or mark."464
The district court's opinion in the Dr. Seuss case suggests that the
court was concerned with the possibility of dilution by tarnishment.465
Despite this language, however, the court held that the defendant's parody
was exempt from liability under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.466
The Act expressly provides that "noncommercial use of a mark" is not
actionable.467 The Act does not define "noncommercial,"4 68 but the dis-
trict court noted that when the bill was introduced, Senator Hatch stated
that the exception would include "parody, satire, editorial and other forms
463 L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1987); see
also MCCARTHY, supra note 411, §24.16[2] at 24-134 ("Tarnishment caused
merely by an editorial or artistic parody which satirizes plaintiffs product or
its image is not actionable under an anti-dilution statute because of the free
speech protections of the First Amendment."); Posner, supra note 142, at 75
("it can be argued that creators of intellectual property should not be al-
lowed to control the public image of their property by forbidding others to
suggest variant images of it."); Klieger, supra note 461, at 830. ("Unless
senior users of a mark have an absolute right to control the mark and its
associations, tarnishment without resulting consumer confusion should not
be actionable.")
464 RESTATEMENT, supra note 411, at § 25(2); see also id., comment i:
The expression of an idea by means of the use of another's trademark in a
parody, for example, will often lie within the substantial constitutional
protection accorded noncommercial speech and may thus be the subject
of liability only in the most narrow circumstances. Although such non-
trademark uses of another's mark may undermine the reputation and
value of the mark, they should not be actionable under the law of
trademarks.
The Restatement recommends that the law of defamation or trade dispar-
agement, with its explicit constitutional limitations, be utilized instead of
trademark dilution. Id., comment i. For a discussion of these constitutional
limitations, see note 475 and accompanying text.
465 The district court stated that "[t]he works of Dr. Seuss are associated with
genuine wit, inventiveness, and wholesomeness," whereas the defendants'
work "deals in macabre humor about an infamous and gruesome double
murder." 924 F. Supp. at 1574 (emphasis added).
466 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1994). See generally David S. Welkowitz, Oh Deere,
What's To Become of Dilution? (A Commentary on the New Federal Trade-
mark Dilution Act), 4 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 1 (1996).
467 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B) (1994).
468 Cf Welkowitz, Oh Deere, supra note 466 at 24 (noting that "drawing the line
between 'noncommercial' and 'commercial' may prove to be a more elusive
task than the drafters of the law anticipate.").
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of expression that are not part of a commercial transaction." 4 6 9 The dis-
trict court interpreted this statement to incorporate by reference the
Supreme Court's definition of commercial speech as "speech which does
no more than propose a commercial transaction," 470 and suggested that
such a limitation was required by the First Amendment.471 The plaintiff
did not appeal this ruling to the Ninth Circuit.
The district court's ruling is consistent with the limitations that have
been placed on copyright and trademark actions in order to accommodate
First Amendment concerns. According to Campbell, copyright law is con-
cerned only with economic competition with the plaintiff's work, not with
reputational injury.472 Likewise, trademark law exists "to eliminate con-
sumer confusion, not to banish all attempts at poking fun or eliciting
amusement." 473 It would be inconsistent with our nation's commitment to
free expression to allow these limitations to be circumvented through the
uncritical application of dilution theory.474 Given the sensitivity of this
ruling to First Amendment concerns, it is a shame that both the district
court and the Ninth Circuit permitted their concerns about possible
tarnishment to color their opinions on the merits of the copyright and
trademark claims.475 If courts are concerned about the risk of tarnishment
or harm to the plaintiff's reputation, they should look instead to the law of
trade libel or product disparagement, which reflects First Amendment
concerns by requiring a showing that the defendant made a false statement
469 924 F. Supp. at 1574, quoting 141 CONG. REC. S19310 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Hatch).
470 Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 762 (1976), cited in, Dr. Seuss, 924 F. Supp. at 1574.
471 924 F. Supp. at 1574 ("The Court therefore holds that the First Amendment
would apply to this use of the trademarks at issue"); see also notes 444-453
and accompanying text (arguing that trademark law can constitutionally be
applied only to misleading commercial speech).
472 See note 373 and accompanying text.
473 Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 322 (4th Cir. 1992).
474 See Shaughnessy, supra note 412, at 1115-16 (concluding that dilution unac-
companied by likelihood of confusion or trade disparagement conflicts with
the First Amendment); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 399 (manuscript at 67
n.251) ("It is worth noting that the argument that false or misleading speech
is unprotected, the one most commonly used to defend trademark laws
against First Amendment attack, offers no support whatever for dilution
statutes such as 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c).").
475 924 F. Supp. at 1574 (finding irreparable injury based on the "genuine wit,
inventiveness and wholesomeness" of the original work, compared to the
"macabre humor" of the parody); 109 F.2d at 1403 (noting that "[tihe good
will and reputation associated with Dr. Seuss' work is subsantial" in evalu-
ating the fourth fair use factor); id. at 1406 (finding harm to the "good will
and reputation associated with The Cat in the Hat character and title, the
name 'Dr. Seuss,' and the Cat's Hat").
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of fact with knowledge that it was false or in reckless disregard as to
whether or not it was false. 4 7 6 At the very least, courts should require a
strong showing of likelihood of confusion before enjoining noncommercial
speech under trademark law.477
VI. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Dr. Seuss Enterprises is riddled with
errors of law and is unreasonably hostile to parody and satire as important
forms of entertainment and social criticism. Unfortunately, because the
opinion was the first Court of Appeals decision to apply the Supreme
Court's decision in Campbell to a copyright case involving parody, other
courts may look to the Dr. Seuss opinion for guidance. Those courts
should reject the Dr. Seuss opinion and should instead give parodists and
satirists the freedom to borrow small amounts of copyrighted works in
forging their own original creations. The Ninth Circuit also should seize
the earliest possible opportunity to overturn the Dr. Seuss opinion and to
conform its approach to parody cases to the more generous standards of
the Supreme Court.
476 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 623A (elements of "injurious false-
hood" include intent to cause injury and either knowledge of falsity or reck-
lessness); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 508 F.
Supp. 1249, 1270-71 (D. Mass. 1981) (holding that "actual malice" standard
of New York Times v. Sullivan applies to trade libel), rev'd on other
grounds, 692 F.2d 189, 194 (1st Cir. 1982) (plaintiff conceded that actual
malice standard applies), affd, 466 U.S. 485, 513 (1984) (assuming for pur-
poses of decision that "actual malice" standard applied); Flotech, Inc v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 814 F.2d 775, 777 n.1 (1V Cir. 1987) (actual
malice standard applies); National Life Ins. Co. v. Phillips Publ'g, Inc., 793
F. Supp. 627, 640-48 (D. Md. 1992) (rejecting contrary argument based on
U.S. Healthcare); but see U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 898 F.2d 914,
927-39 (3d Cir. 1990) ("actual malice" standard does not apply in context of
commercial speech).
477 See notes 444-453 and accompanying text.
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